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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that the British Industrial Revolution, which marked the beginning of sustained 
modern economic growth, was facilitated by the blossoming in eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
Britain of the world’s first infrastructure for commercial R&D, composed of a network of ‘Knowledge 
Access Institutions’ (KAIs): scientific societies, ‘mechanics institutes’, public libraries, masonic lodges 
and other organisations. This infrastructure lowered the cost of access to knowledge for scientists, 
inventors and entrepreneurs, raising the productivity of R&D and encouraging a sustained increase in 
R&D effort. This contributed to the acceleration in technological innovation that lay behind the 
transition to modern economic growth. First, I define the concept of KAIs and explain how they affected 
the rate of economic growth. Second, I present detailed data on the KAI infrastructure and estimate its 
effect on the rate of technological innovation during the British Industrial Revolution, using newly 
constructed spatial datasets on British patents between 1700 and 1852 and exhibits at the Great 
Exhibition of 1851. Third, I argue that KAIs were largely exogenous to industrialisation, rooted instead 
in the intellectual developments of the Scientific Revolution and European Enlightenment. Fourth, I 
show that the prevalence of Knowledge Access Institutions was correlated with the emergence of 
modern economic growth across countries in the late nineteenth century and that the cost of access to 
knowledge was a binding constraint to economic progress shared by many countries during this period. 
Finally, based on the case of late nineteenth century US manufacturing, I investigate the extent to which 
the emergence of modern economic growth depended on the incentives to innovate rather than the 
capabilities lent by access to knowledge and other factors. The thesis suggests that the sharp fall in the 
cost of access to knowledge that we are currently experiencing may give rise to an acceleration in the 
rate of technological innovation in the coming decades and that policymakers should direct some effort 
towards mitigating the potentially harmful effects of rapid technological change. 
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Introduction 
 
Access to Knowledge and the British Industrial Revolution 
 
The British Industrial Revolution marked the beginning of the age of sustained modern 
economic growth and an end to the fits and starts of economic progress that had characterised 
previous eras. The result has been an improvement in living standards in much of the world 
that would have been all but unimaginable to our forefathers. Deidre McCloskey summarises 
the contrast in income levels before and after the British Industrial Revolution. Since time 
immemorial until around 1800, world income per capita fluctuated between about one and five 
US dollars a day1. Since 1800, however, world income per capita has exploded to about sixty 
dollars a day and to well over one hundred dollars a day in the most advanced economies 
(McCloskey 2010). Moreover, these figures are likely to significantly under-represent the 
improvement in the standard of living.2 The coinciding acceleration in the growth of the variety 
and quality of the goods and services available to us means that the ratio of consumer surplus 
to measured output and income is likely to have increased markedly. Furthermore, the 
additional welfare gains achieved during the past century through improvements in health and 
longevity appear to be of a similar magnitude to those from higher incomes (Murphy & Topel 
2006). In truth, we are immeasurably better off than our forefathers.  
 
We are better off than them because we know more than they did. And the knowledge 
that counts is embodied in the technology – the machines, materials and medicines – to which 
we have access. Prior to the British Industrial Revolution, the rate of invention and adoption of 
new technology was slow and sporadic, but since has been rapid and sustained. What happened 
in Britain during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that gave rise to this turn in 
human history?  
 
Were eighteenth century British inventors and other technological innovators uniquely 
capable of accomplishing a technological revolution? Or were they instead particularly well 
incentivised by economic circumstances, such as high British wages and cheap energy, which 
may have encouraged the replacement of manpower with machinery (Allen 2009,Wrigley 
                                                          
1 in 2005 dollars. 
2 as McCloskey acknowledges (McCloskey 2010) 
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2010), or favourable access to foreign input and consumer markets owing to colonialism 
(Pomeranz 2000)? 
  
This is an important question, not just because of the historical significance of the 
British Industrial Revolution as a turning point in living standards. Rather, a thorough 
understanding of the British Industrial Revolution might provide useful lessons from which to 
draw for the management of economies today. Two and a half centuries since the British 
Industrial Revolution began, a significant proportion of the world’s population remains no 
better off than the average Briton was in the mid-eighteenth century. Clearly, any successful 
escape from poverty in the interim might still provide us with useful insights for development 
(Temin 2014).  
 
Furthermore, the prospects for technological innovation in rich countries today are 
contentious. Robert Gordon has argued that the world technological frontier faces numerous 
headwinds during the coming decades that might reduce the trend rate of economic growth to 
its slowest pace since the eve of the British Industrial Revolution itself (Gordon 2016). If this 
warning is correct then we urgently need to know which headwinds we most need to counter, 
and to be aware of any tailwinds that we can influence too. If human and social capabilities 
ushered in the age of modern economic growth in eighteenth century Britain, then we should 
commit resources to their modern analogues today where they are found wanting, in rich and 
poor countries alike. On the other hand, if the incentive to innovate was decisive then we need 
to ensure that this incentive, as fostered by institutions and policies, is alive and well today.  
 
 In the debate concerning the causes of the British Industrial Revolution, human and 
social capability-based arguments have been somewhat played down3. This is partly because 
the basic measures of human capital upon which economists tend to focus, such as literacy and 
schooling, do not paint eighteenth century Britain in an exceptional light (Mitch 1999). Indeed, 
the relationship between human capital and economic growth during the British Industrial 
Revolution appears to have been quite unusual in the context of the overall two hundred and 
fifty-year record of modern economic growth since (Becker, Hornung & Woessmann 2011). 
In the global cross-section of countries and sub-regions today, the level of economic 
development so far achieved is strongly correlated with the current level of human capital in 
                                                          
3 See Temin (2014) who draws development lessons based on the British Industrial Revolution. 
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the workforce, as measured by average years of schooling (Gennaioli et al. 2013). Yet, as Joel 
Mokyr has put it, “Much of the ingenuity of engineers and inventors of the British Industrial 
Revolution was devoted to reducing the need of workers to be educated and skilled” (Mokyr 
2006).  
 
As such, Mokyr has spearheaded a research agenda that focuses on more nuanced 
concepts of human capital and other social capabilities that are intended to capture the 
knowledge, skills and societal characteristics that determined the supply of technological 
innovation during the British Industrial Revolution (Mokyr 2002, 2005, 2009, Meisenzahl & 
Mokyr 2012, Kelly, Mokyr & O’Grada 2014). In this spirit, this thesis argues in favour of 
Britain’s capabilities as a proximate cause of the British Industrial Revolution.  
 
Knowledge Access Institutions and the British Industrial Revolution 
 
Nicholas Crafts’ estimates of the quantitative dimensions of the British Industrial Revolution 
provide us with two important clues as to its underlying causes. First, Britain’s transition to 
modern economic growth was gradual. Second, the rate of growth achieved at the apex of the 
British Industrial Revolution was slow compared to the rate achieved at the technological 
frontier during the twentieth century (Crafts 1995, 1996). In the light of these facts, this thesis 
argues that the blossoming in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain of the world’s 
first substantial infrastructure for research and development (R&D) has an important role to 
play in explaining the British Industrial Revolution. 
  
This infrastructure was composed of a system of ‘Knowledge Access Institutions’ 
(KAIs) – learned societies, ‘mechanics institutes’, masonic lodges and public libraries, among 
other organisations – which over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
steadily reduced the cost of access to useful knowledge for the natural philosophers, inventors 
and technological entrepreneurs engaged in the process of technological innovation. In so 
doing, KAIs gradually raised the productivity of R&D in the British economy, which in turn 
also raised the equilibrium supply of R&D effort. These two effects contributed to the gradual 
acceleration in economic growth that characterised the British Industrial Revolution. 
 
How did KAIs reduce the cost of access to knowledge? There were two main 
mechanisms. First, through their impact on the culture within eighteenth century British 
Introduction 
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industry they encouraged and facilitated the application of the scientific method, the norms of 
science and even a little bit of scientific knowledge itself to the R&D process in the British 
economy (Musson & Robinson 1968, Jacob 1997, 2014, Mokyr 2002, Jacob and Stewart 2004). 
This resulted in the acceleration of the growth of the knowledge base upon which society could 
collectively draw to invent new technology (Mokyr 2002). Second, given this knowledge base, 
KAIs, as a networked system spanning the country and connected to similar scientific 
institutions abroad, reduced the cost to inventors and technological entrepreneurs of searching 
for knowledge within the scientific and technological community4. Furthermore, by 
underpinning a connected community of science, technology and entrepreneurship, KAIs 
raised the level of social capital within the innovation process, aiding the commercialisation of 
knowledge5. 
 
To take a celebrated example, the famous Lunar Society in Birmingham facilitated the 
transmission of knowledge and cemented the personal relationships that enabled James Watt 
to commercialise his ideas for the improved efficiency of steam engines (Schofield 1963). 
What has not been fully appreciated, however, is that as the British Industrial Revolution 
progressed, each successive generation of inventors following in Watt’s footsteps and their 
business collaborators operated within a richer institutional infrastructure and associated 
culture for innovation than the generation before, providing better access to specialised 
knowledge and contacts. This raised the productivity of innovators and, in turn, greater 
encouraged their efforts.  
 
Nevertheless, Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century KAIs were quite basic 
relative to the innovation systems that were established in advanced economies during the 
twentieth century. When countries adopted large-scale corporate R&D departments, research 
universities and government research bodies6 – which enabled a much finer division of labour 
in the search for knowledge, a wider set of solutions to profit-appropriation problems and much 
greater capacity to finance research – they experienced faster rates of economic growth than 
Britain did during the Industrial Revolution. Thus, while Britain’s KAIs can help explain the 
emergence of modern economic growth, their shortcomings can also help explain why growth 
                                                          
4 See Jackson (2010) for a textbook treatment of the effects of networks on economic activity, including 
communication costs and the diffusion of information. 
5 See, for example, Dasgupta (2005) for an introduction to the economics of social capital. 
6 See Nelson (1993) for an overview of the components of the ‘national innovation system’.  
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during British Industrial Revolution remained moderate by twentieth century standards. The 
frontier of economic growth in the nineteenth century advanced at an intermediate pace relative 
to the two eras that it divided. This is because the engine that powered it was the prototype. 
   
Why Britain Built its Knowledge Access Institutions: The ‘Enlightenment Subsidy’ 
 
Who built Britain’s Knowledge Access Institutions and why? Were KAIs simply a response to 
the British Industrial Revolution? As such, would it be incorrect to describe them as a causal 
factor in modern economic growth, as opposed to merely a feature? Indeed, the view that the 
organisations that composed Britain’s KAIs were entirely endogenous to the British Industrial 
Revolution has a rich lineage, dating back, at least, to Marx and Engels (Engels 1895). 
Nevertheless, I argue against this view on two grounds. First, it is difficult to privately 
appropriate the social returns to innovation, even when the prevailing legal system protecting 
intellectual property operates predictably and efficiently and forms of industrial organisation 
that facilitate the appropriation of returns are feasible. As such, markets tend to do a poor job 
of incentivising innovative effort, even at the best of times. During the British Industrial 
Revolution, however, the patent system offered only very expensive and unreliable protection 
to private inventors (MacLeod 1988) and the large scale ‘modern industrial enterprise’, which 
would later facilitate the private appropriation of the returns to technological innovation, was 
yet to appear (Chandler 1990). As such, it proves difficult to attribute British technological 
innovation during the Industrial Revolution to endogenous factors alone (Crafts 1995). As 
KAIs were complements to innovative effort, it follows that it is also difficult to attribute their 
growth to endogenous demand generated by the Industrial Revolution. 
 
 Second, as testimony to the shortcomings of the market, the rapid technological 
progress within the frontier economies since World War II has been achieved with a great deal 
of help from government subsidies (Mazzucatto 2011). During the British Industrial 
Revolution, however, the government provided very little subsidy to innovation, which 
presents us with a puzzle: since Britain built its KAIs without the help of the state, how did it 
solve the problem of the ‘tragedy of the knowledge commons’? The basic answer is that 
Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century KAIs were predominantly financed by private 
membership subscriptions and donations. But what was it about eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Britain that made hundreds of thousands of individuals feel that these subscriptions 
Introduction 
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were worth paying when no such revealed preference for the services of KAIs had existed in 
earlier eras, nor existed in most of Britain’s contemporaries? 
 
The answer to this deeper question is that there were many non-profit related motives 
in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain to engage with science and pay KAI 
subscriptions, which were associated with the ideology and tastes of a society ‘electrified’ by 
the European Enlightenment. During the Enlightenment, science acted as the object of 
Baconian ideology concerning the promotion of the public good, a form of entertainment, a 
social status symbol, a political pawn and religious inspiration. The demand for science created 
by these ideological and cultural utilities made a career in science pay and KAIs viable in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain. While technological innovation during the twentieth 
century was subsidised by the government, during the British Industrial Revolution it was 
subsidised by the European Enlightenment. 
 
That said, however, the proliferation of KAIs during the British Industrial Revolution 
was not due to the Enlightenment alone. KAIs spread because they worked. Physical phase 
transitions between solids, liquids and gases depend on positive feedback mechanisms 
operating through the interdependent energy levels of molecules. Similarly, the transition from 
economic stagnation to sustained economic growth during the British Industrial Revolution 
represented a persistent shift in the state of the economy that is difficult to comprehend without 
appealing to analogous positive feedback mechanisms. There are various channels through 
which positive feedback may have operated, such as the cumulative nature of technological 
breakthroughs (Mokyr 1990) or the growing incentive to invest in human capital as technology 
became more advanced (Galor & Moav 2004). But another channel may have been the growth 
of the R&D infrastructure given its interaction with the level of R&D carried out in the 
economy. KAIs raised the productivity of R&D and as such the amount of R&D undertaken. 
This in turn raised the economic return to the R&D infrastructure, making its further 
development profitable, which raised the equilibrium rate of technological innovation further 
still – and so on into the twentieth century, with the introduction of more capital intensive and 
effective institutions. Such endogeneity within the economic system is sometimes treated by 
economists as a problem to be overcome in the search for empirical identification. However, 
in the case of the emergence of modern economic growth it may be central to the answer.    
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Knowledge Access and the Rise of Modern Economic Growth in a Global Context 
 
The claim that KAIs facilitated the British Industrial Revolution clearly raises some important 
associated questions. I aim to address two of the most important of these in the thesis, the first 
being whether KAIs can help explain the pattern of the emergence of modern economic growth 
beyond the British case. Certainly, there were KAIs in other countries in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and it is possible that they influenced technological innovation there too. 
Indeed, the countries with significant KAIs infrastructures by the late nineteenth century had 
generally become members of the ‘convergence club’ of fast growing economies by 1913, 
while those without KAIs generally had not experienced modern economic growth by then.7 
 
Beyond this basic correlation, however, it is difficult to dig deeper into the relationship 
between KAIs and the international patterns of the emergence of modern economic growth 
without doing detailed comparative work. For example, an obvious question to ask is whether 
Britain assumed industrial leadership in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century because it 
had more or better KAIs. To answer this question, one would need to assemble an aggregate 
database of KAIs in comparator countries, but also ask whether Britain’s KAIs were different 
from these in any decisive way. French KAIs were funded and operated by the state rather than 
by private individuals (Gillespie 1980). Did this affect their efficacy in facilitating modern 
economic growth? Did the eighteenth century French state tend to direct R&D effort towards 
sectors and projects that were less impactful on economic growth? Did the state stand in the 
way of the commercialisation of technology? Or, rather, did privileges awarded by the French 
government perhaps offer a better appropriation mechanism than the English patent system and 
the free market?  
 
The comparative work necessary to tackle these questions is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, the thesis does attempt to shed some light indirectly on the cross-country 
relationship between KAIs and modern economic growth. Since KAIs affected technological 
innovation by reducing knowledge access costs, examining the sensitivity of technological 
innovation to national knowledge access costs per se as modern economic growth spread 
                                                          
7 See chapter 6, which provides an international count of publishing KAIs, based on catalogue of scientific 
publications by Scudder (1877). 
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internationally during the late nineteenth century, might tell us whether KAIs were operating 
upon an active global constraint to modern economic growth.   
 
Exploiting variation in knowledge access costs during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries due to the global railway transportation revolution suggests that national 
rates of technological innovation were indeed sensitive to national knowledge access costs 
during this era. In the three decades before the First World War, the countries in which rail 
networks were expanded the most experienced faster growth in rates of patenting, a proxy for 
technological innovation. Moreover, patenting rates were sensitive to the growth of rail 
passenger volumes not just the growth of rail freight volumes, suggesting that this effect 
appears to have operated through the reduction of knowledge access costs, as distinct from the 
improvement in market access to which the rail revolution also gave rise. Furthermore, 
evidence based on rail and patenting by US states during the decades of the nineteenth century 
US railway revolution shows that rail raised not only patenting rates but also patent quality. As 
I explain in the thesis, there are good reasons to believe that this effect on patent quality was 
due to better knowledge access, as opposed to better market access. As such, the basic cross-
country correlation between KAIs and membership of the convergence club may have had a 
causal dimension.  
 
Weighing Capabilities against Incentives 
 
Finally, as economic outcomes are always determined by the interaction of both supply and 
demand, the supply-side capabilities for innovation during the British Industrial Revolution, 
such as those gained due to the KAI infrastructure, should be considered alongside the demand-
side incentives. The most prominent argument for incentives as the cause of the British 
Industrial Revolution is Robert Allen’s focus on Britain’s high wages and low capital and 
energy costs, which Allen claims incentivised a self-sustaining cycle of labour-saving 
technological innovation (Allen 2009). This thesis attempts to measure the importance of 
Allen’s incentives to the emergence of modern economic growth and, as such, to speak to the 
appropriate balance of emphasis between capabilities and incentives.  
 
To do so, I investigate county-level data on US manufacturing during the late nineteenth 
century, the period of the American transition to modern economic growth. Because both 
eighteenth century Britain and nineteenth century America had high wages and cheap energy, 
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which in both cases may have incentivised labour saving technological change, Allen has 
described the British Industrial Revolution as the ‘prequel’ to the later American case. While 
they were distinct events, and no amount of evidence on the American case can speak directly 
to the British case, the rich data available on the late nineteenth century US manufacturing 
sector at least enables one to thoroughly test Allen’s mechanism while retaining the context of 
an early experience of the transition to modern economic growth (Abramovitz & David 2001). 
Was technological change in the late nineteenth century US labour saving? Did rising unit 
labour costs in US counties prompt faster accumulation of capital per worker? Did higher 
capital-labour ratios in US counties result in faster rates of labour productivity growth via 
learning by doing? Was innovative effort sensitive to profitability? On each of these questions, 
the data provides evidence in favour of Allen’s claims, suggesting a substantive influence of 
incentives on the emergence of modern economic growth. Nevertheless, it also shows that 
incentives alone cannot plausibly account for the emergence of modern economic growth, 
leaving room for capabilities.  
 
Implications of the Argument 
  
This is an optimistic thesis because it suggests that Robert Gordon’s prediction of the imminent 
end of modern economic growth may be significantly exaggerated. Gordon describes several 
headwinds currently facing economic growth but the main findings of the thesis suggest that 
he is ignoring an important tailwind. If falling knowledge access costs ushered in the age of 
innovation during the British Industrial Revolution, then the further sharp reduction currently 
taking place due to declining computing and communication costs is likely to speed up 
technological innovation in the decades ahead. Moreover, the broadening application of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning to sectors such as medicine, transportation and 
manufacturing appear likely to have a significantly positive effect on productivity.    
 
Yet, although Gordon may have overestimated the likelihood of technological 
stagnation in the coming decades, we must also consider a competing dystopia. Technological 
change is always a mixed blessing, exposing us to both economic and psychological gains and 
losses. We cannot take it for granted that accelerating technological innovation and 
productivity growth will give rise to higher average living standards within a reasonable time 
frame, nor that the transitional costs to society of adopting new technologies will be 
comfortably low. We already face challenges related to the current vintage of technological 
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progress in the form of technological unemployment (Brynjolsson & McAfee 2011), the rising 
concentration of national income (Piketty 2013), negative effects of the use of computers on 
mental health (Bauman & Rivers 2015), the increased capabilities of terrorists (Bouchard 2015) 
and the risks that artificial intelligence poses to human safety (Bostrom 2014). If technological 
progress accelerates in the years and decades ahead, these problems could become more acute. 
These risks seem large and plausible enough to warrant effort by governments to take measures 
now to mitigate excessive damage before the underlying problems become larger and more 
difficult to address.     
 
 
Thesis Approach and Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis argues that Knowledge Access Institutions facilitated the British Industrial 
Revolution. The approach taken is to specify the relevant questions in testable form, using 
theoretical models where necessary, and to build new datasets to help answer them. 
 
As discussed below, there is an existing literature of case studies and prosopography of 
the organisations that composed the KAI infrastructure, which has produced a significant 
amount of insight into their role during the British Industrial Revolution (Musson & Robinson 
1968, Schofield 1963, Inkster 1991, 1998, Jacob 1997, 2014, Jacob and Stewart 2004, Mokyr 
2002, 2005). The aim of this thesis is not to add to this research by producing more case studies, 
but rather, to provide an alternative type of analysis based on formal economic modelling and 
statistical identification. The main reason for doing this is to address the main critique made of 
the existing case study-based literature: that the evidence brought to bear so far is not falsifiable 
in nature (Crafts 2011, Allen 2011). As such, the thesis aims to move the debate beyond this 
obstacle.    
 
The approach to statistical identification taken relies on the spatial and temporal 
relationships between variables within Britain during the Industrial Revolution. So far, this 
approach has arguably been under-utilised in the study of the British Industrial Revolution8. 
As such, it is hoped that the creation of new within-Britain spatial and panel databases on 
                                                          
8 Although two important recent exceptions to this are Crafts & Wolf (2014) and Kelly, Mokyr & O’Grada 
(2014) 
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technological innovation and its potential determinants (along with some datasets related to the 
onset of modern economic growth in nineteenth century America) is a useful contribution to 
the study of the British Industrial Revolution and provides a foundation for more work along 
these lines.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 1 provides a summary of the current debate on the relative importance of British 
supply-side capabilities and demand-side incentives to the British Industrial Revolution. It 
focuses mainly on the recent arguments made by Joel Mokyr – in favour of the supply side – 
and Robert Allen – in favour of the demand side – in their respective books, both published in 
2009, and on the analytical joint review of the two books by Nicholas Crafts (2011).  
 
In chapter 2, I make the central argument of the thesis: that Knowledge Access 
Institutions facilitated technological innovation during the British Industrial Revolution. First, 
I discuss the key quantitative dimensions of the British Industrial Revolution established by 
Crafts (2014), to which any explanation for the British Industrial Revolution must relate. 
Second, I define the concept of KAIs and introduce the data collected for the thesis on the 
landscape of British KAIs during British Industrial Revolution. Third, I explain how KAIs 
affected technological innovation through a general equilibrium analysis and then from a 
microeconomic perspective drawing on findings in management science and network theory. I 
argue that KAIs raised the productivity and supply of R&D in the British economy and that 
they can help explain the fundamental quantitative dimensions of the British Industrial 
Revolution set out by Crafts. 
 
In chapter 3, I present empirical evidence of the effect of KAIs on technological 
innovation during the British Industrial Revolution. The empirical strategy employed is based 
on the idea that KAIs would have had a greater impact on innovation in their locale than further 
away. I construct panel datasets on proxies for technological innovation, and test using 
econometric methods whether the spatial and temporal patterns of technological innovation 
during the British Industrial Revolution can be explained by KAIs. These original datasets 
comprise a panel dataset of all patents registered in England by British patentees prior to 1852, 
including details of patentee name, residence, occupation, description of patent, industrial 
sector and a quality index based on a reference index; a spatial dataset of all of the British 
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exhibits at the Great Exhibition of 1851, including details of residence of exhibitor, industry 
sector and whether each exhibit won a prize at the exhibition or not; and a panel dataset of all 
US agricultural patents filed prior to 1873. Estimates based on these datasets find consistent 
evidence of a significant effect of KAIs on technological innovation. 
 
 In chapter 4, I argue that KAIs were not fundamentally endogenous to the Industrial 
Revolution, but rather a product of the European Enlightenment. First, I illustrate in the context 
of the Romer-Mokyr model of chapter 2 why endogenous innovation is difficult to achieve and 
why purely endogenous innovation, and hence endogenous KAIs, during the British Industrial 
Revolution seems implausible. Second, I argue that KAIs were funded by an exogenous 
‘Enlightenment subsidy’, based on the non-profit utilities of KAIs associated with the cultural 
and ideological preferences of the European Enlightenment. I describe the individual sources 
of this subsidy by surveying the literatures on the history of eighteenth century science, religion 
and culture. I provide falsifiable empirical evidence of the Enlightenment subsidy by analysing 
the spatial links between late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Rational Dissent and 
the eighteenth-century adoption of KAIs. I exploit exogenous variation in the spatial 
distribution of Rational Dissent across England due to Charles II’s ‘Five Mile Act’ of 1665, 
which banned Rational Dissent in certain parts of the country. 
 
In chapter 5, I explore the possible influence of KAIs on the emergence of modern 
economic growth beyond the British case in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I 
present a simple positive cross-country correlation between KAIs and economic growth during 
this period. Then, I carry out an analysis of the sensitivity of national and US state-level rates 
of technological innovation to the cost of access to knowledge in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, based on variation in knowledge access costs due to the expansion of 
national and state-level railway systems. I construct datasets on national patenting rates and 
railways between 1883 and 1913 and US state-level patents and railways between 1840 and 
1890. To distinguish between the knowledge access and market access effects of rail on 
innovation at the national level, I measure the respective effects of passenger and freight 
volumes as proxies, and at the US state-level I use patent citation data to investigate the link 
between rail and patent quality, arguing that patent quality is likely to be affected by knowledge 
access but not market access.  I show that technological innovation was sensitive to knowledge 
access costs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and argue that this implies that 
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KAIs were operating upon an active constraint to modern economic growth in numerous 
countries during this period. 
 
In chapter 6, I investigate the influence of demand-side incentives as opposed to supply-
side capabilities on the emergence of modern economic growth in the case of the late nineteenth 
century US manufacturing sector. Noting that Bob Allen’s argument for the British Industrial 
Revolution also applies to the late nineteenth century US case, I specify four empirical 
implications of Allen’s argument and test their validity using a county-decade panel dataset 
based on the nineteenth century US manufacturing censuses between 1870 and 1900. I find 
support for Allen’s argument that technological change during the emergence of modern 
economic growth was labour saving and that capital deepening was sensitive to the cost of 
labour relative to capital and subsequently gave rise to an elevated rate of learning by doing. I 
also find support for the basic claim central to Allen’s argument that innovative effort was 
sensitive to prospective returns. Nevertheless, Allen’s demand-side incentives cannot explain 
the full force of the emergence of modern economic growth in US manufacturing, leaving room 
for the influence of supply-side capabilities. 
 
The table below summarises the datasets constructed for the thesis. The collection of 
new data was a major part of the overall project and took a number of years to complete. I have 
digitised data from archival, library and online sources and geocoded them to produce original 
spatial datasets. These are the basis for the illustration of the KAI system, the empirical 
identification of KAIs as a cause of the British Industrial Revolution, and the investigation of 
related questions.  
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Table I.1: Summary of Databases Constructed and Used 
 
Datasets constructed by the author 
 
Source 
British Core Knowledge Access Institutions 
1700-1851  panel, by census registration district, 
hundred & county 
Various, see appendix to chapter 3 
British ‘Core’ Knowledge Access Institutions 
1851 cross section. Fields: membership, books, 
lectures, fees, by census registration district  
1851 education censuses of England, Wales and Scotland, BPP 
British ‘Peripheral’ Knowledge Access 
Institutions 1700-1851: Public Libraries. panel by 
census reg. district & county   
Raw data from Robin Alston’s Library History Database 
http://digitalriffs.blogspot.co.uk/2011/08/robin-alstons-library-
history-database.html 
British ‘Peripheral’ Knowledge Access 
Institutions 1700-1851: Masonic Lodges in 
England. panel by census reg. district & county   
Raw data from Lane’s Masonic Records 1717-1894 
http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/lane/  
British ‘Peripheral’ Knowledge Access 
Institutions 1700-1851: Booksellers in England. 
panel by census reg. district & county   
Raw data from The British Book Trade Index 
http://bbti.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/ 
US Agricultural KAIs. County panel 1730-1870. 
Fields: membership, meetings, fairs, volumes in 
library, correspondence with state society.  
US Department of Agriculture (1876) List of Agricultural 
Societies… 
Great Exhibition 1851 exhibitor and prize winner 
counts, by British census registration district. 
Fields: address, sector, prize status. 
Royal Commission of the Great Exhibition of 1851 (1852), 
Reports by the Juries on the Subjects in the Thirty Classes into 
Which the Exhibition was Divided (in Four Volumes), London. 
 
Royal Commission of the Great Exhibition of 1851 (1851), 
Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue of the Great 
Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations 1851, 
London. 
British patentees 1617-1852 panel , by British 
census registration district and county. Fields: 
Name, date of application, address, sector, 
Woodcroft Reference Index (citation based 
quality measure), short description.  
Woodcroft B (1854) Titles of Patents of Invention 
Chronologically Arranged, 1617–1852. London. (Located in the 
British Library, London) 
Woodcroft B (1855) Reference Index of English Patents of 
Invention, 1617-1852. London. (Located in the British Library, 
London) 
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English dissenting congregations, 1729 cross 
section by English hundreds. Fields: 
(congregation size, denomination of dissent) 
 
The Evans List, Dr Williams', located at the Library for 
Dissenting Studies, Bloomsbury, London 
English Unitarian congregations panel 1660-1850 Alan Ruston's list of Unitarian congregations 
 
Marriage register mark rates (literacy estimate) 
various cross sections during nineteenth century 
by registration district. 
Annual Reports of the Registrar General, BPP 
 
Population panel by hundred, registration district 
and county populations, various cross sections 
Various censuses, BPP;  
Wrigley E.A. (2012), 'The Early English Censuses' 
Wrigley, E.A (2009) ‘Rickman revisited: …’ 
US patents, panel 1790-1873, counties and states 
panels. Fields: patentee name, location, date, 
sector, brief description, citations received (see 
dataset below) 
Raw data from Patent and Trademark Resource Centre 
Association, 2013, in turn based on the Subject Matter Index of 
Patents for Inventions by the United States Patent Office from 
1790 to 1873 Inclusive (USPO 1873). 
Sector codes from USPTO database (2013) 
US agricultural patents 1790-1873, counties and 
states panels. Fields: patentee name, location, 
date, sector, brief description, citations received 
(see dataset below) 
Raw data from Patent and Trademark Resource Centre 
Association, 2013, in turn based on the Subject Matter Index of 
Patents for Inventions by the United States Patent Office from 
1790 to 1873 Inclusive (USPO 1873) 
Sector codes from USPTO database (2013) 
US patent citation counts panel 1790-1873, by 
county and state. 
Raw data from Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) 
Matched to above databases by patent number. 
US manufacturing census variables, county and 
state level panels 1840-1900 (ten year intervals), 
Fields: labour stock, capital stock, output, raw 
materials, wages 
Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic 
Information System: Version 2.0. Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota 2011, www.NHGIS.org 
US agricultural census variables, county and state 
level panels 1830-1870 (ten year intervals). 
Fields: labour stock, capital stock, output, wages 
Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic 
Information System: Version 2.0. Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota 2011, www.NHGIS.org 
US population census variables, county and state 
level panels 1830-1870 (ten year intervals). 
Fields: urban and rural populations 
Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic 
Information System: Version 2.0. Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota 2011, www.NHGIS.org 
School attendance ratios by census reg. districts 
and counties, 1851 
England and Wales, and Scotland Education Censuses 1851, 
BPP 
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Datasets donated by other authors 
 
 
Occupational census cross section 1851, by 
British registration district 
Donated by Leigh Shaw Taylor & the Cambridge Population 
Group 
Estimated occupational census cross section 1817, 
by English registration district 
Donated by Leigh Shaw Taylor & the Cambridge Population 
Group 
Market access index by US counties 1870 Donated by Dave Donaldson (Donaldson D & Hornbeck R 
2015)  
Other datasets used 
 
 
International rail panel data, annual 1825-1913. 
Fields rail length, passenger volume, freight 
volume 
Mitchell B (2007a, 2007b, 2007c ) 
Annual national patent counts,  panel of 21 
countries, 1883-1913 
World Intellectual Property Organisation 
Annual national GDP, population, GDP per 
capita, various countries and years  
Broadberry S & Klein (2011)   
Maddison A (2013)  
2014 US company financial data aggregated by 
sector on R&D investments and profit rates 
Damodaran A  website at Stern Business School, NYU  
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Debate: Capabilities versus Incentives 
 
Two books published in 2009 have sharpened the focus of the debate on the causes of the 
British Industrial Revolution. In The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, 
Robert Allen argues that the Industrial Revolution happened in eighteenth century Britain 
because it was profitable for it to happen there (Allen 2009). He claims that eighteenth century 
Britain’s high wages and cheap energy, along with a sufficiently large market for capital goods, 
induced the invention and adoption of the famous labour saving macroinventions of the 
Industrial Revolution. This in turn put the British economy on a path of rising capital intensity, 
which was conducive to further technological progress via further rising wages and learning-
by-doing (Arrow 1962). Allen thus believes that fortuitous incentives facing British inventors 
and entrepreneurs in the eighteenth century incentivised the acceleration in technological 
innovation that characterised the Industrial Revolution.  
 
In contrast, in The Enlightened Economy, Joel Mokyr argues that eighteenth century 
Britain experienced the first Industrial Revolution not because of the incentives it faced, but 
rather because of the capabilities that it possessed (Mokyr 2009). Unlike any other nation, 
Britain was willing and able to supply the technological innovations of the Industrial 
Revolution. Such capability was critically dependent on the application of a scientific approach 
to the accumulation of industrial knowledge, a pro-technology ideological climate acting upon 
both government policy and individual behaviour and the relatively high technical skill level 
of British engineers and mechanical operatives. Mokyr credits the first two of these capabilities 
to the eighteenth century European Enlightenment.    
 
In several ways, it seems natural to pit Allen and Mokyr’s arguments against one 
another9. Allen argues for incentives, Mokyr capabilities; Allen the demand for technology, 
Mokyr the supply of technology; Allen economic determinism, Mokyr ‘mind over matter’. 
Nevertheless, as Crafts emphasises in his analytical review of the two books, Allen and Mokyr 
speak in unison on the most fundamental issue (Crafts 2011). In Crafts’ words, a satisfactory 
                                                          
9 Indeed, both Allen and Mokyr downplay the other’s thesis (Mokyr 2009, Allen 2009). 
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explanation for the British Industrial Revolution must “take technological change seriously” 
(Crafts 1995) and both Allen and Mokyr put technology at the centre of the story. Both also 
argue on the basis of extensive empirical study of technological innovation and of the 
characteristics and incentives of inventors and adopters of technology during the British 
Industrial Revolution (Mokyr 1990, Allen 2009). Other prominent accounts of the British 
Industrial Revolution, which emphasise coal (Wrigley 2010), colonialism (Pomeranz 2000) 
and political institutions (North & Weingast 1989, Acemoglu & Robinson 2012) do not provide 
a comparably rich explanation for eighteenth and nineteenth century British technological 
innovation and its characteristics. 
 
Moreover, Allen and Mokyr’s explanations for the British Industrial Revolution are not 
mutually exclusive. One can accept both Allen’s argument that factor prices stimulated 
technological change in eighteenth century Britain and Mokyr’s emphasis on the elasticity of 
supply. Indeed, the most fruitful line of investigation is probably to establish the correct balance 
of emphasis between the two (Crafts 2011). Was Britain’s response to Allen’s incentives 
basically passive, or was it substantively conditional on Mokyr’s capabilities? Was necessity 
the ‘mother of invention’ in the British Industrial Revolution, or was she instead the ‘midwife’, 
helping to deliver the transition to modern economic growth?  
 
Britain’s Incentives: Induced Innovation, Resource Availability and Political Institutions 
 
To explain the British Industrial Revolution, Allen reasons in the tradition of John Hicks 
(1932), who claimed that: “The real reason for the predominance of labour-saving inventions 
is surely that…a change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to 
innovation and to inventions of a particular kind – directed at economizing the use of a factor 
which has become relatively expensive” (1932, pp.124-5). Hicks’ argument has been employed 
previously by H.J. Habakkuk (1962) to explain how scarce labour and abundant resources gave 
rise to US technological pre-eminence in the nineteenth century, and was subsequently 
formalised by Paul David (1975) and later by Daron Acemoglu (2002). Allen essentially 
applies David’s model to the eighteenth century British case, describing the British Industrial 
Revolution as the ‘prequel’ to Habakkuk’s America.  
 
Allen has shown that eighteenth century Britain was a comparatively high wage, cheap 
energy economy and that, dependent on certain assumptions, a selection of the important 
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‘macro-inventions’ of the British Industrial Revolution, namely, the spinning jenny, the steam 
engine and coke smelting, were more profitable to adopt in eighteenth century Britain than 
elsewhere. He argues that this made them more likely to be invented in Britain too (Allen 
2009). Some of Allen’s assumptions have been questioned, such as Allen’s microeconomic 
assumptions about the usage of the technologies (see Crafts 2011). But the most basic objection 
is that high British wages do not necessarily mean that British labour was expensive. To 
calculate unit labour costs, wages must be compared to productivity. Indeed, Kelly, Mokyr and 
O’Grada (2014) argue that higher wages in Britain than France during the eighteenth century 
simply reflected higher productivity levels, which were a function of superior British human 
capital. Unit labour costs may even have been comparatively low in Britain.   
  
Nevertheless, taking Allen’s evidence in favour of expensive labour at face value, Allen 
has advanced the microeconomic history of some of the major inventions of the Industrial 
Revolution. However, to ascertain the overall importance of Allen’s incentives to the British 
Industrial Revolution – and to weigh this against the importance of supply side capabilities – 
one requires an indication of the size of their effect on the overall rate of technological 
innovation. Did factor prices influence the geography of invention and technological adoption 
in general in the way that they influenced the birth of the spinning jenny? Furthermore, did 
differential technology adoption rates across countries, reflected in capital-labour ratios, 
determine the subsequent rate of micro-inventions? Can this causal chain explain the bulk of 
productivity growth during the British Industrial Revolution? Indeed, can it also, as Allen 
claims, explain the patterns of modern economic growth at the global level during the past two 
centuries? (Allen 2012). 
 
 For Allen, the fact that many countries remain without sustained economic growth is 
due to self-reinforcing patterns of relative factor prices into which they are locked, which 
discourage technological innovation. Low wage countries are not incentivised to pursue the 
capital-intensive path that would give rise to a self-sustaining cycle of labour-saving 
innovation, learning by doing and higher wages and thus further labour saving innovation. 
Divergent paths of relative factor prices explain the Great Divergence in incomes between rich 
and the poor countries. Initial lucky breaks and subsequent path dependence have proven to be 
decisive, while relative capabilities for technological innovation have been incidental.  
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Allen supports this explanation for the Great Divergence with an empirical study that 
shows a link between national capital-labour ratios and subsequent labour productivity growth 
at various cross-sections during the past two hundred years (Allen 2012). He shows that since 
the British Industrial Revolution, significant labour productivity growth has occurred only in 
the economies that were already operating at high capital-labour ratios. In contrast, countries 
with low capital-labour ratios have barely raised labour productivity at all, and the small gains 
that they have made have been due to small increases in the capital-labour ratio, not by 
technological innovation. This is a view of long-term economic growth akin to that of Atkinson 
and Stiglitz’s (1969), in which technical change as localised to certain capital-labour ratios. 
This contrasts with the dominant view of long term economic development based on technical 
change that is neutral across capital-labour ratios (Hicks 1932, Solow 1956) and hence 
accessible to all given the right capabilities. 
 
Certainly, this evidence speaks to the important question of the overall impact of factor 
prices on technological progress and economic growth. However, it is subject to a major 
omitted variable problem. The economies that have made progress on the high wage, capital-
intensive growth path since the British Industrial Revolution may simply be the countries that 
possessed the necessary capabilities for modern economic growth. Moreover, if those 
capabilities are difficult to attain but highly persistent once attained then the winners would 
tend to pull away from the losers over time. Indeed, countries that have moved from the latter 
to the former group have tended to experience concurrent institutional improvement, such as 
China, which has experienced both pro-market reforms and an acceleration in economic growth 
since the late 1970s (Brandt, Ma & Rawski 2013).  
 
To explain Britain’s high wages on the eve of the Industrial Revolution, Allen invokes 
the effects of Smithian productivity growth due to its high degree of engagement in 
international trade and high urbanisation rates. Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) attributes the British 
Industrial Revolution more directly to trade, particularly Britain’s trading advantages owed to 
the British empire. For Pomeranz, Britain’s colonies – alongside her coal deposits – were 
crucial because they provided access to the raw materials that allowed the British Industrial 
Revolution to progress without encountering resource constraints. Britain’s access to cheap 
energy, even as its energy usage increased manifold, and colonially sourced raw cotton enabled 
a development path centred on the global expansion of the cotton textiles industry, eventually 
powered by steam. Although Pomeranz highlights manufacturing inputs in general, he is 
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greatly influenced by Wrigley’s articulation of the fundamental energy constraints to historical 
economic development (Wrigley 2010). Wrigley views the British Industrial Revolution as the 
transition from an ‘organic economy’, which is limited in its energy usage by land availability, 
to a ‘mineral-based economy’, which can circumvent this constraint through the exploitation 
of fossil fuels. Like Allen, both essentially attribute the British Industrial Revolution to 
incentives in the form of factor prices, though unlike Allen they fail to identify an explicit 
mechanism for sustained innovation.   
 
The final class of prominent incentive-based arguments focuses on political institutions. 
Douglas North and Barry Weingast (1989) have claimed that the political settlement achieved 
in England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 strengthened parliamentary oversight 
of the king, thereby reducing the risk of state tyranny to investment and innovation. Daron 
Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006, 2012) see the development implications of the Glorious 
Revolution within a framework for interpreting world history that distinguishes between 
‘extractive’ and ‘inclusive’ institutions. In extractive institutions, the ruling elite has a high 
degree of control over the economy and seeks only to maximize its own rents. This tends to 
retard economic development.  In contrast, inclusive institutions provide broader access to the 
political system, which results in policies and laws that are consistent with value creation across 
the economy. Steven Pincus and Robinson (2014) see the important aspect of the Glorious 
Revolution for development as the rebalancing of policymaking rights away from the king to 
parliament, which represented the interests of the emerging commercial class through the Whig 
party. This meant that Britain’s political institutions switched from extractive to inclusive 
institutions. North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) construct a framework similar to Acemoglu 
and Robinson based on the concept of limited-access and open-access social orders, with 
similar differential effects on growth. The shortcoming of these arguments, although persuasive 
as essential pre-conditions for growth, is that they take for granted the elasticity of the supply 
of technological innovation with respect to incentives. 
 
Britain’s Capabilities: Nuanced Notions of Human Capital 
 
By emphasising the incentives for technological innovation, the above explanations for the 
British Industrial Revolution give no credit to the skills of eighteenth century British inventors 
and entrepreneurs for the supply of innovation. Certainly, this assumption is corroborated by 
conventional measurements of human capital for eighteenth century Britain – such as school 
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enrolment and literacy – which cast eighteenth century Britain as unexceptional relative to 
peers (Mitch 1999, Lindert 2004). Moreover, nor did human capital based on these measures 
improve as the British Industrial Revolution progressed. Across Britain, schooling rates and 
industrialisation were inversely correlated across regions, partly because of the demand for 
child labour in the textiles industry. Literacy rates fell in the industrialising areas of Britain 
during the Industrial Revolution (Stephens 1987).  
 
Recently, however, research on eighteenth century Britain’s capabilities has begun to 
shed light on more nuanced concepts and measures. There is a growing focus, as advocated by 
Crafts (1996), on the role of human capital in raising the rate of TFP directly, as opposed to 
augmenting the effective labour supply, as envisaged in the traditional view of human capital 
formalised in the augmented Solow growth model. This shift mirrors recent research by 
education economists, such as Hanushek and Woesmann (2015), who stress the effect of human 
capital levels on economic growth via technology adoption rates (Nelson and Phelps 1966) as 
opposed to the effect of human capital growth rates, operating through gains in effective labour 
units. 
 
This agenda has been spearheaded by Joel Mokyr (2002, 2005, 2009, Meisenzhal & 
Mokyr 2012, Kelly, Mokyr & O’Grada 2014), who de-emphasises average workforce levels of 
human capital in favour of a focus on human capital levels at the upper end of the skill 
distribution. Moreover, Mokyr also argues that skills are poorly captured by literacy and school 
enrolment rates and that strong and rising stocks of the relevant components of human capital 
are reconcilable with mediocre and falling literacy and school enrolment rates. Indeed, Mokyr’s 
observation that the ingenuity of Britain’s innovators during the Industrial Revolution was a 
substitute for the skill of ordinary workers suggests a mechanism by which a rise in upper tail 
human capital could even reduce human capital levels lower in the distribution. 
 
 Mokyr argues that three capabilities were jointly responsible for the British Industrial 
Revolution. The first was the capability to apply a scientific approach to industrial R&D, the 
product of what Mokyr refers to as the ‘Industrial Enlightenment’ (Mokyr 2002, 2005). The 
Industrial Enlightenment was a Western Europe-wide cultural phenomenon rooted in the 
transcontinental private order institution of the ‘Republic of Letters’ established during the 
Scientific Revolution in the three centuries prior to the British Industrial Revolution (David 
2014, Mokyr 2016). The Knowledge Access Institutions of eighteenth and early nineteenth 
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century Britain represented an eventual industrial flowering from these roots. Mokyr’s 
argument is influenced by studies of the role of scientific institutions, method, knowledge and 
culture in the Industrial Revolution by A.E. Musson and Eric Robinson (1968), Robert 
Schofield (1963), Ian Inkster (1991, 1998), Margaret Jacob (1997, 2014) and Margaret Jacob 
and Larry Stewart (2004). However, an important difference between Mokyr’s Industrial 
Enlightenment and Jacob’s important and otherwise closely related concept of eighteenth 
century ‘scientific culture’ is the question of British exceptionalism. For Mokyr, the Industrial 
Enlightenment did not differentiate British capabilities from those of other Western European 
countries but rather differentiated Western Europe from the rest of the world, while Jacob sees 
Britain as playing a leadership role within European scientific culture owing to the empirical, 
Newtonian bias in eighteenth century British science – which provided a suitable model and 
impetus for industrial R&D – compared to the theoretical, Cartesian dominance on the 
continent until late in the century (Jacob 2014).  
 
An important critique of this literature is that relying as it does on case studies, it lacks 
a falsifiable evidence base (Crafts 2011, Allen 2011). Indeed, McCloskey (2010) questions the 
possibility of providing any falsifiable evidence whatsoever for cultural foundations of modern 
economic growth. Other authors reject a major role for science in the British Industrial 
Revolution (the classic arguments are Hall (1974), Mckendrik (1973), Gillespie (1980), Mathias 
(1979), recent contributions are O’Grada 2014, Khan 2015), pointing to the absence of an 
influence of scientific knowledge on textile industry innovation and the low formal education 
levels of some inventors. But this view fails to acknowledge the difficulty of disentangling 
scientific and technological knowledge in the eighteenth century prior to the 
professionalization of science. Indeed, although there were men of pure science in eighteenth 
century Britain, it may be anachronistic to think of science and technology as meaningfully 
separate areas of enquiry during this era, given the still immature state of scientific knowledge, 
particularly the understanding of underlying mechanisms behind empirical regularities, the 
pervasive Baconian ideology of the pursuit of science for the practical “relief of man’s estate” 
and the limited role of pure scientific institutions such as universities, which remained 
unreformed and sparse until the introduction of modern research universities, government 
R&D agencies and corporate R&D departments in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Yet, the scientific age was underway. Above all, the case against the role of science in the 
British Industrial Revolution focuses too much on the contribution of scientific knowledge and 
not enough on the impact of scientific culture on industrial R&D: the emulation of the scientific 
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method and the basic scientific belief in the predictability of nature and the possibility of 
progress in understanding, which made R&D seem like a worthwhile activity. In this spirit, 
Mokyr (2002, 2005, 2009) and Jacob (1997, 2014) emphasise the links between the Scientific 
Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in terms of scientific ideology, method, norms and 
culture as distinct from achievements within scientific knowledge itself.  
 
The second capability was the readiness of the eighteenth and nineteenth century British 
parliament to change laws in favour of innovators and the users of new technology as the 
economy evolved (Mokyr 2009). Mokyr argues that the eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
British parliament was a flexible ‘meta institution’, which, although probably unimpressive by 
modern standards owing to limited access and high levels of corruption, proved to represent 
the allies of technological change well enough to weaken opposition. This gave Britain an 
advantage because the enemies of technological change were more powerful in other countries. 
In terms of empirical evidence, Dan Bogart and Gary Richardson (2011) have shown that 
during the eighteenth century the British parliament was highly responsive to local demands to 
re-organise property rights for economic development. For Mokyr, political institutions are 
ultimately determined by ideology, and the stance of Britain’s parliament in the eighteenth 
century was shaped by the European Enlightenment. This view of political institutions contrasts 
with the view of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), who see institutions and cultural and 
ideological forces as largely competing explanations for economic development. They argue 
that institutional change tends to be stimulated by exogenous shocks at critical junctures. 
 
 The third capability was Britain’s superior level of human capital compared to its 
contemporaries, which enabled much higher adoption rates of new technology and techniques. 
There were two dimensions to this. First the productivity of the British workforce in general 
was relatively high due to a British advantage in nutrition. Kelly, Mokyr and O’Grada (2014, 
hereafter KMO) provide evidence that British nutritional inputs and outcomes, such as height, 
were superior to those in France, and cite biological research that shows a link between 
nutrition and both physical strength and cognitive development. They argue that good British 
nutrition was due in part to the effect of the English Poor Laws, which was a unique institution 
in pre-modern Europe. Second British mechanics and artisans, representing the top 10% or so 
of the skill distribution of the workforce, were better skilled than those in other economies. 
KMO stress that once technology is invented it requires competent individuals to build, use, 
debug and tweak it to generate the bulk of the productivity gains. They cite contemporary 
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accounts that noted the superiority of Britain’s mechanics, and net positive migration rates of 
British mechanics to the continent.  
 
Why were British mechanics highly skilled? Meisenzahl and Mokyr (2012) construct a 
database of 759 such individuals, showing that most were trained via apprenticeship. KMO 
argue that Britain’s system of apprenticeship was more efficacious in skill acquisition than the 
apprenticeship systems on the continent. The basic case for this is that, as Chris Minns and 
Patrick Wallis (2012) and Tim Leunig, Minns and Wallis (2011) show, the British system was 
particularly flexible and reliant upon informal agreements compared with the rigid guild-based 
continental system. Ogilvie (2014) argues that guilds exercised a strong interest in maintaining 
the technological status quo and were poor in general at promoting skill acquisition. As such, 
the British system of apprenticeship was better at adapting skills to new technology within 
existing industries and accommodating shifts in labour demand towards these industries as they 
expanded (Humphries 2003) than those on the continent. In Mokyr’s framework, these three 
capabilities together determined Britain’s leadership. When Western Europe and North 
America attained these capabilities in the nineteenth century, in part stimulated by Britain’s 
example, they followed in Britain’s footsteps. 
 
Contribution to the Debate 
 
The research in this thesis is in the spirit of Mokyr’s focus on Britain’s eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century capabilities to innovate. Its main contribution is to gather evidence on one 
of the key capabilities – the capability to access to knowledge cheaply – and test its impact on 
innovation. Nevertheless, it recognises that the respective arguments of Mokyr and Allen are 
fundamentally complementary. Both “take technological change seriously” and see the main 
task of explaining the British Industrial Revolution as ascertaining the proximate mechanism 
by which inventors and entrepreneurs became more engaged and/or successful in generating 
technological change. Mokyr argues in favour of supply factors, while Allen argues in favour 
of demand factors. As such, the thesis seeks to help establish the correct balance of emphasis 
between British innovators’ capabilities and incentives during the British Industrial 
Revolution. 
  
 34 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Knowledge Access Institutions and the British Industrial Revolution 
 
The British Industrial Revolution marked an important turning point for living standards. We 
are much richer than our forefathers because we know more than they did, and the knowledge 
that counts is embodied in the technology – the machines, materials and medicines that make 
us more productive, healthy and comfortable – at our disposal. Before the British Industrial 
Revolution, the accumulation of this technology was everywhere slow and sporadic, but since 
has been rapid and self-sustaining. Why did the flood gates open in Britain in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, eventually raising the standard of living to levels that our 
forefathers would have found unimaginable?  
 
Nicholas Crafts emphasises two important clues revealed by the measurement of British 
economic growth during course of the British Industrial Revolution (Crafts 1995, 1996). First, 
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Britain was indeed the locus of the transition to 
rapid, sustained, technology-led economic growth, but the transition was gradual. The gate 
crept open, it did not burst open. Second, although the rate of economic growth achieved at the 
apex of the British Industrial Revolution was high relative to anything that had been 
experienced beforehand, it was moderate compared with the rate of growth achieved at the 
world technological frontier in the twentieth century. In Crafts’ words, the British economy 
forged by the Industrial Revolution was “neither an eighteenth nor a twentieth century 
economy. Of course not, it was a nineteenth century economy10.”    
 
Given these facts, this chapter argues that the blossoming of the world’s first 
infrastructure for research and development (R&D) in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Britain has an important role to play in the explanation of the British Industrial Revolution. 
This infrastructure comprised a system of ‘Knowledge Access Institutions’, or ‘KAIs’ – learned 
societies, mechanics institutes, masonic lodges and public libraries, among other organisations 
– which, over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, steadily reduced the 
cost of access to useful knowledge for the natural philosophers, inventors and technological 
                                                          
10 Crafts’ Ellen McArthur Lectures 2009, NFR Crafts, “From the 18th to the 21st Century: a Perspective on 250 
Years of Economic Growth” at Cambridge University (November 2009). Podcast available at 
http://www.econsoc.hist.cam.ac.uk/podcast-crafts.html  
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entrepreneurs engaged in the process of technological innovation. In so doing, KAIs gradually 
raised the productivity of R&D in the British economy, which also raised the equilibrium 
supply of R&D effort. These two effects lay behind the gradual acceleration in economic 
growth that characterised the British Industrial Revolution. 
 
How did KAIs reduce the cost of access to knowledge? There were two main 
mechanisms. First, they promoted the application of the scientific method, the norms of science 
and even a little bit of scientific knowledge itself to the R&D process in the British economy 
(Musson & Robinson 1968, Jacob 2014). This resulted in the acceleration of the growth of the 
knowledge base upon which society could collectively draw to invent new technology (Mokyr 
2002). Second, as a networked system spanning Britain and connected to similar scientific 
institutions abroad, KAIs reduced the cost to inventors and technological entrepreneurs of 
searching the scientific and technological community for knowledge.11 Furthermore, by greater 
connecting the scientific and technological community, the KAI network raised the level of 
social capital within the overall innovation process, aiding the commercialisation of new 
ideas12. 
 
The famous Lunar Society in Birmingham facilitated the transmission of knowledge 
and cemented the personal relationships that enabled James Watt to commercialise his ideas 
for the improved efficiency of steam engines (Schofield 1963). What has not been fully 
appreciated, however, is that as the British Industrial Revolution progressed, each successive 
generation of inventors following in Watt’s footsteps operated within a richer institutional 
infrastructure for innovation, providing cheaper access to specialised knowledge and contacts. 
This raised the productivity of innovators and, in turn, greater encouraged their efforts.  
 
At the same time, however, Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century innovation 
system based on KAIs was quite basic relative to those established in advanced economies 
during the twentieth century. The twentieth century institutions of large-scale corporate R&D, 
research universities and government research bodies13 enabled a greater division of labour in 
the search for knowledge, a wider set of solutions to profit-appropriation problems and greater 
                                                          
11 See Jackson (2010) for a textbook treatment of the effects of networks on economic activity, including 
communication costs and the diffusion of information. 
12 See, for example, Dasgupta (2005) for an introduction to the economics of social capital. 
13 See Nelson (1993) for an overview of the components of the ‘national innovation system’.  
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capacity to finance R&D than eighteenth and nineteenth century KAIs. As a result, the 
technological frontier advanced faster during the twentieth century than during the British 
Industrial Revolution. Thus, while Britain’s KAIs can help to explain the origin of modern 
economic growth, their shortcomings can also help to explain why modern economic growth 
took a long time to accelerate.  
  
The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, I define and quantify Britain’s KAI 
infrastructure during the British Industrial Revolution. After presenting a taxonomy of KAIs, I 
present data on the quantitative dimensions of the growth of KAIs in Britain between 1700 and 
1850. The picture that emerges is of a major nationwide phenomenon and a plausible 
determinant of the economy’s overall rate of technological innovation.  
 
Second, I explain how Britain’s KAIs affected technological innovation during the 
British Industrial Revolution, illustrating the economic effects of KAIs from both a general 
equilibrium and microeconomic perspective. I present a hybrid general equilibrium model of 
Paul Romer and Joel Mokyr’s views of the impact of knowledge on economic growth, which 
captures the overall effect of KAIs on the British eighteenth and nineteenth century economy. 
Then, I examine the day to day activities of KAIs in the light of modern management science 
and network theory. This approach also enables a rough comparison of KAIs with twentieth 
century innovation institutions.  
 
 
The Clues in the Numbers 
 
The macroeconomic dimensions of the British Industrial Revolution, as established by 
Nicholas Crafts provide clues about its causes.14 Any explanation for the British Industrial 
Revolution must explain not only why the rate of technological innovation was faster thereafter 
than before, but also Crafts’ quantitative description of the rate of technological change during 
the transition, which contains two observations (Crafts 1995, 1996). 
 
 
                                                          
14 See Crafts (2014) for his most recent estimates. 
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Table 2.1: Crafts’ estimates of British GDP growth and its contributions during the 
Industrial Revolution 
Year Capital cont. Labour cont. Land cont. TFP Growth 
Real GDP 
Growth 
1700-1760*    0.2 0.7 
1760-1800 0.35*1.0=0.35 0.5*0.8=0.40 0.15*0.5=0.08 0.4 1.2 
1800-1830 0.35*1.7=0.60 0.5*1.4=0.70 0.15*0.1=0.02 0.4 1.7 
1830-1860 0.35*2.5=0.88 0.5*1.4=0.7 0.15*0.1=0.02 0.7 2.3 
Source: Crafts (2014) except *data for 1700-1760 from Crafts (1985: 45) 
 
 
Table 2.1 illustrates Crafts’ most recent estimates of British economic growth and its 
factor contributions for consecutive periods between 1700 and 1860 (Crafts 2014). The real 
GDP growth figures reveal a gradual acceleration, as growth initially increased from an average 
of 0.7% per annum on the eve of the Industrial Revolution (between 1700 and 1760) to 1.2% 
in its early decades (1760-1800). It then accelerated further to 1.7% per annum between 1800 
and 1830 and 2.3% per annum between 1830 and 1860. How much did technological change, 
the hallmark of modern economic growth, contribute to this acceleration? Economists often 
approximate technological innovation’s contribution to economic growth by Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth. During the British Industrial Revolution, the impact of TFP growth 
increased gradually from 0.2% per year during 1700 to 1760 to 0.4% per year between 1760 
and 1830 and 0.7% per year between 1830 and 1860.  However, TFP can be quite a crude 
approximation of the contribution of technological change. On the one hand, TFP growth can 
overstate the rate of technological progress because it can be affected by economies of scale or 
changes in institutions or industrial organisation that affect workers’ incentives. However, as 
the acceleration in TFP growth recorded during the British Industrial Revolution was mostly 
restricted to the sectors of the economy that were revolutionised by major technological 
innovations, it seems likely to have been due primarily to technological change (Crafts 1985).  
 
On the other hand, TFP growth can also understate the rate of technological progress if 
the rate of accumulation of capital is increased by the introduction of new technology. 
Specifically, this will be the case if technological change has a labour-saving bias and the 
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elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than one15, both of which conditions 
appear to have been satisfied during the British Industrial Revolution (Allen 2009b). 
Intuitively, capital accumulation is ultimately endogenous to technological change because in 
the long run the marginal return to the accumulation of existing technology tends to zero. This 
point is consistent with the strong positive relationship observed across countries between TFP 
levels and capital stocks (Clark 2007). In any case, the contribution of capital accumulation to 
economic growth also increased only gradually during the British Industrial Revolution, from 
0.35% during 1760-1800 to 0.6% during 1800-1830 and 0.88% during 1830-1860. The engine 
of technological change warmed up only slowly during the British Industrial Revolution. 
 
Crafts’ second observation is that the peak rates of GDP and TFP growth during the 
British Industrial Revolution were moderate compared to the rates achieved at the world 
economic frontier in the twentieth century. Crafts’ estimate of British TFP growth of 0.7% per 
annum between 1830 and 1860, the apex of the British Industrial Revolution, is less than half 
the 1.7% per annum rate of TFP growth achieved by the United States, the twentieth century’s 
frontier economy, between 1900 and 2000 (Shackleton 2013). Eighteenth century Britain 
witnessed the birth of modern economic growth, but adolescence was a long process and 
maturity was not reached for nearly two centuries.  
  
These clues tell us that whatever caused the acceleration in the rate of technological 
change in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain had only a moderate influence at the start, 
and gradually became more influential over time. This means that any factor that would have 
affected technological innovation suddenly or, conversely, consistently during the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries cannot easily explain the British Industrial Revolution. For 
example, North & Weingast (1989) and Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) argue that the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 was decisive for the British Industrial Revolution because it raised the 
quality of Britain’s political institutions as they pertained to the incentives to innovate and 
invest. But if this event was decisive, one would expect it to have had quite a sudden effect on 
technological progress, which is inconsistent with the macroeconomic record. Conversely, 
North & Thomas 1973 and Bottomley (2015) have argued that Britain’s patent system was an 
important causal factor of the British Industrial Revolution. It may have been a necessary 
                                                          
15 Intuitively, if the adoption of new technological innovations involved an increase in capital per worker and if 
the marginal product of capital did not fall too much as capital per worker increased, then TFP growth could 
miss some of technology’s contribution to growth.   
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condition, but by itself it cannot have governed the gradually rising intensity of the British 
Industrial Revolution, as the patent system underwent no major reform, nor were costs 
substantially reduced, from its inception in 1623 until 1852 (Nuvolari and Macleod 2010).  
 
Crafts’ second observation suggests that the conditions for technological innovation 
during the British Industrial Revolution were probably markedly inferior to those experienced 
during the twentieth century. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that an initial improvement 
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the conditions that eventually produced 
the high economic growth rates of the twentieth century may have facilitated the British 
Industrial Revolution. The search for an explanation for the British Industrial Revolution 
should be informed by our understanding of the forces behind twentieth century economic 
growth16. 
 
 
‘Knowledge Access Institutions’: Definition and Quantification 
 
One of the major cultural features of eighteenth century Britain was the rise of voluntary 
associational societies. This had a profound bearing on social and commercial interaction. 
Voluntary societies increased the number of personal contacts held by the average individual. 
In the language of network theory, the quantity of these contacts is referred to as the average 
degree of the social network. Moreover, voluntary societies also increased the extent to which 
cliques of individuals were connected to other cliques through individuals with a foot in each 
camp – or in network theory terms, the connectivity of the social network (Jackson 2010). These 
two changes in Britain’s social network structure facilitated the diffusion of and search for 
information and raised the level of social capital.17  
 
As Roy Porter has illustrated, the phenomenon of voluntary associational societies had 
a transformative impact on Britain’s culture, politics and economy (Porter 2000). Peter Clark’s 
survey of the history of British voluntary associational societies gives one an idea of the scale 
and diversity of the phenomenon (Clark 2000). Clark estimated the national number of newly 
established societies per decade as 100 in 1700, 200 in 1750, 400 in the 1760s, 700 in the 1780s 
                                                          
16 Crafts (1995) explores the British Industrial Revolution using the lessons of modern growth theory. But 
likeminded research is quite scarce.   
17 See Dasgupta (2005) for an introduction to the social capital literature. 
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and over 1,000 in the 1790s. This rate of growth overwhelmed that of the population. Among 
two thousand or so London clubs and societies said to have met by the 1760s were elite arts 
clubs such as Samuel Johnson’s Literary Club and the Dilettanti Society, political societies 
such as the Whig’s Kit-Kat Club and the Tory’s White’s, the scientific Royal Society, the 
technological Society for the Encouragement of the Arts and Manufactures, and the historical 
Society of Antiquaries (Porter 2000). The range was perhaps even more impressive outside of 
London given much lower population densities. As Porter points out, it did not require a first 
or even second-tier city to support diversity. For example, Maidstone in Kent had the 
Maidstone Society for Useful Knowledge (of which Benjamin Franklin and the agriculturalist 
Arthur Young were corresponding members) alongside “a humane society, assorted drinking 
and dining clubs, an agricultural society, concert and music societies, ‘trapball’ and card 
societies, a book society, a cricket club, party-political clubs, a bachelors’ club, freemen 
societies, benefit clubs, a masonic lodge and, by the mid-1790s, a radical Corresponding 
Society and an opposing Loyalist association” (Porter 2000). 
 
But which of these organisations had a meaningful impact on the process of R&D, 
either as an individual institution or as part of a network? At the very least, they must all have 
facilitated communication per se. On the other hand, only a vanishingly small proportion would 
likely have contributed meaningfully and systematically to the discovery and dissemination of 
knowledge relevant to technological innovation. One faces, therefore, the difficult task of 
drawing a line. Which organisations were KAIs and which were not?  
 
An optimist might respond to this challenge along the same lines as US Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart, who when required in court in 1964 to provide a definition of 
pornographic material responded: “I know it when I see it”. Such an approach might not be too 
far off the mark. The organisations whose raison d'être was to produce and disseminate 
scientific and technological knowledge documented their aims and activities, leaving behind 
detailed records. These organisations include major elite scientific institutions such as the 
Royal Society, the Royal Institution and the Royal Society of Edinburgh, provincial ‘middle 
class’ scientific societies, such as the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, ‘lower 
class’ scientific societies, such as Mechanics Institutes, professional societies such as the Royal 
Society of Physicians and the Geological Society, and agricultural societies. Many such 
organisations may have proven ephemeral and have left no record of their existence, but by the 
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same token these individual organisations are unlikely to have been the ones that made a 
particularly large impact. I refer to this group of societies as Core KAIs. 
 
A second class of KAIs, which I refer to as Peripheral KAIs, likely influenced the 
productivity and supply of R&D indirectly by reducing the cost of access to knowledge more 
generally. They were not disproportionately concerned with science or technology, but 
provided large scale access to literature and underpinned large social networks. Three such 
groups of organisations stand out in this respect owing to their scale: public libraries, 
booksellers and masonic lodges. Moreover, since each operated to some degree as part of a 
network, their aggregate impact on knowledge access costs was likely non-linear in scale and 
large relative to organisations that were not as well connected, such as private libraries or 
independent social clubs. Hence, it seems reasonable to draw the line for peripheral KAIs at 
this point.    
 
Based on this taxonomy, I present below a brief description of each of the parts of the 
British KAI system, along with their quantitative dimensions from the start of the eighteenth 
century to the mid-nineteenth century. I show that while the KAI infrastructure was sparse in 
1700, by 1850 it had a major institutional presence, transforming the environment for 
innovative activity during the interim. I discuss the activities and origins of KAIs only briefly 
in this section, exploring these aspects later in the chapter and in chapter 4.  
 
Core KAIs  
 
National Scientific Institutions: This group of elite KAIs acted as central nodes of the core 
KAI network and as propagators of scientific culture and knowledge. The Royal Society, 
founded in 1660, was Britain’s first core KAI and although its research focus on applied science 
waned somewhat during the late eighteenth century in favour of abstract theory (Miller 1999), 
it nevertheless played a major role in the British Industrial Revolution via four channels. It 
provided the ideological and operational blueprint for core KAIs, acted as the central node in 
the communication network of British core KAIs (through shared membership, correspondence 
and publication), acted as arbiter of scientific legitimacy within the core KAI system and 
incentivised scientific and industrial research in the form of its prestigious FRS fellowships.  
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The ideology of the Royal Society must be understood first in the context of the 
society’s origin as a post within the pan-European institution of the ‘Republic of Letters’, a 
correspondence community of natural philosophers embodying the Scientific Revolution 
(Mokyr 2016). However, while many of the natural philosophers across the Republic of Letters 
were supported by state patronage18, the Royal Society was operationally and financially 
independent of the British state, the purpose of its Royal Charter in 1662 being only to elevate 
its status within the European context. Such political autonomy remained the exception rather 
than the rule among the scientific institutions that emerged across Europe in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. For example, the premier French institution, the Académie des 
Sciences, founded in Paris seven years after the Royal Society, was funded and operated by the 
state. 
 
Second, the natural philosophers who founded the Royal Society were heavily 
influenced both ideologically and practically by the early seventeenth century writings of 
Francis Bacon. In his New Atlantis of 1627, Bacon advocated the establishment of a ‘House of 
Salomon’, a research institution to scientifically investigate the laws of nature for the “relief of 
man’s estate”. The society’s founders – who had been meeting informally in London and 
Oxford since the 1640s to discuss science in the spirit of Baconian philosophy –  implemented 
this vision by establishing an elected membership, lectures and a scientific journal and 
purchasing scientific equipment with which to carry out scientific experiments. Above all, they 
followed and promoted Bacon’s articulation of the scientific method and promoted a scientific 
culture.  
   
The Society for the Encouragement of Arts and Manufactures19 was founded in 1754 
to focus on the technological application of science, in principle creating a division of labour 
between itself and the Royal Society (Chambers 2007). Indeed, there was a large overlap 
between the membership of the two institutions, 60 percent of the society’s original members 
being Fellows of the Royal Society. The Society for the Encouragement… awarded prizes 
(called ‘premiums’) for technological innovations funded by its membership subscriptions, and 
disseminated these innovations through its journal. In 1799, the Royal Institution was added to 
the London scene. It sought to reach beyond the elite scientific community through public 
                                                          
18 Except for three short-lived failed attempts to establish scientific academies in Italy during the seventeenth 
century.   
19 Later renamed the Royal Society of Arts (RSA). 
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lectures, such as the celebrated chemistry lectures of Humphry Davy held during the first 
decade of the new century. Finally, in 1831 the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science (BA) was founded to promote science outside of the capital and facilitate the national 
interaction of scientists. The main activity of the BA was its annual gathering at which 
scientists gathered to present scientific papers, held first in York in 1831 and then in different 
towns and cities each successive year. These institutions, along with the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh, a Scottish version of the Royal Society founded in 1783, acted as the backbone of 
the British establishment scientific community during the Industrial Revolution.  
 
Provincial Literary and Philosophical, and other Scientific, Societies: One the one hand, 
provincial scientific societies, which began to emerge during the final quarter of the eighteenth 
century, extended the network of the national elite institutions. They were founded and 
populated by local elites, who were often members of the metropolitan elite societies, and 
corresponded with and subscribed to journals of the metropolitan elite societies. Through these 
connections they inherited the Baconian ideology and institutional format of the Royal Society. 
However, at the same time, the provincial scene exhibited a degree of ambivalence towards the 
London scientific community, just as London often projected indifference to the provinces. 
Some of the most significant provincial societies, such as the Manchester Literary and 
Philosophical Society (1781) and the Derby Philosophical Society (1783), were instigated by 
members of the Lunar Society, an informal society founded in Birmingham in 1765 by a group 
of ‘super-star’ natural philosophers, inventors and entrepreneurs, who at times operated quite 
independently of the metropolitan elite. The members of both the Lunar Society and many of 
the subsequently formed provincial societies were disproportionately of anti-establishment 
religious and political orientation,20 such as non-conformists and Whigs, if not outright 
reformists. By the 1820s, such core KAIs existed in most major cities, including Sheffield, 
Bristol, Liverpool, Bath, Newcastle and Leeds. 
 
Professional Societies: By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the market for science, 
and the body of scientific knowledge itself, had expanded to a size that could support 
specialised KAIs. Previous attempts to specialise, such as various short-lived societies focused 
on chemistry founded at the turn of the century, had failed21 but by the 1830s, societies such as 
                                                          
20 as I discuss at length in chapter 4. 
21 Although the Spitalfields Mathematical Society of 1717 was a notable outlier. 
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the Royal Geographical Society (1830), the Edinburgh Geological Society (1834), the Royal 
Institute of British Architects and the Royal Artillery Institution (1838) were successfully 
established and sustained. On the one hand, specialisation meant that progress in the 
accumulation of propositional knowledge might be quicker. However, on the other hand, 
occupationally delineated KAIs had far fewer opportunities to combine and transfer knowledge 
across different areas of study and application, and may have produced an environment in 
which – similar to that of medieval guilds (Ogilvie 2014) – members were incentivised to 
oppose technological change to preserve mutual rents.    
 
Mechanics Institutes: The mechanics institute movement began in 1823 with the 
establishment of the London Mechanics Institute and was national in scope, there being around 
800 mechanics institutes around the country by mid-century (BPP 1852). They were inspired 
by the physician George Birkbeck’s ideological campaign to expand the Baconian scientific 
franchise beyond the elites to the lower classes (Kelly 1992). Mechanics institutes were run by 
members of the local elite societies (see Inkster 1997 for case studies of Liverpool and 
Sheffield), who gave lectures in science, but the inter-class social connections that were formed 
– for example between gentleman scientists and mechanics – may have been more important 
than the lectures themselves. Mechanics institutes also provided classes on reading and writing 
to the lower classes aiding their capacity to absorb new knowledge. They were a precursor to 
British further education, which emerged in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, they served as 
its physical infrastructure in its early stages (Walker 2012). 
 
Figure 2.1 presents a time series of core KAIs between 1700 and 1851, which has been 
constructed for this thesis based on the primary and secondary sources listed in the appendix 
to this chapter. The core KAI infrastructure grew enormously during this period. On the eve of 
the British Industrial Revolution, around the mid-eighteenth century, there were less than a 
handful of core KAIs in existence – the Royal Society, the recently founded Society for the 
Encouragement of the Arts in London and the informal Lunar Society in Birmingham. Together 
they had only a couple of thousand members. By 1851, however, around the apex of the British 
Industrial Revolution, there were around 1,000 core KAIs with approximately 160,000 
members in total, representing around 1% of the adult population.22 Moreover, by 1851, the  
 
                                                          
22 I have calculated this aggregate membership figure using a comprehensive survey of learned societies and 
mechanics institutes in the 1851 Census of Education for Great Britain. 
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Figure 2.1: Core KAIs in Great Britain, 1700-1851 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Core KAIs per 100,000 Capita by British region, 176, 1801 & 1851 
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geographical coverage of core KAIs was broad. Figure 2.2 displays regional counts of core 
KAIs per 100,000 capita for 1761, 1801 and 1851. Although in 1761 the infrastructure was 
highly localised, and in 1801 still patchy, by 1851 significant ratios of core KAI per capita had 
been established in each British region. 
 
Figure 2.3: Core KAIs: Histogram of lectures per year across KAIs, 1851 (not including 
KAIs with more than 1 lecture per week) 
 
Figure 2.4: Core KAIs: histogram of library books across KAIs in 1851 (excluding KAIs 
with more than 50,000 library books) 
 
 
In the year of 1851, around 15,000 lectures were held at core KAIs and close to two 
million volumes held in their libraries23. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 displays histograms of core KAIs 
                                                          
23 Based on my classification of core KAIs and calculations based on the 1851 Census of Education. 
Knowledge Access Institutions and the British Industrial Revolution 
47 
 
by lectures per year and volumes in library respectively, in 1851. Lectures were most 
commonly held between once a quarter or once a month, though 10% of core KAIs did not 
hold lectures at all and more than 20% held lectures more regularly than monthly. A small 
number of core KAIs had very large libraries indeed, holding more than 10,000 volumes, 
though most held less than 3,000.  
 
Peripheral KAIs 
 
Masonic lodges: Although Freemasonry was by far the largest national social institution in 
eighteenth century Britain its economic impacts have been hardly studied (Clark 2000). 
However, Margaret Jacob (1991) and Paul A. Elliott (2010) have described its links to scientific 
culture in the eighteenth century, visible by the disproportionate number of ‘men of science’ 
among its membership, the occasional holding of scientific lectures at lodges and by written 
testimony to a masonic culture of science. Science, however casual the masons’ interest in it 
was, was a natural fit for an institution that was constitutionally non-political and non-religious. 
The main role of Freemasonry in the KAI system was to augment the core KAI network. The 
masonic network was dense, national, cross-occupational and reached across social classes, 
increasing the connectivity of the British social structure. 
 
Figure 2.5: Masonic Lodges in Great Britain, 1700-1853, London and Provincial 
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Historical data on Masonic lodges for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is 
available at Lane’s Masonic Records 1717-1894 (http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/lane/), an official 
Masonic website. I extract the data from this database to create a spatial dataset of all Masonic 
lodges in existence between 1700 and 1851, utilising their foundation and expiry dates. The 
first ‘Grand Lodge’ was founded in London in 1717, after four existing London lodges joined 
together. The movement then grew rapidly, first in London and later in the provinces, as chart 
2.5 shows. By 1767, there were 440 lodges in England, 206 in London and 234 in the provinces, 
the number of provincial lodges overtaking metropolitan lodges in 1763. By 1850, there were 
817 lodges in England, 225 of which were in London and 592 in the provinces. Figure 2.6 
illustrates the regional perspective in 1761, 1801 and 1851, capturing the wide regional 
diffusion by 1801. Per capita ratios in all regions fell between 1801 and 1851, although the 
absolute numbers of lodges in each region continued to grow healthily. In terms of membership 
numbers, Peter Clark has surveyed around thirty lodges over the second half of the eighteenth 
century. He finds average membership numbers in London rising from around 30 in 1768-70 
to about 75 in the 1780s and 1790s. He finds average membership numbers in provincial lodges 
of around 25 in 1768-70. As such, there were possibly close to 50,000 Freemasons in Britain 
by 1800. 
  
Figure 2.6: Masonic Lodges per 100,000 Capita by British Region, 1761, 1801 & 1851 
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Public libraries: Britain’s libraries prior to 1850 have been heroically catalogued by the late 
Robin Alston, Professor of Library Studies at University College London until retirement in 
1998. Consulting over 1,500 published works over many years, he found references to over 
30,000 private and public libraries in Great Britain.  This section is based on his database, 
which lists the name of library, category, year of first mention and location (typically at the 
parish or sub parish level.24  
 
Table 2.2: Libraries by Type in Great Britain, Founded up to 1850 
Type Count % 
Circulating Libraries  5,481 44.54 
Endowed, Grammar & Charity Schools  1,846 15 
Book Clubs & Reading Societies  1,183 9.61 
Parochial Libraries  1,162 9.44 
Subscription Libraries  1,005 8.17 
Libraries of Societies  923 7.5 
Mechanics' Institutions  538 4.37 
Literary Societies  525 4.27 
Chained libraries  306 2.49 
Religious Libraries  191 1.55 
Religious Subscription Libraries  117 0.95 
Hospitals & Infirmaries  105 0.85 
College Libraries  97 0.79 
Sunday School Libraries  90 0.73 
Professional Societies  89 0.72 
Medical Libraries  85 0.69 
Musical Circulating Libraries  48 0.39 
Law Libraries  46 0.37 
Science & Technology Libraries  43 0.35 
Government Libraries  32 0.26 
Cathedral Libraries  30 0.24 
Agricultural Libraries  28 0.23 
Factory & Shop Libraries  26 0.21 
Cooperative Society Libraries  23 0.19 
Public Libraries  21 0.17 
Museum Libraries  20 0.16 
Coffee House Libraries  15 0.12 
Private Clubs  13 0.11 
Juvenile Circulating Libraries  10 0.08 
University Libraries  10 0.08 
Inn Libraries  4 0.03 
Record Offices  3 0.02 
Itinerating Libraries  2 0.02 
Religious Circulating Libraries  1 0.01 
Juvenile Subscription Libraries  1 0.01 
                                                          
24 It is available in pdf form at http://digitalriffs.blogspot.co.uk/2011/08/robin-alstons-library-history-
database.html , and there appear to be plans to host it at the at the University of London, Institute for Historical 
Research’s website at some point in the future. 
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Alston’s data illustrates a proliferation of public libraries in eighteenth century Britain 
and a change in mix by type of public library as the century progressed. The library types in 
Alston’s database are shown in table 2.2, along with overall counts by type. At the beginning 
of the century the landscape was dominated by parochial (church) libraries and the endowed 
libraries of large wealthy schools. This public infrastructure in turn was similar in aggregate 
size to the count of private libraries held in grand houses. However, the 1720s saw the start of 
the circulating library movement, which was followed in the second half of the century by the 
rise of subscription libraries. These libraries were more inclusive and provided significantly 
cheaper access to books than the alternative option of purchasing them. In the late eighteenth 
century, the average annual subscription for circulating and subscription libraries was 
approximately equal to the price of one book and members tended to borrow on average around 
twenty books per year (Kelly 1992). 
 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 display a time-series of public and private libraries based on 
Alston’s database, first in absolute and then in per capita terms. The series is defined by the 
year of first mention in the literature that Alston surveyed, so does not necessarily reflect the 
year of foundation, although Alston reports that in about 50% of cases for public libraries it 
does. Nor does the database include an expiry date for library closures. As such, I show the 
flow of first mentions (based on a ten-year moving average) as opposed to the cumulative stock 
of first mentions. A striking feature of figures 2.7 and 2.8 is the surge of new public libraries 
during the second half of the eighteenth century relative to new private libraries. Beforehand, 
public and private libraries had grown at a similar rate, at around ten per decade until the late 
seventeenth century when they accelerated in unison to about twenty per decade. However, by 
the turn of the nineteenth century, new public libraries had surged to about one hundred per 
decade, and by mid-century to about two-hundred per decade. Given the much lower cost of 
book consumption provided by circulating and subscribing libraries, this acceleration must 
have significantly reduced the cost of codified access to knowledge. Figure 2.9 shows the stock 
of all public libraries mentioned in Alston’s database by region in per capita terms up until 
1761, 1801 and 1851. 
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Figure 2.7: Public and Private Libraries in Great Britain, Year of Foundation/First 
Mention, 1700-1850 (10y MA) 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Public and Private Libraries in Great Britain per 100,000 Capita, Year of 
Foundation/First Mention, 1700-1850 (10y MA) 
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Figure 2.9: Public Libraries by 100,000 Capita British Region, 1761, 1801, 1851 
 
 
Booksellers: a proliferation of booksellers and reduction in book prices also contributed to 
falling knowledge access costs. The final lapse of the Licensing of the Press Act in 1694 
deregulated the printing industry and set the stage for a national explosion in print during the 
eighteenth century. ‘Print culture’ under a relatively free press facilitated the diffusion of the 
‘popular Enlightenment’ via newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and books (e.g. Porter 2000). 
Only a small fraction of publications would have been concerned with science or technology. 
Nevertheless, in absolute terms, this small fraction would have constituted a significant flow 
of scientific and technological literature. During the nineteenth century, printing costs fell 
significantly, particularly on large-run publications such as newspapers, as steam-power was 
harnessed within the printing process, as pioneered by William Chambers in Edinburgh (Fyfe 
2006). As chart 2.10 shows, based on Greg Clark’s cost of living index (Clark 2004), using a 
smoothed three-decade average, the real price of books fell by 30% between 1750 and 1850. 
 
The British Book Trade Index project based at Oxford University25 maintains a database 
of the English and Welsh book trade up to 1850. The Scottish Book Trade Index project extends 
this database to Scotland26. These databases contain information on all known members of the 
                                                          
25 See http://bbti.bodleian .ox.ac.uk/ 
26 http://www.nls.uk/catalogues/scottish-book-trade-index 
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book trade by occupation, year of known activity and location. I construct from them a panel 
dataset of booksellers in Great Britain between 1500 and 1851. The resultant national aggregate 
time series is shown in figure 2.11 and regional counts in 1761, 1801 and 1851 are displayed 
in figure 2.12. There is an explosion in the number of booksellers in existence around the 
second half of the eighteenth century, most of the increase being provincial. This must have 
helped to reduce the cost of access to codified knowledge, alongside the rapid growth of public 
libraries and the 30% reduction in book purchase costs. The regional perspective shows quite 
balanced coverage across all British regions by 1801.  
 
Figure 2.10: Real price of books 1650-1850 (deflated by builders’ wages, 3 decade 
centred average, 1750 = 100) Based on Clark (2004) 
 
 
Finally, in figures 2.13 to 2.15, I provide maps of the county distributions of KAIs per 
capita, by type, in 1761, 1801 and 1851 respectively. In tables 2.3 and 2.4, I provide raw data 
on the counts of KAIs by county in 1761, 1801 and 1851, in absolute terms and per capita terms 
respectively. In table 2.5, I produce standardised scores for each county in terms of core KAIs 
and peripheral KAIs per capita in years 1761, 1801 and 1851. For each year, I express the raw 
count per capita for each county in standard deviation terms with respect to the cross section. I 
do this for core and peripheral KAIs separately to produce two separate scores. To construct a 
single peripheral KAI standardised score, I take an average of the three standardised scores for 
Masonic Lodges, public libraries and booksellers. Figure 2.16 illustrates the geographical 
correlation between the core and peripheral parts of the infrastructure, via a scatter plot of 
standardised core and standardised peripheral scores by county in 1851. 
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Figure 2.11: Booksellers in Great Britain, 1500-1850, London Edinburgh and Provincial 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Booksellers per 100,000 Capita by British Region, 1761, 1801, 1851 
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Figure 2.13: KAIs Per Capita 1761 
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Figure 2.14: KAIs Per Capita 1801 
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Figure 2.15: KAIs Per Capita 1851 
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Table 2.3: KAIs by county, 1761, 1801 and 1851 
 
  Core Libraries Booksellers Freemasons 
County & Country  1761 1801 1851 1761 1801 1851 1761 1801 1851 1761 1801 1851 
BEDFORDSHIRE E 0 0 5 5 12 33 3 7 1 0 0 2 
BERKSHIRE E 0 0 9 3 32 87 13 16 24 3 6 6 
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE E 0 0 8 3 15 27 6 16 3 0 0 2 
CAMBRIDGESHIRE E 0 3 11 25 47 85 24 16 13 6 5 3 
CHESHIRE E 0 1 15 7 34 162 35 64 121 7 26 38 
CORNWALL E 0 0 23 1 13 66 10 19 66 6 5 10 
CUMBERLAND E 0 0 14 3 36 102 18 30 67 3 9 12 
DERBYSHIRE E 0 1 18 9 42 130 22 26 94 2 3 6 
DEVON E 0 2 25 7 40 304 43 85 274 15 30 35 
DORSET E 0 0 6 5 33 80 14 22 5 2 6 8 
DURHAM E 0 1 29 11 43 156 26 34 115 8 11 15 
EAST RIDING E 0 2 16 5 28 147 6 33 43 3 5 3 
ESSEX E 0 0 17 5 43 143 13 40 62 4 10 10 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE E 0 0 9 22 103 287 52 59 146 12 15 16 
HAMPSHIRE E 0 0 26 7 72 159 36 48 53 15 16 18 
HEREFORDSHIRE E 0 0 0 3 25 63 16 24 57 2 3 3 
HERTFORDSHIRE E 0 0 13 3 17 71 0 11 40 0 0 8 
HUNTINGDONSHIRE E 0 0 3 7 20 32 4 3 0 0 0 1 
KENT E 0 0 19 20 119 420 32 120 275 15 40 39 
LANCASHIRE E 0 7 95 41 164 678 73 198 325 17 68 81 
LEICESTERSHIRE E 0 1 10 14 46 88 21 30 50 3 4 6 
LINCOLNSHIRE E 0 0 17 16 55 148 20 27 129 1 6 14 
LONDON E 2 16 120 139 414 1312 683 1277 1034 190 243 228 
NORFOLK E 0 4 15 14 80 193 55 79 6 23 31 24 
NORTH RIDING E 0 0 22 6 19 85 8 11 22 2 4 8 
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE E 0 0 8 12 36 76 9 21 1 0 4 8 
NORTHUMBERLAND E 0 4 27 8 37 132 23 59 154 7 12 11 
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE E 0 0 9 4 36 106 15 30 38 4 8 9 
OXFORDSHIRE E 0 1 3 28 45 83 18 36 7 1 5 9 
RUTLAND E 0 0 0 1 2 3 0 1 5 0 0 0 
SHROPSHIRE E 0 0 13 5 26 77 18 50 88 2 8 7 
SOMERSET E 0 1 21 13 66 154 32 47 5 6 18 16 
STAFFORDSHIRE E 0 0 26 8 35 137 18 28 116 2 15 20 
SUFFOLK E 0 0 15 13 66 164 24 62 118 3 9 13 
SURREY E 0 0 14 5 41 215 8 20 33 0 3 7 
SUSSEX E 0 0 19 7 58 255 19 34 146 2 8 12 
WARWICKSHIRE E 0 5 20 14 68 268 42 82 329 9 12 19 
WEST RIDING E 0 6 152 28 123 571 109 193 377 9 43 52 
WESTMORLAND E 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 18 1 1 1 
WILTSHIRE E 0 0 11 0 0 0 22 18 8 3 7 6 
WORCESTERSHIRE E 0 0 12 2 6 17 29 34 61 3 9 11 
Aberdeen S 0 0 3 7 23 77 19 28 73 4 10 16 
Argyll S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ayr S 0 0 5 2 13 77 6 15 38 5 19 26 
Banff S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Berwick S 0 0 1 4 13 31 1 5 7 2 3 4 
Bute S 0 0 0 0 2 11 2 2 3 0 0 1 
Caithness S 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 1 
Clackmannan S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dumbarton S 0 0 4 0 4 28 1 2 4 2 4 6 
Dumfries S 0 0 2 3 16 46 9 11 17 3 8 11 
Edinburgh S 1 3 14 29 75 217 102 180 345 9 12 18 
Elgin S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Fife S 0 0 3 3 10 59 9 14 28 10 12 16 
Forfar S 0 0 6 2 21 57 16 34 64 7 11 18 
Haddington S 0 0 1 1 9 27 5 5 11 2 3 3 
Inverness S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kincardine S 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 0 1 1 
Kinross S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kirkcudbright S 0 0 0 0 2 16 1 1 6 1 3 3 
Lanark S 0 1 17 8 43 185 56 109 211 10 23 33 
Linlithgow S 0 0 1 0 2 8 4 5 6 2 2 2 
Nairn S 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Orkney S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peebles S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Perth S 0 1 2 5 13 58 18 36 77 6 11 13 
Renfrew S 0 0 7 0 8 60 12 18 48 3 8 12 
Ross & Cromarty S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Roxburgh S 0 0 5 2 11 35 3 4 8 1 2 2 
Selkirk S 0 0 1 0 2 9 0 2 1 1 1 3 
Stirling S 0 0 5 0 2 31 6 12 21 3 6 7 
Sutherland S 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wigton S 0 0 0 0 2 9 1 1 6 0 1 1 
ANGLESEY W 0 0 2 0 2 8 1 6 4 0 1 1 
BRECKNOCKSHIRE W 0 0 2 1 6 16 3 7 14 2 2 1 
CARDIGANSHIRE W 0 0 2 0 1 19 0 6 18 0 1 0 
CARMARTHENSHIRE W 0 0 4 0 0 0 9 16 21 1 0 1 
CARNARVONSHIRE W 0 0 0 8 12 43 4 10 9 0 1 2 
DENBIGHSHIRE W 0 0 3 1 4 11 10 11 12 0 2 1 
FLINTSHIRE W 0 0 0 2 2 10 0 4 1 1 1 0 
GLAMORGANSHIRE W 0 0 19 3 16 66 6 21 55 3 4 6 
MERIONETHSHIRE W 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 5 7 0 0 0 
MONMOUTHSHIRE W 0 0 6 1 6 25 4 12 26 1 1 3 
MONTGOMERYSHIRE W 0 0 1 0 2 6 6 6 10 0 1 1 
PEMBROKESHIRE W 0 0 3 3 7 22 0 15 15 1 0 4 
RADNORSHIRE W 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 
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Table 2.4: KAIs per 100,000 capita by county, 1761, 1801 and 1851 
 
  
Core Libraries Booksellers Freemasons 
County & Country 
 
1761 1801 1851 1761 1801 1851 1761 1801 1851 1761 1801 1851 
BEDFORDSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 3.9 9.5 18.1 25.4 5.7 10.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.5 
BERKSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 4.5 3.0 24.4 43.7 12.9 12.2 12.0 3.0 4.6 3.0 
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 5.6 3.1 15.7 18.8 6.2 16.7 2.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 
CAMBRIDGESHIRE E 0.0 3.3 5.7 32.0 51.8 44.3 30.8 17.6 6.8 7.7 5.5 1.6 
CHESHIRE E 0.0 0.5 3.5 5.0 18.0 38.3 24.9 33.8 28.6 5.0 13.7 9.0 
CORNWALL E 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.8 6.7 18.5 7.5 9.8 18.5 4.5 2.6 2.8 
CUMBERLAND E 0.0 0.0 7.2 3.4 30.7 52.2 20.3 25.6 34.3 3.4 7.7 6.1 
DERBYSHIRE E 0.0 0.7 6.9 7.9 29.8 49.9 19.3 18.4 36.1 1.8 2.1 2.3 
DEVON E 0.0 0.6 4.4 2.3 11.7 53.1 14.0 24.8 47.9 4.9 8.8 6.1 
DORSET E 0.0 0.0 3.4 5.0 30.1 45.2 14.0 20.1 2.8 2.0 5.5 4.5 
DURHAM E 0.0 0.6 7.0 8.5 27.0 37.9 20.2 21.4 27.9 6.2 6.9 3.6 
EAST RIDING E 0.0 1.6 6.3 4.8 22.0 57.8 5.7 25.9 16.9 2.9 3.9 1.2 
ESSEX E 0.0 0.0 4.9 2.5 20.4 41.6 6.5 19.0 18.0 2.0 4.8 2.9 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 2.1 10.2 45.0 68.4 24.1 25.8 34.8 5.6 6.6 3.8 
HAMPSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 6.5 3.9 33.1 39.6 20.2 22.0 13.2 8.4 7.3 4.5 
HEREFORDSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 33.2 63.6 19.5 31.9 57.5 2.4 4.0 3.0 
HERTFORDSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 7.5 3.1 16.7 40.8 0.0 10.8 23.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 
HUNTINGDONSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 5.0 19.9 57.6 53.1 11.4 8.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 
KENT E 0.0 0.0 3.9 8.5 46.0 86.6 13.5 46.4 56.7 6.3 15.5 8.0 
LANCASHIRE E 0.0 1.0 4.5 13.5 24.0 32.3 24.1 29.0 15.5 5.6 10.0 3.9 
LEICESTERSHIRE E 0.0 0.7 4.3 13.4 34.3 37.5 20.1 22.4 21.3 2.9 3.0 2.6 
LINCOLNSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 4.2 8.8 26.8 37.0 11.0 13.1 32.2 0.6 2.9 3.5 
LONDON E 0.4 1.5 4.7 24.9 39.9 51.4 122.2 123.2 40.5 34.0 23.4 8.9 
NORFOLK E 0.0 1.5 3.5 5.6 29.5 44.5 21.9 29.1 1.4 9.1 11.4 5.5 
NORTH RIDING E 0.0 0.0 11.3 4.3 12.9 43.7 5.8 7.4 11.3 1.4 2.7 4.1 
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 3.7 9.6 28.1 35.5 7.2 16.4 0.5 0.0 3.1 3.7 
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NORTHUMBERLAND E 0.0 2.4 8.9 6.0 22.0 43.5 17.1 35.1 50.7 5.2 7.1 3.6 
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 3.1 4.3 23.6 36.0 16.0 19.7 12.9 4.3 5.2 3.1 
OXFORDSHIRE E 0.0 0.9 1.8 29.2 40.1 48.8 18.8 32.1 4.1 1.0 4.5 5.3 
RUTLAND E 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 10.9 12.4 0.0 5.5 20.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SHROPSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 5.3 3.7 14.2 31.4 13.3 27.4 35.9 1.5 4.4 2.9 
SOMERSET E 0.0 0.4 4.6 5.7 23.4 33.8 14.0 16.7 1.1 2.6 6.4 3.5 
STAFFORDSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 4.1 5.1 13.8 21.7 11.4 11.0 18.4 1.3 5.9 3.2 
SUFFOLK E 0.0 0.0 4.5 7.4 30.7 48.8 13.6 28.9 35.1 1.7 4.2 3.9 
SURREY E 0.0 0.0 6.9 3.0 37.4 106.2 4.8 18.3 16.3 0.0 2.7 3.5 
SUSSEX E 0.0 0.0 5.6 6.8 36.0 75.1 18.4 21.1 43.0 1.9 5.0 3.5 
WARWICKSHIRE E 0.0 2.3 4.2 9.9 31.5 55.8 29.6 37.9 68.5 6.3 5.6 4.0 
WEST RIDING E 0.0 1.0 11.7 7.8 21.3 43.9 30.5 33.5 29.0 2.5 7.5 4.0 
WESTMORLAND E 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5 14.7 30.8 2.7 2.4 1.7 
WILTSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 10.4 3.3 1.6 4.0 2.5 
WORCESTERSHIRE E 0.0 0.0 4.6 1.7 4.5 6.6 24.0 25.7 23.6 2.5 6.8 4.3 
Aberdeen S 0.0 0.0 1.4 6.0 19.0 36.3 16.4 23.1 34.4 3.4 8.3 7.5 
Argyll S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ayr S 0.0 0.0 2.6 3.4 15.4 40.6 10.2 17.8 20.0 8.5 22.6 13.7 
Banff S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Berwick S 0.0 0.0 2.8 16.7 43.0 85.4 4.2 16.6 19.3 8.3 9.9 11.0 
Bute S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 66.2 28.1 17.0 18.1 0.0 0.0 6.0 
Caithness S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 2.6 
Clackmannan S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dumbarton S 0.0 0.0 8.9 0.0 19.3 62.1 7.2 9.7 8.9 14.4 19.3 13.3 
Dumfries S 0.0 0.0 2.6 7.5 29.3 58.9 22.6 20.1 21.8 7.5 14.7 14.1 
Edinburgh S 1.1 2.4 5.4 32.1 61.2 83.6 112.8 146.8 133.0 10.0 9.8 6.9 
Elgin S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fife S 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.7 10.7 38.4 11.0 14.9 18.2 12.3 12.8 10.4 
Forfar S 0.0 0.0 3.1 2.9 21.2 29.8 23.2 34.3 33.5 10.2 11.1 9.4 
Haddington S 0.0 0.0 2.7 3.4 30.0 74.2 16.8 16.7 30.2 6.7 10.0 8.2 
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Inverness S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kincardine S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 11.4 8.7 0.0 3.8 2.9 
Kinross S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kirkcudbright S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 37.1 4.7 3.4 13.9 4.7 10.3 7.0 
Lanark S 0.0 0.7 3.2 9.8 29.1 34.9 68.5 73.8 39.8 12.2 15.6 6.2 
Linlithgow S 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 11.2 26.5 23.8 28.0 19.9 11.9 11.2 6.6 
Nairn S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.1 17.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Orkney S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Peebles S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Perth S 0.0 0.8 1.4 4.2 10.4 41.8 15.0 28.7 55.5 5.0 8.8 9.4 
Renfrew S 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 10.2 37.2 45.0 22.9 29.8 11.3 10.2 7.4 
Ross & Cromarty S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Roxburgh S 0.0 0.0 9.7 5.8 32.6 67.8 8.6 11.9 15.5 2.9 5.9 3.9 
Selkirk S 0.0 0.0 10.2 0.0 37.1 91.8 0.0 37.1 10.2 24.9 18.6 30.6 
Stirling S 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 3.9 35.9 16.2 23.6 24.4 8.1 11.8 8.1 
Sutherland S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wigton S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 20.7 6.1 4.4 13.8 0.0 4.4 2.3 
ANGLESEY W  0.0 4.6  7.8 18.5  23.4 9.3  3.9 2.3 
BRECKNOCKSHIRE W  0.0 3.4  17.2 27.0  20.1 23.7  5.7 1.7 
CARDIGANSHIRE W  0.0 2.0  1.6 19.5  9.8 18.4  1.6 0.0 
CARMARTHENSHIRE W  0.0 4.2  0.0 0.0  28.8 22.2  0.0 1.1 
CARNARVONSHIRE W  0.0 0.0  26.1 45.4  21.7 9.5  2.2 2.1 
DENBIGHSHIRE W  0.0 3.1  6.5 11.4  17.9 12.4  3.2 1.0 
FLINTSHIRE W  0.0 0.0  9.0 24.4  18.0 2.4  4.5 0.0 
GLAMORGANSHIRE W  0.0 7.9  21.6 27.5  28.3 22.9  5.4 2.5 
MERIONETHSHIRE W  0.0 0.0  5.6 15.6  13.9 13.6  0.0 0.0 
MONMOUTHSHIRE W  0.0 3.4  11.0 14.1  21.9 14.7  1.8 1.7 
MONTGOMERYSHIRE W  0.0 1.3  3.6 7.8  10.7 13.0  1.8 1.3 
PEMBROKESHIRE W  0.0 3.6  13.9 26.0  29.8 17.8  0.0 4.7 
RADNORSHIRE W  0.0 0.0  0.0 9.5  8.5 3.2  0.0 0.0 
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Table 2.5: Standardised KAI prevalence by county, 1761, 1801 and 1851  
  Core Peripheral Core Peripheral Core Peripheral 
County Country 1761 1761 1801 1801 1851 1851 
BEDFORDSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.25 -0.42 -0.51 0.11 -0.65 
BERKSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.26 -0.42 -0.06 0.34 -0.10 
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.54 -0.42 -0.47 0.70 -0.73 
CAMBRIDGESHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 1.66 4.76 0.69 0.76 -0.29 
CHESHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.15 0.41 0.70 0.00 0.56 
CORNWALL ENGLAND -0.15 -0.36 -0.42 -0.61 1.00 -0.35 
CUMBERLAND ENGLAND -0.15 -0.10 -0.42 0.48 1.25 0.63 
DERBYSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.00 0.69 0.01 1.16 0.34 
DEVON ENGLAND -0.15 -0.16 0.50 0.11 0.29 0.87 
DORSET ENGLAND -0.15 -0.20 -0.42 0.24 -0.05 -0.12 
DURHAM ENGLAND -0.15 0.31 0.57 0.28 1.21 0.14 
EAST RIDING ENGLAND -0.15 -0.30 2.04 0.06 0.95 0.04 
ESSEX ENGLAND -0.15 -0.44 -0.42 -0.03 0.48 -0.03 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.41 -0.42 0.73 -0.48 0.68 
HAMPSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.22 -0.42 0.46 1.01 -0.02 
HEREFORDSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.15 -0.42 0.40 -1.21 0.94 
HERTFORDSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.64 -0.42 -0.54 1.35 0.17 
HUNTINGDONSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.33 -0.42 0.34 0.49 -0.27 
KENT ENGLAND -0.15 0.21 -0.42 1.63 0.13 1.62 
LANCASHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.57 1.19 0.52 0.34 -0.13 
LEICESTERSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.34 0.75 0.22 0.25 -0.06 
LINCOLNSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.16 -0.42 -0.09 0.25 0.19 
LONDON ENGLAND 2.51 4.35 2.00 3.17 0.40 0.94 
NORFOLK ENGLAND -0.15 0.37 1.89 0.74 -0.03 -0.07 
NORTH RIDING ENGLAND -0.15 -0.40 -0.42 -0.51 2.67 -0.03 
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.22 -0.42 0.00 0.07 -0.35 
NORTHUMBERLAND ENGLAND -0.15 0.08 3.31 0.40 1.84 0.60 
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.07 -0.42 0.08 -0.16 -0.18 
OXFORDSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.94 0.98 0.59 -0.61 0.01 
RUTLAND ENGLAND -0.15 -0.49 -0.42 -0.75 -1.21 -0.61 
SHROPSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.31 -0.42 -0.06 0.61 0.13 
SOMERSET ENGLAND -0.15 -0.13 0.14 0.10 0.37 -0.38 
STAFFORDSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.28 -0.42 -0.23 0.20 -0.28 
SUFFOLK ENGLAND -0.15 -0.12 -0.42 0.32 0.32 0.42 
SURREY ENGLAND -0.15 -0.56 -0.42 0.21 1.16 0.86 
SUSSEX ENGLAND -0.15 -0.05 -0.42 0.36 0.71 0.89 
WARWICKSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 0.53 3.21 0.56 0.22 1.09 
WEST RIDING ENGLAND -0.15 0.23 1.21 0.38 2.80 0.27 
WESTMORLAND ENGLAND -0.15 -0.40 -0.42 -0.70 -1.21 -0.48 
WILTSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.50 -0.42 -0.67 0.35 -0.88 
WORCESTERSHIRE ENGLAND -0.15 -0.17 -0.42 -0.16 0.38 -0.32 
Aberdeen SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.03 -0.42 0.22 -0.73 0.52 
Argyll SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Ayr SCOTLAND -0.15 0.04 -0.42 0.94 -0.31 0.80 
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Banff SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Berwick SCOTLAND -0.15 0.55 -0.42 0.75 -0.27 1.20 
Bute SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.32 -0.42 -0.44 -1.21 0.54 
Caithness SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -0.70 
Clackmannan SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Dumbarton SCOTLAND -0.15 0.18 -0.42 0.70 1.83 0.88 
Dumfries SCOTLAND -0.15 0.38 -0.42 0.80 -0.33 1.11 
Edinburgh SCOTLAND 8.07 3.13 3.41 3.16 0.64 2.77 
Elgin SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Fife SCOTLAND -0.15 0.29 -0.42 0.18 -0.54 0.50 
Forfar SCOTLAND -0.15 0.33 -0.42 0.61 -0.14 0.56 
Haddington SCOTLAND -0.15 0.04 -0.42 0.47 -0.27 1.02 
Inverness SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Kincardine SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.64 -0.42 -0.67 -1.21 -0.76 
Kinross SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Kirkcudbright SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.43 -0.42 -0.24 -1.21 0.14 
Lanark SCOTLAND -0.15 1.51 0.64 1.68 -0.11 0.49 
Linlithgow SCOTLAND -0.15 0.30 -0.42 0.30 -0.07 0.08 
Nairn SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.49 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -0.85 
Orkney SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Peebles SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Perth SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.05 0.83 0.14 -0.72 1.09 
Renfrew SCOTLAND -0.15 0.61 -0.42 0.14 0.28 0.45 
Ross & Cromarty SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -1.12 
Roxburgh SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.20 -0.42 0.20 2.11 0.36 
Selkirk SCOTLAND -0.15 0.68 -0.42 1.47 2.29 2.62 
Stirling SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.04 -0.42 0.11 0.78 0.39 
Sutherland SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -1.08 -1.21 -0.96 
Wigton SCOTLAND -0.15 -0.68 -0.42 -0.54 -1.21 -0.43 
ANGLESEY WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.30 0.38 -0.54 
BRECKNOCKSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.02 -0.05 -0.23 
CARDIGANSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.79 -0.51 -0.55 
CARMARTHENSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.63 0.24 -0.67 
CARNARVONSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.02 -1.21 -0.18 
DENBIGHSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.46 -0.15 -0.68 
FLINTSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.32 -1.21 -0.75 
GLAMORGANSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 0.18 1.50 -0.17 
MERIONETHSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.74 -1.21 -0.68 
MONMOUTHSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.38 -0.05 -0.56 
MONTGOMERYSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.72 -0.77 -0.70 
PEMBROKESHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.30 0.01 -0.11 
RADNORSHIRE WALES -0.15 -0.78 -0.42 -0.95 -1.21 -0.94 
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Figure 2.16: Core KAIs per Capita versus Peripheral KAIs per Capita, 1851 (z-scores) 
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How did KAIs affect Economic Growth? A General Equilibrium Perspective 
 
How did KAIs facilitate the British Industrial Revolution? To state the answer rigorously and 
to help guide empirical work later in the thesis, in this section I model the general equilibrium 
effect of KAIs on economic growth using an endogenous growth model that incorporates both 
Paul Romer and Joel Mokyr’s views about the role of knowledge in economic growth (Romer 
1990, Mokyr 2002). Then, using insights from management science and network theory I 
explore the day to day activities of KAIs.  
 
Both Romer and Mokyr put knowledge at the heart of long-run economic growth. 
However, while Romer provides a formal explanation of how economic growth arises from the 
accumulation of new knowledge, Mokyr describes the fundamental discontinuity in the process 
of accumulating knowledge that occurred during the British Industrial Revolution. A joint 
approach is required to describe the general equilibrium effect of KAIs on the British Industrial 
Revolution. 
 
In Romer’s 1990 model, the growth of knowledge 𝐴?̇?  is governed by the following 
equation: 
 
𝐴?̇? = 𝛿𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑅             
 
where LR is labour engaged in the search for new knowledge, At is the existing knowledge stock 
at time t and δ is a parameter for the productivity of labour engaged in the search for new 
knowledge. The search for knowledge is motivated by profit, i.e. LR is determined 
endogenously by the market for technological innovations, which are the fruits of the search 
for knowledge. The more labour engaged in the search for new knowledge and the greater the 
existing stock of knowledge, the faster new knowledge is found. Knowledge is a non-rival 
good, i.e. one person’s use does not preclude another’s, and excludable, i.e. at least part of its 
social return can be appropriated through mechanisms such as patenting or secrecy. For Romer, 
all productively useful knowledge has these characteristics, so if appropriation mechanisms are 
available and markets are large enough then the conditions for modern economic growth are 
satisfied. 
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In contrast, Mokyr sees an important distinction between two types of useful 
knowledge: propositional and prescriptive knowledge. Propositional knowledge, Ωt, is 
knowledge about nature and its regularities, which includes but is not limited to scientific 
knowledge. Unlike Romer’s unidimensional knowledge, it is typically non-excludable because 
it cannot usually be patented. Moreover, it is not typically produced for profit per se but rather 
by researchers operating within the institutional setting and norms of science, motivated by 
reputation-based returns. These alternative incentives tend to give rise to the open 
dissemination of knowledge as opposed to secrecy (David 2014). As such, the rate of growth 
of propositional knowledge is determined by the scale and efficacy of scientific institutions. 
During the British Industrial Revolution, this would have been determined by the size and 
efficacy of the KAI infrastructure. 
 
Prescriptive knowledge, 𝜆𝑡, on the other hand is the set of known techniques for 
manipulating the natural world, essentially the current stock of technology. It is largely 
excludable by patenting and its rate of growth is sensitive to prospective profits, in turn a 
function of market size and the efficacy of appropriation mechanisms.27  
 
Propositional and prescriptive knowledge are economic complements. The larger the 
base of propositional knowledge, the higher the productivity of the search for new prescriptive 
knowledge. This is because a deeper understanding of underlying principles and regularities 
generally cuts the length of the path of trial and error. Hence, the accumulation of techniques 
is an increasing function of the size of the propositional knowledge base: 
 
𝜆?̇? = 𝑓(Ω𝑡 , . ) 
 
Conversely, the accumulation of the propositional knowledge base is itself a function of the 
state of the prescriptive knowledge base: 
 
Ω𝑡̇ = 𝑔(𝜆𝑡 , . ) 
 
                                                          
27 Because prescriptive knowledge includes final goods alongside capital goods, it is not equivalent to the 
technology in Romer’s model. Nevertheless, Romer’s technology is a sub-component and serves as an adequate 
representation of prescriptive knowledge in a general equilibrium framework. 
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This is because technology such as observation instruments, measuring devices and computers 
help scientists discover new propositions. 
 
Size is not the only parameter of the propositional knowledge base that influences the 
productivity of inventors. The user costs of the propositional knowledge base depend on its 
density and tightness. The density of propositional knowledge refers to how widely its elements 
are known across society. In the extreme cases, if each piece of propositional knowledge is 
held by only one individual then the propositional knowledge base has minimal density and if 
each element is held by every member of society then it has maximal density.28 Higher density 
implies lower average knowledge access costs for individuals. The tightness of propositional 
knowledge refers to the degree of consensus held on the elements. Contradictory beliefs about 
the efficacy of a medical treatment, for example, lowers tightness. Whether tightness enhances 
inventor productivity depends on how propositional knowledge is verified and legitimised in 
society. Uniform belief in any proposition, no matter what it is, corresponds to maximal 
tightness. However, the adoption and acceptance of the scientific method, as upheld and 
promoted by appropriate institutions, produces a positive correlation between tightness and 
inventor productivity. Furthermore, under these conditions, scientific research makes 
knowledge tighter still over time. As described below, KAIs affected both the density and 
tightness of the propositional knowledge base during the British Industrial Revolution. 
       
The Romer-Mokyr Model of the British Industrial Revolution 
 
There are four main features of the model. First, as in Romer’s model of 1990, technological 
innovation results in economic growth by raising productivity in the production of an 
homogenous final good, which households consume and from which they derive utility29. This 
final good is produced by firms under perfect competition, using labour and capital goods. 
However, rather than there being a single homogenous capital good as in the standard 
neoclassical framework, there are instead many different varieties. Productivity in the 
production of the final good is an increasing function of the variety of capital goods used, and 
                                                          
28 While the size of society’s propositional knowledge base is a function of the intersection of all individuals’ 
knowledge, its density is a function of their union. 
29 The representative consumer’s utility function is a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function of the form: 𝑢(𝑐) =
𝑐1−𝜀− 1
1−𝜀
, where ε > 0 is a relative risk aversion measure. An important implication 
of this utility function is that the relationship between the real rate of interest and the growth rate of the economy 
obeys the Euler equation 𝑟 = 𝜀𝑔 + 𝜌 where ρ is the consumer’s rate of time preference. 
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technological innovation is manifest by the creation of new varieties of capital goods.  The 
economy’s aggregate production function in period t is30: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐿𝑀
1−𝛼∫ 𝑥𝑖
𝛼  𝑑𝑖
𝜆𝑡
0
        (3.1) 
 
where the xi’s (where i ∈ 0,…,λt) represent different varieties of capital good used in production 
in period t and α represents the degree of substitutability between them. Second, technological 
innovation is the result of innovative effort motivated by profit maximization. The fruit of 
innovative effort is the capital goods subset of Mokyr’s prescriptive knowledge. A unit of 
prescriptive knowledge is a technological innovation in the form of a new capital good, xi (i.e.  
?̇?t >0). It is subsequently patented and sold to the final goods sector under monopoly conditions.  
  
Third, technological innovation, or the growth of the stock of prescriptive 
knowledge/new capital goods, ?̇?t , occurs according to the following equation, where LR is 
labour allocated to innovative effort, Ωt is the stock of propositional knowledge and δ is a 
productivity parameter. 
 
𝜆?̇? = 𝛿Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)𝐿𝑅             
 
Ωt contains all knowledge in existence at time t that might be useful for the invention of new 
capital goods. As such, the productivity of innovative effort is an increasing function of the 
existing stock of propositional knowledge, which in turn contains knowledge of the existing 
stock of technology. Hence, Ωt is expressed as a function of 𝜆𝑡.  
 
Fourth, each unit of labour is allocated either to the production of the final good or 
technological innovation31, so L = LM + LR. There is free entry to both activities, so in 
                                                          
 
30 In Romer’s model new capital goods do not render existing capital goods obsolete. Growth is achieved through 
increasing “product variety”. However, obsolescence (or creative destruction) is inherent to technological change. 
It is captured in Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) seminal “quality ladder” endogenous growth model, which offers an 
alternative approach to modelling endogenous growth to Romer (1990). Although creative destruction was 
exhibited during the British Industrial Revolution, incorporating it into the model presented in this chapter adds 
little to the analysis of the effect of KAIs on technological innovation, while adding complexity. I therefore base 
the analysis on Romer (1990). 
31 i.e. there is no demand for leisure.  
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equilibrium the return to each must be equal, meaning that wages are equal across the two 
activities: wM = wR. 
 
Solving the model consists of finding the equilibrium split of labour allocated to 
manufacturing and innovative effort. This allocation determines the equilibrium growth rate of 
the economy. The starting point is the return flowing to innovative activity, which is equal to 
 
𝛱𝑅 =
𝛱𝐶
𝑟
 𝛿Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)𝐿𝑅 − 𝑤𝑡 𝐿𝑅 
 
where ΠC is the earnings flow to each monopolist in the manufacture and sale of his/her 
respective variety of capital good to the final goods sector, not including fixed research costs. 
Because there is free entry into innovative activity this return must be zero in equilibrium, 
hence: 
 
𝑟 = 𝛿Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)
𝛱
𝑤𝑡
         (𝑅) 
 
This is the research arbitrage equation common to many endogenous growth models, which 
determines the relative allocation of labour to research and manufacturing. To make use of it 
one needs to find the equilibrium wage rate, wt, which is equal to the marginal product of labour 
in the production of the final good. Since the economy’s production function is: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐿𝑀
1−𝛼𝜆𝑡𝑥
𝛼 
 
the marginal product of labour equals 
 
𝑤𝑡 =
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝜕𝐿𝑅
= (1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝑀
−𝛼𝜆𝑡𝑥
𝛼       (3.2) 
 
Next, one calculates the capital goods monopolist’s choice of x, which is chosen by maximizing 
profits subject to the inverse demand curve of the final goods sector. This is equal to the 
marginal product of the capital good in the final sector, which is   
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𝑝 = 𝛼𝐿𝑀
1−𝛼𝑥𝛼−1 
 
Hence, each capital goods monopolist maximizes  
 
𝛱𝐶 = max
𝑥
{𝑝𝑥 − 𝑥} = max
𝑥
{𝛼𝐿𝑀
1−𝛼𝑥𝛼−1} 
 
which implies the profit maximizing output (i.e. differentiating with respect to x and setting 
this derivative to zero): 
 
𝑥 = 𝐿𝑀𝛼
2
1−𝛼     (3.3) 
 
As such, (3.2) can be written as 
 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝛼
2𝛼
1−𝛼𝜆𝑡        (3.4) 
 
Furthermore, (3.3) implies that the equilibrium flow to monopoly production and sales of the 
capital good, ΠC, equals 
 
𝛱𝐶 = 𝐿𝑀𝛼
2
1−𝛼          (3.5) 
 
The research arbitrage equation, R, can now be re-written using (3.4) and (3.5) as  
 
𝑟 = 𝛼
𝛿Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)
𝜆𝑡
𝐿𝑀    (3.6) 
 
This can be re-arranged and, using the assumption stated above that L = LM + LR , re-written 
with LR  on the left hand side: 
 
𝐿𝑅  = 𝐿 −
𝑟𝜆𝑡
𝛼𝛿Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)
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Since the growth rate of the economy, g, is proportional to the growth rate of product variety, 
we have 
 
 𝑔 =
1
𝜆𝑡
𝜆?̇? =
𝛿 Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)
𝜆𝑡
𝐿𝑅 
 
Substituting in (3.6) for research labour and the Euler equation in footnote 29 for r gives 
 
𝑔 =
𝛼
𝛿 Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)
𝜆𝑡
𝐿 − 𝜌
𝛼 + 𝜀
 
 
This equation is similar to Romer’s growth equation (Romer 1990). Growth is proportional to 
population32 and the productivity of R&D and inversely proportional to the rate of time 
preference and the substitutability between capital goods innovations. The key difference 
between the growth equation presented here and that of Romer’s is that it features the size of 
the propositional knowledge base. Moreover, this knowledge base is a function of exogenous 
institutional factors (including their effect on density and tightness). Furthermore, the rate of 
growth of the propositional knowledge stock is a function of the state of technology, so a 
change in institutions affects the rate of technological innovation directly in the first instance 
and then further via positive feedback effects over time as new technology facilitates the search 
for new knowledge. As Mokyr argues, these feedback dynamics may have been important to 
the establishment of sustained modern economic growth (Mokyr 2002). 
 
The growth equation above helps illustrate the mechanism through which KAIs affected 
the rate of technological innovation and economic growth. KAIs raised the rate of technological 
innovation and economic growth directly by raising the productivity of R&D labour and then 
indirectly by raising the share of labour allocated towards R&D in equilibrium (by raising the 
relative marginal productivity of R&D labour compared with manufacturing labour as captured 
in equation R). As explained below, KAIs achieved this by making two contributions to the 
R&D process. First, KAIs promoted and facilitated a culture of scientific R&D – the application 
of the scientific method and scientific norms to the practice of industrial R&D – which led to 
                                                          
32 human capital adjusted-population in Romer (1990) 
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a faster exogenous growth rate of the propositional knowledge base. Second, they reduced the 
cost of access to the existing propositional knowledge base for inventors and entrepreneurs. 
 
 One can illustrate the general equilibrium effect of reducing the cost of access to the 
propositional knowledge base by extending the Romer-Mokyr model to incorporate multiple 
regions, following, in spirit, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991)33. To take the most basic case, 
assume that there are now two regions in the British economy, in each of which prospective 
innovators have access to their own regional propositional knowledge base, but not the 
propositional knowledge base of the other region.34 For simplicity, assume also that these two 
knowledge bases are perfect complements, i.e. they possess no propositional knowledge in 
common and are the same size. The introduction of a system of KAIs in this economy – i.e. at 
least one KAI in each region, which communicate with one another – lowers the cost of access 
for each region to the other region’s propositional knowledge base. This raises the steady state 
rate of economic growth.  
 
First, note that before the introduction of KAIs, although the two regions do not share 
propositional knowledge, they are integrated by a common market for capital and consumer 
goods (as were British regions on the eve of the Industrial Revolution). What is the growth rate 
of this trade-integrated, knowledge-autarkic economy? Trade in capital goods between the two 
regions means that the marginal product of manufacturing labour in each region is twice as 
high as it would be under trade autarky, rising from (1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝑀
−𝛼𝜆𝑡𝑥
𝛼 to (1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝑀
−𝛼(𝜆
𝑡
+
𝜆𝑡′)𝑥
𝛼, where λ’ represents the prescriptive knowledge base of the other region. But the market 
for new capital goods doubles due to trade too, so the marginal productivity of research labour 
also doubles, from δPλ to 2δPλ. The overall effect is that the share of labour allocated to research 
in each region is unchanged. Long run growth with inter-regional trade is no faster than without 
it. 
 
In contrast to trade between regions, the integration of knowledge bases through KAIs 
does effect relative labour productivities. The productivity of labour in research doubles to: 
 
                                                          
33 who consider the Romer model in a multiple-country setting. 
34 i.e. there is a fundamental impairment of density due to a step function across space in communication costs 
indeed communication costs across regions are infinitely large. 
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𝜆?̇? = 𝛿2Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)𝐿𝑅            (3.7) 
This has two effects on the economy’s equilibrium growth rate. First, the increase in the 
productivity of research directly increases the rate of technological innovation. Second, the rise 
in research productivity relative to manufacturing productivity raises the equilibrium labour 
allocation to research. Equilibrium research labour is now   
 
𝐿𝑅  = 𝐿 −
𝑟𝜆𝑡
𝛼𝛿2Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)
 
 
And the equilibrium growth rate is now 
 
𝑔 =
𝛼
𝛿 2Ω𝑡(𝜆𝑡)
𝜆𝑡
𝐿 − 𝜌
𝛼 + 𝜀
 
 
Hence, the reduction in knowledge access costs achieved by KAIs raises the steady-state rate 
of economic growth. 
 
 
Inside the ‘Black Box’ of KAIs: ‘Scientific R&D’ and Network Effects 
 
Figure 2.17 summarises the effect of KAIs on economic growth. KAIs raised the productivity 
and equilibrium supply of British industrial R&D by promoting a culture of ‘scientific R&D’ 
in British industry and reducing propositional knowledge access costs for British industrialists. 
Scientific R&D can be considered the application of the scientific method and the worldview 
and norms of science, established during the Scientific Revolution, to the industrial R&D 
process. Its adoption within British industry during the eighteenth century amounted to a broad 
behavioural change towards innovation, and KAIs helped to establish this new behaviour as a 
part of British culture (Musson & Robinson 1968, Inkster 1997, Jacob 1997, 2014, Jacob & 
Stewart 2004, Mokyr 2002, 2005, 2009, Goldstone, 2002, Elliott 2003). Regarding the second 
channel, KAIs helped to reduce knowledge access costs by strengthening and extending social, 
correspondence and publication networks within the scientific, technological and industrial 
community. Furthermore, the two channels were mutually reinforcing. Scientific norms 
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encouraged communication and the sharing of knowledge while, in turn, greater social 
connectivity facilitated the cultural diffusion of the practice of scientific R&D. 
 
Figure 2.17: KAIs and Economic Growth 
 
 
 
 
KAIs and Scientific R&D 
 
KAIs helped to raise the growth rate of the propositional knowledge stock by absorbing, 
cultivating and spreading throughout British industry what Margaret C. Jacob calls a ‘scientific 
culture’ and what Joel Mokyr calls the ‘Industrial Enlightenment’ (Jacob 1997, 2014, Mokyr 
2002, 2005)35. Whether the high scientific theory of the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
Scientific Revolution – of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, Huygens and Newton – was 
directly instrumental to the British Industrial Revolution or not has been vigorously debated, 
but is beside the main point.36 What really mattered was the application of the ethos of the 
Scientific Revolution to industrial R&D in eighteenth century Britain (Musson & Robinson 
1968, Jacob 1997, 2014, Goldstone, 2002, Mokyr 2002, 2005). As the eighteenth century 
progressed, the experimental scientific method employed in the pursuit of “the relief of man’s 
estate” as envisaged by Francis Bacon in the 1620s and later exemplified by Robert Boyle and 
Newton characterised the behaviour of a growing number of British industrialists seeking to 
                                                          
35 While Mokyr sees the Industrial Enlightenment as a Western European phenomenon in which Britain held no 
discernible pre-eminence, Jacob sees British scientific culture as advanced relative to the rest of Western 
Europe. 
36 The classic study linking science and the Industrial Revolution is Musson & Robinson (1969) and refutations: 
Hall (1974), Mckendrik (1973), Gillespie (1980), Mathias (1979).  For recent expositions on opposing sides of 
the debate see O’Grada (2014) and Wootton (2016).  
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profit from success in R&D projects concerning problems of industrial production across the 
economy. As Josiah Wedgwood put it to a friend in 1766: “Many of my experiments turn out 
to my wishes, and convince me more and more, of the extensive capability of our Manufacture 
for further improvement...Such a revolution, I believe, is at hand, and you must assist in, [and] 
profit by it” (Wedgwood 1903). Moreover, the growing belief in nature’s predictability and 
manipulability, especially following Newton’s articulation of the mechanical laws of nature 
and the popular dissemination of the Newtonian worldview during the early eighteenth century 
by famous Newtonians such as John Theophilus Desaguliers made costly and painstaking R&D 
projects appear worth a shot (Jacob and Stewart 2004). The body of ‘modern’ scientific 
knowledge accumulated during and following the Scientific Revolution – in the fields of 
astronomy, mechanics, chemistry, optics, electricity, hydrostatics, magnetism, pneumatics, 
among others – often supplemented by an exposition of practical industrial applications, 
formed the basis of a common mathematical, scientific and technical education among a slice 
of British industrialists, endowing them with, alongside a stock of advanced human capital, a 
common technical language within industrial R&D.37 Furthermore, scientific experimental 
protocol and rising standards of measurement precision, critical for the technological 
achievements of the Industrial Revolution, bled from high science into industrial R&D projects 
(Heilbron 1990).  
 
All of this was fundamental to the British Industrial Revolution because the 
technological innovation that characterised the era was contingent upon unprecedented levels 
of R&D effort and sophistication (Allen 2009). Within the development of steam power, the 
seventeenth century scientific insights of Galileo, Evangelista Torricelli, Otto von Guericke, 
Huygens and Boyle provided the inspiration for the first commercial application of steam 
technology in the form of pumps to drain mines, attempted unsuccessfully in the first instance 
by Thomas Savery in 1698 and then successfully by Thomas Newcomen in 1712. But in terms 
of perspiration, Newcomen undertook a decade long R&D programme – notably, twentieth 
century engineers recreating Newcomen engines have found it difficult to make them work 
(Hills 1989, Allen 2009). James Watt spent the early 1760s working on Newcomen engines at 
the University of Glasgow, experimenting on and calculating the amount of energy required to 
                                                          
37 This education was often obtained outside of the English university system, either at the cheaper, less 
restrictive and more scientifically progressive Scottish universities (Clow & Clow 1952), the English dissenting 
academies (Elliott 2010), or often informally through itinerant lecturers extensively touring London and the 
provinces during the eighteenth century, and the growing scientific and technical literature (Musson & Robinson 
1968). 
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change gas to liquid. He then spent the late 1760s and almost £1,000 of venture capital funds 
experimenting on model engines and a prototype of his famous engine with separate condenser 
(Hills 1989, Allen 2009). On account of his rigorous R&D projects, Watt saw himself as a ‘man 
of science’ and consistently referred in his correspondences to his scientific method. He copied 
out experiments by Priestly and La Place in his notebooks alongside his own experiments on 
heat and his engines (Jacob 2014). Wedgwood too sought to apply the scientific method 
rigorously to industrial R&D, as evidenced by his famous ‘5,000 experiments’ on clay mixtures 
and glazes. In establishing his manufactory’s famous experimental approach employed 
chemical lecturer William Lewis’ technician Alexander Chisolm (Stewart 2008). In water 
power, John Smeaton experimented extensively on model water wheels in ascertaining the 
superior efficiency of the overshot breast water wheel to the undershot water wheel (Allen 
2009). Although Joseph Black, Professor of Chemistry at Glasgow and Edinburgh Universities 
described Henry Cort, the inventor of the important iron puddling and rolling process (1784), 
as a “plain Englishman, without Science”, he did concede that his discovery was due to “a dint 
of natural ingenuity and a turn for experiment”. Moreover, the fact that Cort took the trouble 
to consult Black for scientific advice tells us that Cort, although perhaps an outsider to scientific 
culture, was clearly operating under it influence (Mokyr 2009).   
 
Likewise, the fact that innovation within the textile sector – which contributed more 
than any other sector of the British economy to labour productivity growth during the Industrial 
Revolution (Clark 2007) – owed nothing directly to scientific knowledge did not mean that the 
culture of scientific R&D played any less a role. James Hargreaves, Richard Arkwright, Samuel 
Crompton, Edmund Cartwright and Richard Roberts all embarked on painstaking and costly 
R&D projects to crack difficult problems within the replication of human dexterity by powered 
machines (Allen 2009). Chlorine bleaching was an important invention in the finishing of 
textiles and one of the most important chemical inventions of the early Industrial Revolution. 
The basic scientific breakthrough was made in continental Europe: chlorine was discovered 
Carl Willhelm Scheele, a Swedish chemist, in 1774 and its bleaching properties discovered by 
Claude Berthollet, one of the leading students of Lavoisier. However, many years of R&D were 
undertaken by British industrialists, including Watt’s father in law and Boulton, until in 1799 
Scottish bleacher Charles Tennant combined chlorine with slaked lime to produce a 
commercially successful bleaching powder (Clow & Clow 1952).  
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A shared scientific culture was essential for the application of steam power to textiles. 
Early adopters of steam within textile production, such as James M’Connel and John Kennedy 
of Manchester needed to be conversant in the language of scientific culture to collaborate with 
Watt and Boulton on the installation and adaptation of Watt’s engine to the context of the cotton 
mill (Jacob 2014). Likewise, Benjamin Gott relied upon scientific cultural acumen in 
transferring cotton textile innovations to the wool industry in Leeds (Jacob 2014). These are 
extremely important examples of the principle of ‘absorptive capacity’, essential for the 
realisation of much of the potential productivity gains from invention (Cohen & Levinthal 
1990). 
 
By providing an institutional basis for the eighteenth century British scientific-
industrial community in the form of the metropolitan elite and provincial learned societies, and 
by extending the franchise via mechanics’ institutes in the early nineteenth century, core KAIs 
absorbed and greatly strengthened British scientific culture. They encouraged and spread the 
behaviours that constituted this culture, raising the supply and productivity of industrial R&D 
projects, exemplified by the famous cases listed above and thousands more besides. Core KAIs 
put individuals searching for prescriptive knowledge under the same roof as purveyors of 
propositional knowledge, which meant that the scientific methodology and norms of 
experimentation, accurate measurement, mathematical representation, dispassionate reporting 
of results and publication of results became established practice in British industrial R&D. 
Consider figure 2.18, which is a chronological list of papers read at the Royal Philosophical 
Society of Glasgow in 1841 and 1842. Drawing a distinction between propositional and 
prescriptive knowledge is a somewhat subjective procedure, however, of the 53 papers listed 
here, 37 appear to be oriented towards an exposition of propositional knowledge and 16 
towards prescriptive knowledge. Each paper was read at the same regular seminar to the same 
returning audience. Figure 3.19 extracts two adjacent papers, the second and third on the 
programme: “On the determination of the melting points of metals and various metallurgic 
products and on the temperature required for the formation of different silicates” and “On the 
means of extinguishing fires in factories”. The first is an archetypical exposition of 
propositional knowledge: some equations and calculations followed by a systematic tabulation 
of the empirical properties of various chemical elements. The second begins by stating a 
pressing local practical problem: “The extensive fires that have lately occurred in two of the 
largest factories in this city have had their origins in the upper floors of buildings”. It then 
provides a detailed description, with a careful illustration, of a proposed fire extinguishing 
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system in the form of a device that is added on to the building’s existing cistern. This is the 
process of the accumulation and dissemination of prescriptive knowledge, as shaped by the 
Scientific Revolution – the culture of scientific R&D. In the early nineteenth century, 
mechanics institutes taught science to mechanical operatives, who possibly gained more by 
absorbing scientific culture than the scientific knowledge imparted to them, which cannot 
always have been easy to take in during the evening after a day’s work.  
 
Partha Dasgupta and Paul David (1994) argue for the general influence of scientific 
norms on industrial R&D. Two norms that they emphasise that stand out in the case of KAIs 
during the British Industrial Revolution are publication and reputation-based reward. Scientific 
publication switched from books to journals during the British Industrial Revolution, as figure 
2.20 illustrates using data from Allen, Qin and Lancaster (1994). In 1700, over 80% of citations 
in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society were of books and only around of 10% 
journal articles. By 1850, this had shifted substantially to a 50% share each. Latin publications 
almost disappeared between 1700 and 1850, from 60% of publications cited by the 
Philosophical Transactions to less than 10%, as chart 2.21 shows. Core KAIs, including those 
focused more on R&D than science embraced the periodicals revolution. Scudder (1879) of 
Harvard University Library counts 568 British institutions that had published a scientific or 
technological periodical by 1876. Olav Sorenson and Lee Fleming (2004) have shown using 
patent citation data linked to scientific publication citation data, the beneficial impact of 
scientific publication on the rate of technological innovation via the enhanced dissemination of 
knowledge. Robert Allen (1983) and Alessandro Nuvolari (2004) have emphasised the role of 
collective invention – the sharing of R&D results among industrial competitors – during the 
British Industrial Revolution.  
 
Individuals were incentivised to allocate effort to R&D by status-oriented reward 
mechanisms borrowed from science, such as titles and prizes (Dasgupta and David 1994). 
Titles and prizes bestowed social status upon individual recipients but, importantly, also raised 
the profile and social status of ‘the inventor’ in general. Both the Royal Society and the Society 
for the Encouragement of Arts offered meaningful status-based incentives for industrial R&D. 
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Figure 2.18: Papers read at the Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow, 1841-4 
(Proceedings of the Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow Volume 1, 1842) 
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Figure 2.18: continued. 
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Figure 2.19: Two consecutive papers read at the Royal Phil Soc of Glasgow 1841 
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Figure 2.19: continued. 
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Figure 2.20: Royal Society Article Citations by Books, Journals and Other 
 
 
 
Figure 2.21: Royal Society Article Citations by Language  
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The Royal Society’s Fellowships (FRSs) were highly prestigious and often awarded for 
applied work. O’Grada (2014) has questioned the relevance of the Royal Society Fellowships 
because some well-known individuals were awarded fellowships late in life, long after they 
had made their major scientific or technological contributions. But this was not generally the 
case as figure 3.23 shows. During the eighteenth century, the average age of an FRS at election 
was mid to late-30s and remained under 45 until 1850. By comparison, Anton Howes (2016) 
calculates from a new database of inventors during the British Industrial Revolution that the 
average age of inventors at the time of their important invention was 33. The Society for the 
Encouragement of Arts was also engaged in status-oriented reward mechanisms. Indeed, as 
table 2.6 shows, between its founding in 1754 and 1776, it spent more on medals for inventors 
(£24,616) than cash premiums for inventors (£23,552). Khan (2016) shows that there was no 
detectable direct link at the sectoral level between the society’s awards and innovation rates. 
However, the society’s most important contribution to innovation was to promote and bestow 
prestige upon inventing in general. As a nationally visible institution patronised by London’s 
social, intellectual and commercial elites, it punched above its weight in doing so. Regarding 
the direct effects of prizes in the nineteenth century, Brunt, Lerner and Nicholas (2012) show 
at the level of individual innovations a positive effect on agricultural innovation of monetary 
prizes and medals awarded by the Royal Agricultural Society of England from 1839 onwards, 
finding a larger effect for medals than monetary awards. 
 
Figure 2.22: Royal Society Fellowships, Average Age at Election and Death, 1660-2013  
(10y moving average) 
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Table 2.6: RSA Premiums 1754-1776 
 
Cash Premiums Gold 
Medals 
Silver 
Medals 
Gold 
Pallets 
Silver 
Pallets 
Agriculture 
 
3,202 56 26 
  
Chemistry 
 
1,315 2 1 
  
Colonies and Trade 
 
2,786 12 
   
Manufactures 
 
2,026 1 3 
  
Mechanics 
 
2,285 6 10 
  
Polite Arts 
 
8,326 10 6 17 84 
Miscellaneous 
 
3,613 16 
   
      
Total Premiums 
 
23,552 103 46 
  
      
Cost of medals 
 
24,616 
    
      
Total Cost of Prizes 
 
48,168 
    
 
 
KAIs and Network Effects 
 
As explored in the Romer-Mokyr model, KAIs reduced the cost of access to fragmented 
knowledge bases, raising the average productivity of R&D. They achieved this by lowering the 
cost of communication within the R&D community, increasing the network’s average degree 
and connectivity, as discussed above (Jackson 2010). This facilitated innovation via three 
channels:    
 
1. Knowledge Diffusion Rates and Search Costs: Network theory has established the efficacy 
of ‘small-world’ social networks in permitting the diffusion of information through society and 
reducing knowledge search costs relative to other societal structures (for example, see 
Granovettor 1973, Cowan & Jonard 2003, or for a textbook treatment oriented towards 
economics, Jackson 2010). A small-world network is one in which individuals are locally 
connected within cliques, while a small number of connections connect cliques together. KAIs 
created such a social structure within the British scientific and technological community. The 
hierarchical ‘hub and spoke’ structure of core KAIs discussed above – of national elite, local 
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elite and ordinary local KAIs – along with shared membership across regions and hierarchical 
levels, bridged geographic and social distance across scientists, inventors and entrepreneurs 
from different walks of life. Musson and Robinson (1968) describe the network from the 
perspective of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society in the 1780s, illustrating the 
society’s national and trans-European correspondences with scientists and industrialists, the 
numerous Fellows of the Royal Society among its ordinary attending membership and its 
seminal role in the foundation of educational institutions in the city and wider region, such as 
the Manchester College of Arts and Sciences and dissenting academies such as Manchester 
Academy. Robert Schofield describes the rich scientific and industrially oriented networks of 
the Lunar Society in Birmingham (Schofield 1957) and Ian Inkster reveals a similar structure 
to Manchester in other English cities (Inkster 1997). 
 
As a large network with a cultural bias towards science, Freemasonry supported the 
network established by core KAIs. One of the founders of the movement was leading 
Newtonian, Desaguliers. Figure 2.24 shows the number of Freemasons who were Fellows of 
the Royal Society over time based on a list of FRS Freemasons on the website of the London 
Museum of Freemasonry38. In figure 2.25, I denominate this figure by concurrent Royal 
Society membership to show the percentage of Royal Society Fellows who were Freemasons. 
Throughout the British Industrial Revolution around 10% of FRSs were Freemasons. 
Freemasonry may have had a significant effect in helping to connect the central node of the 
KAI infrastructure with the rest of the scientific, technological and business community. 
 
A prominent example of the KAI network facilitating the search for expertise was the 
invention of the Davy lamp in 1815. Following an accidental mining explosion in Newcastle, 
local KAIs contacted chemist Humphry Davy of the Royal Institution in London to design the 
would-be famous safety lamp (Jacob 2014). Such long-range interaction became more common 
over time as the KAI infrastructure matured, as figure 2.26 illustrates. Using the dataset of 
British patents during the Industrial Revolution constructed for this thesis and discussed in 
chapter 3, I calculate the proportion of joint patents over time whose co-patentees resided in 
different counties across Britain (excluding patents with any London patentees as these were 
sometimes patent agents). There is a very marked upward trend from around one-tenth in the 
early decades of the Industrial Revolution to about one third by the 1840s.   
                                                          
38 http://www.freemasonry.london.museum/os/wpcontent/resources/frs_freemasons_complete_jan2012.pdf 
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Figures 2.23: Number of Freemasons who were Fellows of Royal Society 
 
 
Figure 2.24: Percentage of Fellows of the Royal Society elected during previous 10 years 
who were Freemasons 
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Figure 2.25: Share of joint patents whose co-patentees live in different counties (London 
patents excluded) (20 year, centred) 
 
 
2. Collaboration and Knowledge Recombination Effects: Core KAI membership was cross-
occupational, rather than divided along occupation or industry lines. This had two implications 
for innovation. First, there was little product market competition between members, which 
meant that they were more likely to share information and collaborate, as Lawrence Katz’s 
model of R&D consortia predicts (Katz 1984). Indeed, Wedgwood tried to set up an industry-
specific R&D consortium-type KAI in 1775 but the project failed due to disagreement among 
the prospective members about how to share the profits of innovation (Schofield 1957). Mixed 
occupations also circumvented the incentives of members of the same occupational group to 
stifle innovation to preserve shared rents, which Ogilvie (2014) documents in the case of 
medieval guilds.  
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Second, interaction between occupational groups increased the scope for ‘recombinant 
innovation’, in which new innovations are based on a combination of existing technologies 
from multiple industries. The canonical example in the British Industrial Revolution was Henry 
Cort’s invention of the puddling and rolling process, already mentioned above, which 
combined reverberatory furnaces used in glass making with mill rollers. Leonard Dudley 
argues that the innovations that characterise modern economic growth are differentially 
dependent upon collaboration, crediting the increased scope for communication through shared 
language and literacy as a determinant of modern economic growth (Dudley 2012). Akcigit, 
Kerr and Nicholas (2013) show using patent citation data that recombination is conducive to 
high quality innovation. Likewise, De Vaan, Vedres and Stark (2015) show that recombination 
lies behind blockbuster innovations in the computer games industry, while Uzzi et al. (2013) 
have shown that cross-disciplinary teams of scientists produce particularly high quality 
research.  
 
Figure 2.26: Letter from Erasmus Darwin to Matthew Boulton, 1783/03/04 
 
Derby Mar. 4-83 
Dear Sir 
I am favour’d with your letter, and the note for 30£. In respect to the principle I should not have written to you 
for it, but that I supposed the income from your Engins would have render’d it not inconvenient to you to return 
it. When you can do it therefore conveniently, do so. 
 We intend to pass this Summer at Radburn, where Mrs D. and myself shall be very happy to see you, and 
yours; in the Autumn we design to return to Derby to reside for good (I hope) as they say. 
 We have establish’d an infant philosophical Society at Derby, but do not presume to compare it to your 
well-grown gigantic philosophers at Birmingham. Perhaps like the free-Mason societies, we may sometime make 
your society a visit, our number at present amounts to seven, and we meet hebdomidally. 
 I have repeatedly spoke of you Engins to Arkwright’s friends, and hope you may still be employ’d, but 
know very little at present of the matter. I suppose you use your reciprocating engine for working corn-mills, and 
not your circular one? 
 Pray bring you Son to see us at Radburn sometime this Summer, that we may renew our early 
acquaintance. I wish you would bring a party of your society and hold one Moon at our house.  
 NB. our Society intend to eclipse the Moon on the 18 of this month, pray don’t you counteract our 
conjurations. I beg to be remember’d to all the Insane at your next meeting, and am dear Boulton, your affect. 
friend and obed. serv.  
E Darwin 
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3. Social Capital Effects: Small-world networks also facilitate the flow of reputational 
information and gossip. They raise the cost of defection within business transactions, thereby 
increasing the level of social capital, or the scope to trust other members of society (Dasgupta 
2005). Laursen et al (2012) show using data on modern day Italy that social capital has a 
positive effect on the localised rate of innovation. By generating a small-world social structure 
KAIs must have had a positive impact on social capital within the innovation process. An 
interesting example is illustrated by figure 2.27, a letter from Erasmus Darwin to fellow 
member of the Lunar Society Mathew Boulton. Darwin was acting as the middle-man between 
Boulton and Watt and some potential customers with whom Darwin had recently formed 
another KAI in Derby. Watt had previously had an acrimonious relationship with the firm, 
which Darwin repaired.  
 
 
Britain’s Industrial Revolution KAIs versus Twentieth Century Innovation Institutions 
 
Although Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century KAIs represented a giant leap forward as 
innovation institutions they were inferior to those of the twentieth century, namely research 
universities, corporate R&D departments and government research and funding bodies. 
Although none of these three has proved to be without its flaws, the strength of the modern 
innovation system lies in their nature as mutual complements. 
 
Different R&D projects suit different institutional approaches. The most appropriate 
approach generally depends on the degree of technical specialisation required, the difficulty of 
the appropriation of returns and the funding requirements. In principle, a project may be so 
challenged in any one of these dimensions that it cannot proceed at all. However, the à la carte 
menu of modern innovation institutions has risen to these challenges much more effectively 
than KAIs could on their own during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As such, they 
have likely processed a much larger proportion of prospective R&D projects than KAIs did 
during the British Industrial Revolution, generating a higher rate of technological progress.  
 
 First, modern innovation institutions have achieved a much finer division of labour 
giving rise to greater expertise, including a division between propositional knowledge 
acquisition in research universities and prescriptive knowledge acquisition in corporate R&D 
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departments, fitting the incentive structures of the two institutions (Brookes 1994). The benefit 
of specialisation also includes a more rigorous filtering and validating of propositional 
knowledge. More expertise and better validation have sped up the rate of accumulation of 
propositional knowledge. 
 
Second, twentieth century innovation institutions have offered a wider set of solutions 
to profit-appropriation problems, which in turn has encouraged innovative effort. David Teece 
(1986) argues that the returns to innovation can often only be appropriated through the 
ownership of complementary assets. The invention of the large scale ‘modern industrial 
enterprise’ around the turn of the twentieth century has enabled such ownership through 
vertical integration (Chandler 1990). The large corporation also helps the innovator to 
maximise his first mover advantage by enabling him to produce at large scale, providing cost 
and brand advantages (Chandler 1990, Teece 1993). Acs, Economidou and Sanders (2009) 
show the benefits of vertical integration within an endogenous growth model. In the absence 
of the large industrial enterprise during the British Industrial Revolution, the appropriation of 
innovation returns was more difficult. As Harley shows for the textile industry, industries 
expanded rapidly following technological innovation, but industry growth occurred via firm 
entry rather than the growth of technological leaders and the prices of output fell rapidly 
(Harley 2012). 
 
Third, twentieth century innovation institutions have delivered much greater funding 
for R&D than KAIs could during the British Industrial Revolution. Cleary, much greater 
government taxation and expenditure as a share of the economy in general has played a large 
role, but so too has the division of financing between the government and the private sector. 
As chapter 4 explores, the government finances a disproportionately high share of basic 
research into propositional knowledge, while the private sector tends to finance more 
downstream R&D. In doing so, large corporations have been better able to cross-subsidise 
R&D with revenues than small firms were during the British Industrial Revolution (Chandler 
1990). Rising financing requirements appear to have set in during the nineteenth century due 
to the advance of capital intensive experimental science, as Crosland and Galvez (1989) show 
in the French context. The state-funded French Academy of Sciences responded to the 
increased demand for working capital in R&D by re-allocating financial resources away from 
prizes, which had traditionally served as the basis of R&D funding, towards research grants. 
British KAIs did not respond so adeptly.  
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In an interesting twist, since the beginning of the twenty first century, new R&D 
activities have emerged that resemble those of KAIs during the British Industrial Revolution. 
Large investments by large firms in their internal R&D departments are being increasingly 
displaced by so-called “open innovation”, the reliance upon external sources of innovation, 
such as academic technology specialists, other firms or independent inventors (Chesbrough 
2003). Arora, Cohen & Walsh (2014) find from a survey of 6,000 US manufacturing firms that 
of the 16% that had innovated, 49% reported that their most important innovation came from 
an outside source.   This shift is likely due to three factors. First, the internet is a complementary 
technology to open innovation, lowering communication and knowledge transfer costs. 
Second, innovation within the IT industry has represented a highly disproportionate share of 
overall innovation and appears to be particularly conducive to open innovation, via the ‘open 
source’ development of software by collaborating communities of programmers. Third, 
innovation in the IT sector tends to require lower capital outlays, leading to the converse of the 
rise in required outlays experienced moving out of the age of KAIs in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century.  
 
To some degree, this trend validates the activities of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
KAIs. Nevertheless, open innovation today represents just one of the numerous options on the 
menu. This menu caters much better for the idiosyncratic challenges faced by inventors, 
whether due to the depth of knowledge required, uncertainty regarding the appropriation of 
returns or the need to secure finance. Given the superiority of the twentieth century innovation 
infrastructure compared to the prototype offered by Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century 
KAIs, it is not surprising that the rate of technological innovation achieved at the technological 
frontier during the twentieth century was greater than that achieved during the British Industrial 
Revolution. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have shown in this chapter that Britain’s network of KAIs became a substantial institutional 
infrastructure during the British Industrial Revolution. I have argued that KAIs gradually 
lowered the cost of access to knowledge in Britain, thereby raising the productivity and supply 
of British R&D and that, as such, they can help us explain the gradual emergence of modern 
economic growth during the British Industrial Revolution. At the same time, KAIs lacked 
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important capabilities that the institutions that replaced them in the twentieth century 
possessed, so the transition to these institutions can help explain the further acceleration of 
economic growth in the twentieth century. In the next chapter, I present empirical tests of the 
influence of KAIs on technological innovation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Did Knowledge Access Institutions Facilitate Modern Economic Growth?  
An Empirical Investigation 
 
 
Did Knowledge Access Institutions (KAIs) contribute systematically to the acceleration in 
technological innovation that characterised the British Industrial Revolution? This chapter 
provides falsifiable evidence that suggests so. The empirical strategy used to identify this 
contribution rests on the assumption that the effect of a KAI on innovation would be stronger 
within its locale than further away. This assumption follows from two observations. First, as 
explained in chapter 2, KAIs raised the rate of technological innovation by reducing the cost 
of access to knowledge. Second, the cost of access to knowledge is an increasing function of 
geographical distance from the source (see Barthelemy 2011 for a survey). Together these 
observations imply that the regional distribution of KAIs would have influenced relative 
regional knowledge access costs and rates of technological innovation. Moreover, the 
economics literature on ‘knowledge spillovers’ shows that in the modern economy the flow of 
technological knowledge is spatially mediated (see Audretsch and Feldman 2004 for a survey). 
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, before the introduction of modern 
transportation and communication technologies, it would surely have been even more spatially 
mediated.  
 
As such, this chapter asks: was the rate of technological innovation during the British 
Industrial Revolution faster close by KAIs than further away? Did local rates of technological 
innovation accelerate in relative terms when KAIs were introduced in the vicinity? To answer 
these questions, I carry out three studies of the link between the spatial-temporal distributions 
of KAIs and technological innovation during the British Industrial Revolution and the period 
of the nineteenth century emergence of modern economic growth in the United States. These 
studies use new datasets of proxies for the spatial-temporal distribution of technological 
innovation during the British Industrial Revolution based on all English patents granted to 
British residents between 1617 and 1852 and all British exhibitors at the Great Exhibition of 
1851, and for the US case, all American patents granted up to 1873. In each case, observations 
are geocoded based on the patentee or exhibitor’s address and grouped by discrete regional 
units to create panel datasets of proxies for the rate of technological innovation. I match this 
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data with the dataset on KAIs introduced in chapter 2, along with control variables, and use 
econometric methods to test if the spatial-temporal patterns of technological innovation can be 
explained by the location and timing of KAIs.  
 
I find that local rates of patenting during the British Industrial Revolution were 
responsive to the local prevalence of core KAIs. This indicates an association between core 
KAIs and R&D/innovative effort. Furthermore, the prevalence of core KAIs also influenced 
average patent quality, indicating an association between core KAIs and R&D productivity. 
These results support the two main predictions of the Romer-Mokyr model in chapter 2. They 
are supported by a cross-sectional study of core KAIs and exhibitors and prize winners at the 
1851 Great Exhibition. British registration districts with greater numbers of core KAI members 
sent more exhibitors and won more prizes at the exhibition. Likewise, agricultural innovation 
appears to have been responsive to core agricultural KAIs in the mid-nineteenth century United 
States, with similar elasticities observed to the British industrial case. In general, the effect of 
peripheral KAIs on innovation is not detected. This may be due to a low marginal elasticity of 
innovation with respect to libraries, masonic lodges and booksellers. 
 
 
Theory: The Spatial Relationship between KAIs and Technological Innovation  
 
Consider an n-region version of the Romer-Mokyr model from chapter 2, dropping the 
simplifying assumptions that regional propositional knowledge sets are perfect complements 
and of equal size. Let m/n be the proportion of regions with at least one KAI (i.e. m regions 
have a KAI, n-m do not).  
 
The rate of technological innovation in region i in the presence of a KAI is proportional 
to:     
 
𝑑𝜆𝑖
𝑑𝑡
𝐾𝐴𝐼
= 𝛿𝐾𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑅𝑖[Ω𝑖 ∪ ⋃ Ω𝑗
𝑚≤𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖
] 
 
 
Conversely, without a KAI, the rate of technological innovation in region i is proportional to: 
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𝑑𝜆𝑖
𝑑𝑡
𝑁𝑂 𝐾𝐴𝐼
= 𝛿𝑁𝑂 𝐾𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑅𝑖Ω𝑖 
 
The marginal effect of region i’s first KAI on the local rate of innovation is positive for two 
reasons. First, the productivity of research in region i increases, since 𝛿𝐾𝐴𝐼>𝛿𝑁𝑂 𝐾𝐴𝐼, owing to 
the influence of ‘scientific R&D’, as described in chapter 2. Second, researchers in region i 
now have access to the propositional knowledge sets of all m regions, which represents a fall 
in knowledge access costs so long as m >1 and the other m-1 regions have non-zero 
propositional knowledge sets. This term captures the network effects of KAIs on technological 
innovation described in chapter 2. 
 
 Clearly, identifying these effects requires controlling for confounding variables, such 
as differences in the allocation of innovative effort over space and time. As such, it is desirable 
to use within-region estimation, which enables one to control for time invariant characteristics, 
and time fixed effects to control for the national trend over time.   
 
Empirical Strategy: Distance and Access to Knowledge 
 
Regional variation in knowledge stocks assumes that the cost of accessing knowledge held only 
in region i is lower for an inventor residing in region i than region j. The positive relationship 
between distance to source and the cost of knowledge access is the key to the empirical strategy 
of this chapter. What evidence exists that it holds? 
 
There are three types of evidence. First, the ‘knowledge spillovers’ literature has 
illustrated the spatial mediation of knowledge flows within the process of technological 
innovation in the modern economy. Knowledge spillovers represent an inventor’s exploitation 
of another agent’s knowledge base. The source agent may be, for instance, a research university 
or corporate R&D department. Knowledge spillovers tend to be localised in nature: inventors 
based further away from the producer of a unit of knowledge are less likely to utilise it, even 
after controlling for the spatial distribution of economic activity. The seminal contribution to 
the literature was Griliches’ (1979) ‘knowledge production function’, which modelled regional 
innovation outputs, e.g. patents, as a function of regional knowledge inputs e.g. corporate R&D 
expenditure and university research. Using this model, Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Jaffe 
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(1986, 1989) showed that patenting rates across US states could be explained by state-level 
corporate R&D expenditure and university research of agents other than the patentees. 
Subsequent studies strengthened the identification of localised knowledge flows by examining 
spatial data on patent citation pairs. These studies showed that patent citations were 
systematically biased towards other local patents, even after controlling for industrial location 
(e.g. Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson 1993, or see Audretsch & Feldman 2004 for an 
authoritative survey), suggesting that locally produced knowledge is more accessible than 
knowledge produced further away. More recently, Cowan and Zinovyeva (2013) have tested 
the effect of an exogenous supply of knowledge inputs on local technological innovation in the 
form of the national policy-led expansion of the Italian university system between 1985 and 
2000, finding a large effect.  
 
Second, Jasjit Singh (2005) and Stefano Breschi and Francesco Lissoni (2009) have 
examined the link between the spatial and social mediation of knowledge access. By matching 
data on patent citation pairs to data on connections between inventors, based on past research 
collaborations, they show that the local bias of social connections explains most of the spatial 
mediation of patent citations. Knowledge tends to flow between individuals residing close to 
one another because those individuals know one another, not merely because they are subject 
to the same local stimuli.  
 
Third, recent studies have used large-scale spatial datasets based on online social 
networks, mobile phone calls and emails to illustrate the generality of the spatial embeddedness 
of social connections. For example, using data on the locations of users of Facebook in the US, 
Backstrom et al. (2010) find that the probability of a connection between two users declines 
rapidly as distance between them increases. This can be summarized by the formula 
Prob(friendship) = (0.2 + x)-1.05, where x is distance in miles. This result holds beyond 
Facebook connections. Goldenberg and Levy (2009) obtain a similar result, i.e. a decay 
exponent for the probability of connection of the order of -1, using the IP addresses of email 
pairs in the US. In the case of inventors, Cerina et al. (2014) show using data on joint patentees 
(controlling for inventors working for the same institution) that the probability of connection 
also decays by distance with a decay exponent of around -1. Using data on phone call pairs, 
Sobelevsky et al. (2013) illustrate the strongly localised nature of mobile phone communication 
in Great Britain. Relatedly, Gonzalez, Hidalgo and Barabasi (2008) illustrate the strongly 
localised nature of individual geographical mobility. They show that the probability of an 
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individual making a phone call from any location decays as a function of the distance of that 
location from that of the individual’s modal location. The distance decay exponent of -1.75 
captures a somewhat steeper decay than between-person connections. This is as one would 
expect, since one is likely to substitute physical travel for remote communication as distance 
increases.  
 
This evidence reveals that locally produced knowledge is more accessible than 
knowledge produced further away and that this is because social networks are spatially 
embedded. Moreover, the spatial embeddedness of social networks is general, so we should 
expect knowledge access to be spatially mediated in general. Indeed, the spatial mediation of 
social networks and limits to individual geographical mobility would surely have been much 
greater during the British Industrial Revolution and in the mid-nineteenth century US than 
during modern times owing to the much higher transport and communication costs that 
prevailed prior to the full expansion of the rail network and the introduction of the telegraph, 
telephone, automobile, air travel and the internet. 
 
 
Study 1: KAIs and Patenting during the British Industrial Revolution 
 
This study investigates whether the regional prevalence of KAIs affected regional patenting 
rates and quality during the British Industrial Revolution. It uses a panel dataset of all patents 
filed under English jurisdiction by British residents between 1757 and 1852 grouped by county 
and census registration district in ten year intervals. This dataset is matched to data on core and 
peripheral KAIs introduced in chapter 2. Panel data on population and, for some cross-sections, 
manufacturing employment, are also matched to act as controls. I estimate within-region to 
help reduce potential bias from omitted variables.  
 
The strength of this study is that it observes the overall period of the British Industrial 
Revolution as conventionally dated. However, it suffers from two weaknesses. First, the set of 
controls included is quite sparse owing to the lack of available data. Regional fixed-effects 
mitigate this weakness somewhat and an additional two-period ‘long panel’ is constructed 
specifically to allow for the inclusion of a manufacturing employment variable as a control for 
industrialisation, nevertheless, more controls would have further helped identification. Second, 
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the use of patent counts as an indicator of the rate of technological innovation suffers from well 
documented flaws, and should always be interpreted with caution (Griliches 1990, Hall 2013). 
The main problems are that not all innovation is patented and not all patents represent valuable 
innovation. Since not all innovations are patented, differences in the propensity to patent over 
space and time may give rise to observed differential patent counts that do not reflect 
differential innovation. In the cross section, the problem arises when comparing across 
different patent jurisdictions, which can introduce significant differentials in the costs and 
benefits of patenting due to differences in patent fees, the time-demands of the application 
process and the size of the addressable market covered by the patent. In time series, the problem 
arises when reform of the patent system materially changes the costs and benefits of patenting 
over time, the cost or availability of patent services (such as patent agents or lawyers) changes 
over time, or the growth of the market raises the return to inventions.  
 
This study observes a single patent jurisdiction that underwent no reforms or fee 
changes during the period under consideration. Patentees increasingly used agents during the 
latter eighteenth century, cutting down the length of the application procedure possibly from 
around six months to two months. However, this was an expensive service to procure, adding 
a further £40 to £100 of cost to the £100 patent fee, compared to an average skilled worker’s 
weekly wage of between £1 and £2. As such, it is not clear that this represented a significant 
average cost reduction (Bottomley 2015). Market size increased over time due to the growth 
of the economy.39 However, this was a national-level factor which can be controlled for in a 
within-region estimation framework by using time fixed effects. Likewise, within-region 
estimation enables one to control for time invariant regional influences on the relative 
propensity to patent, such as distance to London, which would have affected patentee 
transaction costs40. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 (though note that Richard Sullivan has found that the elasticity of patenting to market size during the 
nineteenth century was much lower than during modern times (Sullivan 1994) 
40 Some influence will remain if relative geographical propensities to patent change over time. 
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Figure 3.1: Partial correlation across countries in 2006 of resident patent filings and 
R&D spend, controlling for GDP and population (data from WIPO) 
 
 
 
How problematic valueless patents prove to be depends on the research question at 
hand. If patenting is not trivially cheap then even valueless patents represent a significant outlay 
of innovative effort. As figure 3.1 shows, there is a strong partial correlation between patenting 
rates and R&D expenditure across countries in 200641, controlling for GDP and population. 
This indicates a strong relationship between innovative effort and patenting rates, even despite 
differences in national patenting jurisdictions. Patenting in England during the Industrial 
Revolution was expensive, as mentioned above and explored in more detail in chapter 4. 
Therefore, patent counts are likely to capture variation in innovative effort, as it features in the 
Romer-Mokyr model.  
 
To capture variation in the productivity of innovative effort, I employ a measure of 
patent quality for English patents prior to 1852 advocated by Alessandro Nuvolari and 
Valentina Tartari (2011).  This is based on a count of references to each patent in the 
contemporary technological and legal literature discussed below. Finally, to circumvent patent 
data concerns entirely, study two below uses data on technology exhibits rather than patents. 
 
 
                                                          
41 using data from the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
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KAIs and Patenting during the British Industrial Revolution: Data 
 
I have constructed a dataset of all English patents registered by British residents from 1617, 
the year of the first registered patent, to 1852, the year of the first substantive reforms to the 
patent system. An aggregate annual time series of registered patents and a 10-year moving 
average are shown in figure 3.2, however, the original feature of the dataset is the spatial coding 
of patentee residences to enable regional disaggregation. The dataset was constructed by 
manually entering information from the Titles of Patents of Invention Chronologically 
Arranged, 1617–1852 (Woodcroft 1854), located in the British Library, into a spreadsheet and 
geocoding the addresses of patentee residences. I convert residence information, which in most 
cases includes parish, village, town or city and county to British Ordnance Survey co-ordinates 
using data kindly provided by Tim Leunig at LSE and a matching algorithm between addresses 
and corresponding degrees of latitude and longitude, supplied by http://www.geonames.org/. 
Where place names taken from the Chronological Index were unsuccessfully matched by this 
method because of the use of historical spellings or defunct place names, I assigned co-
ordinates manually using Google Maps. I use GIS software to convert latitudinal and 
longitudinal co-ordinates to kilometres east and north from a fixed point located south-west of 
the British land mass, as per the convention of British Ordnance Survey coordinates (referred 
to as ‘easting’ and ‘northing’ coordinates). This conversion adjusts for the curvature of the 
Earth.  
 
I match each patent with its entry in the Reference Index of English Patents of Invention, 
1617–1852 (Woodcroft 1855), from which a patent quality index can be derived, as shown by 
Nuvolari and Tartari (2011). This Reference Index was compiled in 1855 by Bennet Woodcroft 
of the British Patent Office and contains a list of citations in technological and legal 
publications for each patent. Nuvolari and Tartari argue that although the index is subject to 
sources of noise, it contains information about the relative quality of individual patents. For 
example, they show that it assigns high scores to historically important patents. The index is 
particularly useful if used to estimate the average quality of a group of patents, reducing 
idiosyncratic noise at the individual patent level. Nuvolari and Tartari de-trend Woodcroft’s 
original count index to control for time heterogeneity. Following their approach, I apply a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (with lambda=6.25) to the annual average of Woodcroft’s simple count 
index and divide each patent’s count by the value of the time-trend in that year. Then, because 
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of the highly non-linear distribution of references across patents, as illustrated in figure 3.3,42 
I create a binary indicator of patent quality in which the top 10% of patents based on the de-
trended index are coded to equal 1, representing ‘top patents’, and the bottom 90% are coded 
to equal 0.  
 
Figure 3.2: English Patent Applications by British Residents, by Year 1617-1852 
 
Figure 3.3: the distribution of continuous weighted Woodcroft Reference Index 
 
                                                          
42 which matches the pattern of modern citation distributions (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg 2000) 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1
6
1
7
1
6
2
4
1
6
3
1
1
6
3
8
1
6
4
5
1
6
5
2
1
6
5
9
1
6
6
6
1
6
7
3
1
6
8
0
1
6
8
7
1
6
9
4
1
7
0
1
1
7
0
8
1
7
1
5
1
7
2
2
1
7
2
9
1
7
3
6
1
7
4
3
1
7
5
0
1
7
5
7
1
7
6
4
1
7
7
1
1
7
7
8
1
7
8
5
1
7
9
2
1
7
9
9
1
8
0
6
1
8
1
3
1
8
2
0
1
8
2
7
1
8
3
4
1
8
4
1
1
8
4
8
Annual count 10 year moving average
Empirical Investigation: Did KAIs facilitate Modern Economic Growth? 
105 
 
Fields included in the dataset are: year of patent, patentee name, patentee address 
(town/village, county, street if in London), geocoded co-ordinates of patentee address, patentee 
occupation, industrial sectors to which the patent applies (not a unique field, i.e. a patent may 
apply to more than one industrial sector), a brief description of the patent and the binary patent 
quality measure described above based on the Woodcroft Reference Index. I construct the 
dataset at the level of patentee, and include separate observations where there are multiple 
patentees for a single patent. 
 
I derive from this individual patentee-level dataset, two region-period panel datasets. 
The first is a county-decade panel, which includes all 86 English, Welsh and Scottish counties 
covering Great Britain. The decade counts for each county are centred in ten year intervals 
around the years 1761, 1781, … , 1851, and include the patents filed between years t-5 to t+5 
inclusive, except for the count centred on 1851 which is truncated in 1852 because of 
substantive reform of the system in that year which may have affected the comparability of 
observations beyond this date. The overall observation period 1756 to 1852 provides good 
coverage of the conventional dating of the period of the British Industrial Revolution. The 
second panel is a ‘long-panel’ of two cross-sections of the 586 English and Welsh census 
registration districts centred on 1817 and 1851. I group registration districts in London together 
due to the indeterminacy of the registration district level location of many of the KAIs within 
London in the dataset43. This panel was constructed to exploit the availability of data on sector-
specific employment for these years, as discussed below. 
 
Table 3.1 displays patents per capita by English county-decade, expressed as a 
percentage of the contemporaneous London count in each decade. As the British Industrial 
Revolution progressed, patenting rates in Lancashire, Warwickshire, Staffordshire44 
Leicestershire and the East Riding of Yorkshire made up ground on London. Nevertheless, 
London held on to its dominance throughout the entire period, Warwickshire getting the closest 
at around 60% of the London rate from 1811 onwards. Figure 3.4 displays the geographic 
distribution of patents per capita in 1761, 1801 and 1851. 
 
 
                                                          
43 Hence, the overall number of registration districts is reduced from 623 to 586. 
44 discounting its high starting rate in 1761’s which had fallen by 1771 
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Table 3.1: Patents per capita by decade (centred around year t), by English county, 
expressed as percentage of London patents per capita each decade. 
County 1761 1771 1781 1791 1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 1851 
BEDFORDSHIRE 0.0 25.4 0.0 5.0 3.8 14.1 10.1 0.0 4.3 2.5 
BERKSHIRE 0.0 0.0 10.0 2.8 5.8 7.3 1.4 2.4 3.0 8.3 
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE 0.0 4.8 0.0 5.9 2.6 2.0 9.2 4.8 4.2 11.5 
CAMBRIDGESHIRE 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 2.8 8.1 1.7 4.3 6.3 5.1 
CHESHIRE 6.1 2.9 6.3 6.8 16.0 14.1 9.2 8.0 5.8 13.2 
CORNWALL 13.0 6.6 11.2 7.1 14.4 7.5 5.9 8.4 7.0 6.9 
CUMBERLAND 9.7 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.2 1.6 1.4 8.7 4.3 10.9 
DERBYSHIRE 7.5 15.0 13.3 8.4 17.9 11.6 22.4 11.1 9.6 15.8 
DEVONSHIRE 5.6 4.8 5.3 7.4 5.9 7.6 13.4 14.4 6.1 6.6 
DORSETSHIRE 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 4.6 1.7 3.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 
DURHAM 13.3 3.6 0.0 8.3 12.7 5.9 8.6 8.4 10.9 11.2 
EAST RIDING 0.0 4.0 5.8 6.5 15.9 17.8 10.1 7.6 10.5 7.8 
ESSEX 0.0 6.9 3.4 4.4 10.8 13.4 12.3 13.6 10.5 14.8 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE 8.0 6.4 9.3 25.4 28.7 28.4 32.1 28.5 11.7 9.4 
HAMPSHIRE 4.8 0.0 12.0 7.3 15.1 6.8 8.6 14.2 6.8 10.6 
HEREFORDSHIRE 10.5 11.0 4.0 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 6.6 
HERTFORDSHIRE 0.0 4.7 0.0 3.2 9.9 14.7 4.9 17.1 7.1 7.6 
HUNTINGDONSHIRE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 17.3 13.6 
KENT 3.6 9.9 9.6 7.4 15.6 11.6 18.0 21.2 9.3 13.9 
LANCASHIRE 17.0 11.7 18.1 11.0 15.5 11.3 17.0 20.5 26.9 33.7 
LEICESTERSHIRE 0.0 0.0 6.3 5.0 9.4 8.1 4.9 13.7 27.6 19.6 
LINCOLNSHIRE 0.0 2.5 1.8 3.0 4.9 0.9 5.5 5.4 3.2 7.4 
LONDON 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
NORFOLK 0.0 1.8 11.1 2.3 4.7 7.9 7.7 1.6 3.8 4.9 
NORTH RIDING 0.0 3.1 6.8 2.0 1.7 5.3 1.2 3.5 6.7 5.1 
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.9 7.9 10.5 6.8 2.4 4.4 7.7 
NORTHUMBERLAND 6.4 16.7 12.3 14.9 16.5 14.6 7.2 16.9 17.4 23.3 
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 82.6 105.7 117.8 67.9 44.7 39.8 48.4 60.5 39.9 40.8 
OXFORDSHIRE 9.0 0.0 13.9 11.9 9.0 6.9 3.2 6.9 15.4 5.8 
RUTLAND 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 0.0 0.0 6.8 
SHROPSHIRE 6.3 13.1 7.2 27.7 8.3 8.4 8.2 4.6 4.4 3.4 
SOMERSETSHIRE 3.8 2.0 9.9 8.0 16.1 13.3 13.2 11.2 5.2 3.2 
STAFFORDSHIRE 21.8 10.7 3.7 11.5 20.9 18.3 19.5 21.8 19.1 19.8 
SUFFOLK 0.0 2.5 1.8 3.1 8.2 2.6 4.9 4.3 11.9 7.3 
SUSSEX 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 4.7 8.7 14.0 3.1 4.8 6.3 
WARWICKSHIRE 18.2 50.4 45.4 53.5 42.0 59.9 59.5 66.9 59.6 60.0 
WEST RIDING 12.0 7.0 7.8 23.0 17.1 12.4 17.7 14.8 11.6 14.6 
WESTMORLAND 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 1.7 11.3 
WILTSHIRE 4.5 4.9 5.4 7.7 8.7 0.0 5.3 12.2 15.9 29.4 
WORCESTERSHIRE 0.0 3.6 2.7 9.1 7.6 15.1 17.6 17.6 15.5 20.3 
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Figure 3.4: Patents per Capita by 
County (centred decade) 
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A Novel Measure of the Spatial Distribution of Technological Innovation 
 
As a digression, I illustrate below a novel approach to mapping the spatial distribution of 
technological innovation with patent data, which controls for the spatial distribution of 
patenting itself. This is based on a case-control method influenced by the epidemiological 
literature on the spatial prevalence of disease. The spatial distribution of risk to a disease is 
estimated by how the spatial distribution of disease cases differs to that of the population at 
risk, which is estimated from a random sampling of individual addresses (see Bithell 
1990,1991, Prince et al. 2001, Wheeler 2007 for examples). Analogously, by utilising a quality 
measure of patents, high quality patents can be used to represent cases of exceptional 
innovativeness while low or average quality patents can be used as controls for the underlying 
spatial distribution of patenting. For example, there is a differential in local innovativeness 
between a location with a high and low quality patent and a location with two low quality 
patents. The benefit of this measure is that the difference in the spatial distribution of the cases 
and controls represents a measure of local innovativeness while controlling for the underlying 
factors determining the distribution of patents such as population, industry location or 
individual propensity to patent.    
 
The distributions of cases and controls can be compared using an analogous measure to 
the epidemiological log relative risk density, which identifies statistically significant 
differences in the distribution of the cases to the distribution of controls. This involves 
estimating bivariate kernel density functions for the distribution of point locations of cases and 
controls, and dividing case distribution by the control distribution at each point location. The 
result is a contour/heat map of the density of cases relative to the controls, where the x and y 
coordinates represent the geographical area under study and the contours/colours represent 
innovativeness. To carry out this methodology I follow the programming procedure in R 
proposed by Davies, Hazelton and Marshall (2011).  
 
 I take as case observations the top 10% of patents ranked by the de-trended Woodcroft 
citations index and their corresponding point location in ordinance survey co-ordinate units. 
For controls I take a random sample of observations drawn from the bottom ranked 75% patents 
from the same period. I use a control to case ratio of two, following Davies et al, and limit the 
selection of controls to the bottom 75% of the quality distribution to avoid including marginal 
cases among them. The distribution of cases and controls are shown in figures 3.5 and 3.6 for 
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the periods 1750 to 1800 and 1810 to 1830, which are chosen to investigate the evolution over 
time45.   
 
Figure 3.5: High (cases) and Low (controls) Quality Patents 1750-1800 
 
 
Figure 3.6: High (cases) and Low (controls) Quality Patents 1800-1830 
 
 
                                                          
45 This analysis was undertaken quite early on in the PhD project. At that point I had only collected patent data 
up to 1830. Although I intend to do so, I have not yet extended the analysis to include the 1830-1852 patent 
data.  
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The two bivariate densities, f for the case observations and g for the controls, are 
estimated by kernel smoothing, using the standard bivariate normal probability density 
function, the Gaussian kernel:  
 
 
𝑓(𝒛) =
1
𝑛
∑ℎ𝑗
1−2𝐾 (
𝒛 − 𝑿𝑖
1
ℎ𝑗
1 )
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
and 
?̂?(𝒛) =
1
𝑚
∑ℎ𝑗
2−2𝐾 (
𝒛 − 𝑿𝑗
2
ℎ𝑗
2 )
𝑚
𝑗=1
 
 
where 𝑿𝑖
1 are case observations (i = 1, … , n) and 𝑿𝑗
2  are control observations (j = 1,…,m); K 
is the kernel function, chosen to be the bivariate normal probability density function (the 
bivariate Gaussian kernel); z is a set of two dimensional coordinate points across Britain at 
which K is evaluated, and ℎ𝑗
1 and ℎ𝑗
2 represent the smoothing parameter or bandwidth for the 
ith and jth observation of the cases and controls respectively. Often the bandwidth is chosen to 
be a constant value across observations, i.e. a fixed bandwidth. However, I follow Davies et al. 
in using the more flexible approach suggested by Abramson (1982) of calculating bandwidths 
that vary across the geographic space according to the density of observations. This enables 
greater local contour detail where there are more observations and less contour detail where 
there are fewer observations.  
 
 The estimated (log) relative innovation density, ?̂?, can be expressed as the log ratio of 
the estimated case and control densities 𝑓 and ?̂? respectively (the log value of the ratio is taken 
to symmetrize the treatment of the two densities). The estimated function ?̂? is therefore written 
as 
 
?̂?(𝒛) = log (
𝑓(𝒛)
?̂?(𝒛)
) 
 
Finally, a procedure to correct for the bias that the boundaries of the area under analysis 
introduce is implemented, described in Marshall and Hazelton (2010). In order to identify 
statistically significant fluctuations in relative innovation density, I follow a procedure 
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described in Davies and Hazleton (2010), to test the following one-tailed hypothesis for each 
point-location at which ?̂? is evaluated: 
 
H0: ?̂?(𝒛) =  0 
H1: ?̂?(𝒛)  > 0 
 
The null hypothesis is that the relative densities of the cases and controls are not different at 
point z, and the alternative hypothesis is that the case density is higher than the control density 
at point z. This is to say that under the null hypothesis, there is no statistically significant 
evidence of disproportionally high innovation at a particular location, but under the alternative 
there is statistically significant evidence of an elevated innovativeness. The output of this 
procedure is a surface of p-values related to the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 3.7: Log relative innovation density 1750-1800 (left) and 1810-1830 (right). 
 
High innovation patent density relative to low innovation patent density. Zero signifies equal density at point location. 
Contour lines represent statistically significant innovativeness at the 1% level (solid line) and 5% level (dashed line).      
   
 Figure 3.7 graphically displays the results for the periods 1750-1800, and 1810-1830 
respectively. Each is in the form of a heat map indicating the log relative innovation density, 
and contour lines representing statisitcally significant elevated innovation at the 5% (solid 
black line) and 10% (dashed black line) levels. It is interesting that during the second half of 
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the eigtheenth century, London is the most innovative region. As chapter 2 showed, London 
dominated the KAI infrastucture during this time also. As the British Industrial Revolution 
progressed during the early nineteenth century, however, the midlands, northern England  and 
Scotland become the most innovative regions. Clearly, many factors could help explain this 
diffusion of innovative activity, including the patterns of industrialisation taking hold. But one 
factor may have been the diffusion of the KAI infrastucture out of London into the provinces 
as illustrated in chapter 2.   
 
KAIs and Patenting during the British Industrial Revolution: Control Variables 
 
The patent datasets are matched with the datsets on KAIs introduced in chapter 2. For each 
decade centred on year t, extending to years t-5 and t+5, the count of KAIs includes those that 
were present for at least one of these years. County-level counts for 1761, 1801 and 1851 are 
shown in table 2.3. Population is calculated by county-decade and registration district-decade 
and manufacturing employment by registration district-decade. Population data is taken from 
the decennial census covering all of Britain for 1801, 1811, 1821, 1831, 1841 and 1851. Prior 
to 1801, popualtion data for English counties is taken from Wrigley (2009). Scottish county 
popualtions prior to 1801 are estimted as follows: for 1761 I use estimates for 1755 in 
Webster’s Analysis of Population and for 1771, 1781 and 1791, I interpolate between 
Webster’s estimate and the 1801 census figures. Welsh county-level population data is not 
available at all prior to 1801, so Welsh observations only begin in 1801. Data on manufacturing 
employment by English registration district in 1817 and 1851 was kindly provided by the 
Cambridge Population Group at Cambridge University, which has constructed detailed 
registration district-level occupational employment datasets for these two years. The 1851 
dataset is based on the 1851 census of occupations, while the 1817 dataset is the result of a 
‘synthetic’ occupational census created by the Group (Kitson et al. 2010). 
 
KAIs and Patenting during the British Industrial Revolution: Model 
 
Using the panel datasets described above, I estimate the effect of KAIs on patent counts with 
controls. All variables are log-transformed because of their highly skewed distributions, which 
is typical of count data. In the case of KAIs and patents, I use the transformation log(x+1), 
because both variables include numerous zero counts in county-decades and registration 
district-decades, which are too valuable to the estimation procedure to omit. A prominent prior 
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example of this approach to dealing with zero counts is Nathan Nunn’s historical study of 
Africa’s slave trade in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (2008). Count data models, such as 
Poisson or negative binomial regression models – which can handle zero counts without the 
use of an arbitrary transformation – cannot be used here because of the incidental parameters 
problem, due to inclusion of a large set of fixed-effects (Angrist & Pischke 2009). However, 
the regression results displayed below are robust to altering the log(x+1) transformation by 
adding alternative arbitrary constants to the KAI and patent counts, such as 0.1 or 0.01, and 
indeed to excluding the zeros counts of KAIs and patents. First, I estimate the following two 
models: 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnCORE KAIsit + β2LnPUBLIC LIBRARIESit + + β3LnMASONIC 
LODGESit + β4LnBOOKSLLERSit + β5LnPOPit  + δj  + ɣt  + εit                                    (3.1)  
 
𝐿𝑛𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnCORE KAIsit + β2LnPUBLIC LIBRARIESit + β3LnMASONIC 
LODGES + β4LnBOOKSELLERS + β5LnMALE POPULATION OVER 20it + 
β6LnMANUFACRTURING EMPLOYMENTit  + δj  + ɣt  + εit                                        (3.2)                                               
 
where in equation 3.1, LnPATENTSit is the log of the count of patents in county i and decade t, 
LnCORE KAIsit is the log of core KAIs in county i in decade t, LnPUBLIC LIBRARIESit is the 
log of public libraries in county i in decade t, LnMASONIC LODGESit is the log of masonic 
lodges in county i in decade t, LnBOOKSELLERSit is the log of booksellers in county i in 
decade t, LnPOPit is logged population in county i in the centre of decade t. δj is a set of 86 
county fixed effects, and ɣt is a full set of decade time fixed-effects for t = 1761, 1771, … , 
1851. Standard errors are clustered by county. Some descriptive statistics for patent and KAI 
counts by decade are shown in table 3.3.  
 
Equation 3.2 changes the unit of observation to 586 registration districts and time to t 
= 1817 and 1851. LnINDUS is the log count of manufacturing employment in registration 
district i and period t. Counts are log(x+1) transformed and standard errors are clustered by 
registration district.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of patent and core KAI counts by decade 
 Patents     Core KAIs     
 Year Mean S.D Max Mean S.D Max 
1761 1.1 2.2 13 1.6 7.4 65 
1771 1.5 2.7 14 3.2 15.3 134 
1781 2.0 3.4 14 4.8 21.5 187 
1791 3.4 5.0 24 6.8 27.8 242 
1801 4.2 6.2 33 10.0 42.0 373 
1811 5.3 7.6 46 13.2 58.9 523 
1821 7.8 10.0 60 16.6 70.2 619 
1831 10.1 13.6 85 21.0 90.0 790 
1841 14.8 21.1 122 49.9 220.4 1916 
1851 19.0 27.4 171 38.4 165.5 1422 
 
 
Next, I estimate the effect of KAIs on patent quality using the patent quality indicator 
based on the Woodcroft Reference Index. I replace the patent count in equations 3.1 and 3.2 
with a count of the 10% of top patents only and add the overall patent count as a regressor, 
which controls for the distribution of the quantity of patenting. I estimate equations 3.3 and 3.4 
below, where all subscripts have the same representation as equations 3.1 and 3.2 respectively: 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑂𝑃 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnCORE KAIsit + β2LnPUBLIC LIBRARIESit + + 
β3LnMASONIC LODGESit + β4LnBOOKSLLERSit + β5LnPOPit  + β6LnPATENTSit + δj  + ɣt  
+ εit     (3.3)  
 
𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑂𝑃 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnCORE KAIsit + β2LnPUBLIC LIBRARIESit + 
β3LnMASONIC LODGES + β4LnBOOKSELLERS + β5LnMALE POPULATION OVER 20it + 
β6LnMANUFACRTURING EMPLOYMENTit  + β7LnPATENTSit + δj  + ɣt  + εit                                            
(3.4)                                        
 
The spatial distribution of patent quality may be influenced by industrial location if top 
patents are not distributed proportionally across industry sectors. If, in turn, industry sectors 
with high quality patents are spatially correlated with KAIs then this would bias upwards the 
estimate of the effect of KAIs on patent quality. Table 3.2 shows top patent ratios by sector, as 
measured by the proportion of sector i’s patents that are top patents. Top patents were quite 
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varied across sectors of the economy. The top sector was beverages where 14% of patents were 
in the top 10% by quality, second was transport with 12% and third was food at 11.1%. For 
industrial patents, which are most likely to be spatially correlated with KAIs, 10.5% were in 
the top 10%, which represents only a small skew above the unconditional expected proportion 
of 10%.  
 
Table 3.2: Sector Distribution of Top Patents 
Sector 
% in top 
5% 
% in top 
10% 
% in top 
15% 
Agriculture 0 1.1 11.2 
Beverages 9.7 14.0 19.4 
Clothing 3.1 7.7 10.8 
Communications 0 0 25.0 
Domestic 3.1 7.7 10.4 
Food 7.1 11.1 13.1 
Industrial 5.2 10.5 15.2 
Instruments 2.1 5.3 9.6 
Medical 2.8 2.8 8.3 
Military 2.4 3.6 7.2 
Paper & printing 3.4 7.8 12.1 
Textiles 5.6 8.9 11.2 
Transport 5.5 12.0 18.3 
Note: sectors not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
KAIs and Patenting during the British Industrial Revolution: Results 
 
As a starting point, figure 3.8 displays the cross-sectional relationship in 1851 between core 
KAIs per capita and patenting per capita, illustrating a clear correlation. Table 3.4 displays the 
results of the regressions based on equation 3.1. Core KAIs are strongly associated with 
patenting rates, both in the pooled cross-section (column 1) and within-county (column 2). 
Within-county, the elasticity of patenting to the growth of KAIs is 0.43 with a standard error 
of 0.05. Among the peripheral KAIs, Masonic Lodges appear to be associated with patenting 
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rates, with an elasticity of 0.19 and a standard error of 0.09. Booksellers have a significant 
effect in the pooled cross section but not within-county and public libraries exhibit a positive 
but insignificant effect in both specifications. Table 3.5 displays the results of the 1817-1851 
census registration districts long-panel. Core KAIs retain their strong association with 
patenting, both in the cross section and within-county over time. However, within-registration 
district the elasticity of patenting to core KAIs has roughly halved to about 0.18 with a standard 
error of 0.07. This might be due to correcting for manufacturing employment. Masonic lodges 
also retain their association with patenting, exhibiting a similar elasticity to the county level 
model of around 0.16 with a standard error of 0.08. Figure 3.9 shows the relationship across 
census registration districts of the change in KAIs between 1817 and 1851 and the 
corresponding change in the patent count, which has an R2 of 0.24. 
 
The above results indicate a significant association between the regional emergence of 
KAIs and patenting, suggesting a positive effect of KAIs on innovative effort as predicted by 
the Romer-Mokyr model. Table 3.6 presents estimates of the effect of KAIs on research 
productivity as captured by patent quality, based on equations 3.3 and 3.4. At the county level, 
there is a strong positive association between core KAIs and the quality of patenting. Top 
patents exhibit an elasticity of 0.24 to core KAIs with a standard error of 0.05 after controlling 
for the overall patent count. The impact of Masonic lodges on patent quality is negative. At the 
registration district level, controlling for manufacturing employment, the effect of core KAIs 
on patent quality is diminished, although still detectable and significant under some 
specifications. The elasticity of top patents to core KAIs is 0.1 in the cross section (standard 
error 0.03) and 0.05 within-registration district between 1817 and 1851 (standard error 0.03) if 
the peripheral KAIs are excluded from the model (column 3). However, when peripheral KAIs 
are included (column 2) the elasticity of top patents to core KAIs falls to 0.035 and is 
insignificant.  
 
The main result of this study is the association of core KAIs with both patent quality 
and patent quantity, as the Romer-Mokyr model predicts. 
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Figure 3.8: Log Patents per Capita versus Log Core KAIs per Capita in 1851, by 
County 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Change in log of Learned Societies vs change in log of patents, 1817 to 1851, 
by English census registration district 
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Table 3.4: Determinants of patenting by British county-decade, 1761-1851 
 (1) (2) 
Data: 
 
 
 
Dep Variable: 
 
County-decade panel 
1761-1851 
Pooled Cross Section 
 
Ln Patents 
County-decade panel 
1761-1851 
Fixed Effects 
 
Ln Patents 
 
Ln Core KAIs 
 
0.555*** 
 
0.431*** 
 (0.0802) (0.0480) 
   
Ln Public Libraries 0.0385 0.106 
 (0.0556) (0.0735) 
   
Ln Booksellers 0.125** 0.0102 
 (0.0570) (0.0513) 
   
Ln Masonic Lodges 0.129 0.190** 
 (0.0891) (0.0884) 
   
Ln Population 0.323*** 0.128 
 
 
 
County Fixed Effects 
 
 
Decade Fixed Effects 
 
(0.0760) 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
(0.129) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Observations 808 808 
Counties 
Years 
R2 
86 
10 
0.755 
86 
10 
0.633 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0 
Welsh counties only included from 1801 onwards due to availability of population data. 
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Table 3.5: Determinants of patenting by English Registration District, 1817 and 1851 
 
 (1) (2) 
Data: 
 
 
 
Dep Variable: 
 
Registration District 
Long panel 1817 & 1851 
Pooled Cross Section 
 
Ln Patents 
Registration District 
Long panel 1817 & 1851 
Fixed Effects 
 
Ln Patents 
 
Ln Core KAIs 
 
0.369*** 
 
0.184** 
 (0.0590) (0.0715) 
   
Ln Public Libraries 0.0245 0.152 
 (0.0299) (0.0983) 
   
Ln Booksellers 0.0197 -0.0684 
 (0.0309) (0.0442) 
   
Ln Masonic Lodges 0.224*** 0.157** 
 (0.0523) (0.0790) 
   
Ln Population 0.188 0.973*** 
 (0.124) (0.262) 
   
Ln Manufacturing Employment 0.220*** -0.379** 
 
 
 
Reg. District Fixed Effects 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
(0.0848) 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
(0.176) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Observations 
Registration Districts 
Years 
1,175 
586 
2 
1,175 
586 
2 
R2 0.494 0.251 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
London census registration districts grouped together 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of patent quality by British counties, 1761 to 1851 
 (1) (2) 
Data: 
 
 
 
Dep Variable: 
 
County-decade panel 
1761-1851 
Pooled Cross Section 
 
Ln Top Patents 
County-decade panel 
1761-1851 
Fixed Effects 
 
Ln Top Patents 
 
Ln Core KAIs 
 
0.208*** 
 
0.239*** 
 (0.0433) (0.0448) 
   
Ln Public Libraries -0.0780*** -0.0734* 
 (0.0291) (0.0436) 
   
Ln Booksellers 0.0121 0.0303 
 (0.0266) (0.0418) 
   
Ln Masonic Lodges -0.00537 -0.145** 
 (0.0335) (0.0730) 
   
Ln Population -0.0649** 0.179 
 (0.0264) (0.111) 
   
Ln Patents 0.416*** 0.293*** 
 
 
 
County Fixed Effects 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
(0.0474) 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
(0.0332) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
Counties 
Years 
808 
86 
10 
808 
86 
10 
R2 0.702 0.523 
Clustered standard errors by county in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Welsh counties only included from 1801 onwards due to availability of population data. 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of patent quality by English Registration District, 1817 and 
1851 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Registration 
District Long 
panel 1817 & 
1851 
Pooled Cross 
Section 
Ln Patents 
Registration 
District Long 
panel 1817 & 
1851 
Fixed Effects 
 
Ln Patents 
Registration 
District Long 
panel 1817 & 
1851 
Fixed Effects 
 
Ln Patents 
Ln Core KAIs 0.110*** 0.0348 0.0498* 
 (0.0337) (0.0345) (0.0302) 
    
Ln Booksellers -0.00134 -0.0301  
 (0.0136) (0.0228)  
    
Ln Libraries -0.0211* 0.0864*  
 (0.0124) (0.0480)  
    
Ln Masonic Lodges 0.0188 -0.0112  
 (0.0326) (0.0403)  
    
Ln Patents 0.254*** 0.186*** 0.190*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0252) (0.0247) 
    
Ln Population 0.136 0.382*** 0.405*** 
 (0.0874) (0.120) (0.126) 
    
Ln Manufacturing Emp. -0.0664 -0.175** -0.172** 
 
 
 
Reg. Dist. Fixed Effects 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
(0.0598) 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
(0.0729) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
(0.0729) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Observations 1175 1175 1175 
R2 0.539 0.338 0.329 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Study 2: KAIs and the Great Exhibition of 1851 
 
A shortcoming of study one is that it is short on controls. Furthermore, patenting offers only a 
partial perspective on technological innovation. The rich data available for the year 1851 
enables a more detailed cross-sectional study based on non-patent data. Below, I use data on 
the addresses of the British exhibitors and prize winners at the Great Exhibition of 1851 as a 
proxy for the spatial distribution of innovation, detailed data on core KAIs in 1851 based on a 
survey of learned societies and mechanics institutes carried out in the 1851 education census 
and extensive data on controls based on the 1851 census.  
 
KAIs and the Great Exhibition of 1851: Data and Model 
 
The Great Exhibition of 1851 was a major exhibition of world technology and industry held in 
Hyde Park in London. Between its opening day on 1st May and final day on 11th October, the 
exhibition was visited by around six million people, equivalent to about a third of the British 
population. It showcased technological and industrial exhibits from around the world, however, 
about half of the exhibitors – approximately 6,400 – were British. In turn, these were chosen 
from around 8,200 British applicants, who submitted applications to 330 purposely-formed 
regional committees located throughout the country during the year prior to the exhibition. Of 
those admitted to the exhibition, 30 per cent were awarded prizes for a combination of the 
utility and novelty of their exhibit. Data on the addresses of all exhibitors and prize-winners, 
which is available in the exhibition’s catalogue, can be used to construct a quality-filtered 
indicator of technological innovation across Britain in 1851. Using this data, I produce exhibit 
and prize counts for the 656 census registration districts covering Britain. 
 
The British education census of 1851 included a comprehensive survey of learned and 
scientific societies and mechanics institutes, providing details on membership, subscription 
fees, frequency of meetings and subject coverage for each organisation. I distinguish core KAIs 
from other organisations in this survey based on the criteria set out in chapter 2 and enter the 
KAI-level data into a spreadsheet. Then I aggregate variables by registration district.  
 
As a first pass at investigating the spatial relationship between core KAI membership 
and technological innovation, figure 3.10 shows core KAI membership and exhibits at the 
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Great Exhibition by registration district, both in per capita terms. The two spatial distributions 
share some common patterns. Figure 3.11 shows a log-log scatter plot of core KAIs versus 
exhibits, which has an R2 of 0.56 and figure 3.12 shows a log-log plot in per capita terms, which 
has an R2 of 0.3. The task at hand is to quantify this relationship while controlling for 
confounding factors. 
 
Figure 3.10: Core KAI membership per capita (left)  and Exhibits at the Great 
Exhibition in 1851. (Black regions are higher than median, white regions lower than median) 
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Figure 3.11: Scatterplot of log of KAI members in 1851 against log of 1851 Great 
Exhibition exhibitors, by British census registration district  
 
  
 
 
Figure 3.12: Scatterplot of log of KAI members per capita in 1851 against log of 1851 
Great Exhibition exhibitors per capita, by British census registration district   
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To control for the location of industrial production, which may be correlated both with 
technological innovation and core KAI membership, first I stratify the innovation counts across 
10 industrial sectors, producing counts of exhibits and prizes for 6,560 industry-regions. Then, 
I calculate the size of the labour force employed in the secondary sector in each of the 10 
industries in each registration district, using occupational data from the 1851 census provided 
by the Cambridge Population Group. This enables me to produce within–industry sector 
estimates of the effects of the covariates, while controlling for the location of specific industrial 
activity. Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for each of the industry sector exhibitor and 
prize winner counts. 
 
To control for other factors that may affect both core KAI members and technological 
innovations, I include population density and a proxy for the regional literacy rate derived from 
the proportion of grooms by registration district who signed their  name on the marriage register 
in 1851, as recorded by the Registrar General (Annual Report of the Registrar General 1852). 
I include the size of the adult population in each registration district and a dummy for London 
registration districts to control for possible idiosyncrasies of the capital.  
 
Table 3.8: Great Exhibition exhibit and prize counts by registration district, by industry 
Industry 
Count of exhibits per 
census reg. district 
Count of prize winners per 
census reg. district 
 Mean Max S.D. Mean Max S.D. 
Mining and metallurgy 0.48 15 1.42 0.08 4 0.34 
Chemicals 0.19 10 0.88 0.09 6 0.52 
Food processing 0.19 7 0.67 0.08 5 0.39 
Manufactures 4.47 215 17.53 1.47 93 6.71 
Engines 0.56 31 2.21 0.1 8 0.57 
Manufacturing machinery 0.34 26 1.49 0.09 12 0.63 
Civil, mil, naval engineering 0.72 29 2.65 0.09 6 0.5 
Agricultural machinery 0.36 9 0.96 0.04 2 0.21 
Instruments 0.83 39 3.39 0.2 16 1.18 
Textiles 
 
0.82 
 
51 
 
4.12 
 
0.24 
 
19 
 
1.43 
 
 
 
The process for recruiting exhibitors could in principle influence the correlation 
between KAIs and exhibitors for various reasons. If core KAI membership gave prospective 
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exhibitors an advantage other than better capabilities for technological innovation, such as 
enhanced awareness of the exhibition or benefits of favouritism, then this might bias upwards 
estimates of the impact of KAIs on technological innovation. The 330 local committees 
operated out of the offices of the respective town mayors. Core KAIs were not a formal contact 
point. Indeed, some committees treated mechanics institutes with suspicion because of their 
reputation for harbouring radical political views, worrying that mechanics institutes might 
attempt to sabotage the exhibition (Davis 1999). Although the public’s awareness of the 
exhibition may have been enhanced by KAIs, it was extremely high anyway, as Davis describes 
(Davis 1999), so the marginal impact of core KAIs would have been small. The call for 
exhibitors was advertised extensively via a national campaign covered by the local and national 
media. Moreover, news coverage began as early as June 1849 and, following the establishment 
of a Royal Commission led by Prince Albert on 3rd January 1850, hundreds of delegations and 
tens of thousands of letters were sent out into the provinces to raise awareness. Prince Albert’s 
involvement lent the exhibition star power, but perhaps the greatest stimulus for public 
attention was frequent controversy fuelled by public relations disasters related to the proper 
role of state financing, protectionist concerns about revealing British technology to foreigners, 
the harmful effect of the exhibition building on Hyde Park and the danger posed by hordes of 
‘marauding northerners’ descending on London. Each of these issues were debated in 
parliament and the media (Davis 1999). 
 
Data on the location of the 330 local committees is available in the official report on 
the exhibition. I use it to control for the presence of a local committee by registration district. 
The geographic distribution of local committees is shown in figure 3.13. A second potential 
problem is that central organisers might have wished to achieve a balanced distribution of 
exhibitors across local committees. However, this does not appear to have had a major effect, 
as there is very wide variation in the numbers of exhibitors by local committee.  
 
Was exhibiting financially prohibitive for ordinary inventors? Exhibitors were not 
required to pay a fee to exhibit, rather the working capital for the exhibition was supplied by 
around £75,000 of subscriptions donated gratuitously by the public following considerable 
fund raising efforts46. Nevertheless, given that there ultimately proved to be excess exhibitor 
                                                          
46 Ticket sales revenue would eventually vastly exceed expectations allowing the exhibition to turn a very large 
profit of £183,000, which was subsequently used to finance a set of scientific and artistic institutions near the 
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demand for spaces at the exhibition, subscriptions might have served, de facto, to buy spaces. 
This is not necessarily a challenge to the identification of the effect of KAIs on exhibits, 
nevertheless, it determines whether the process selected for wealthier innovators.  
 
Figure 3.13: Locations of the Great Exhibition 1851 Local Committees 
 
 
 
 
Did subscriptions buy exhibition spaces? The Official Catalogue lists total 
subscriptions raised and the number of exhibitors accepted by each of the 330 local committees. 
Under the extreme assumption that exhibitors only subscribed to buy a space at the exhibition, 
I derive an upper-bound estimate of the cost of an exhibit space by regressing the number of 
exhibitors accepted by each of the local committees on the value of subscriptions received 
controlling for local population based on the 1851 census. The co-efficient on subscriptions is 
£7.60 (with a standard error of about £1), which represents a reasonable estimate for the 
average cost of an exhibit space. Based on Gregory Clark’s national wage series (Clark 2011) 
this represents about 14% of the average annual wage in Britain in 1850. The cost of 
transporting an exhibit to the exhibition was not high. Train fares from northern manufacturing 
                                                          
site of the exhibition in South Kensington including Imperial College, the V&A Museum and the Royal Albert 
Hall. 
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towns, for example, cost between 5s and 10s and all rail companies offered a half-price 
concession to exhibitors (Auerbach 1999). The cost of transportation for an exhibitor amounted 
to about the same as the national average daily wage of around 3.3s (Clark 2011). In total, these 
costs do not appear prohibitive to the average inventor relative to the prospective benefit of 
accessing the large potential market at the exhibition and the possibility of receiving an award 
from the exhibition’s £20,000 prize fund or a Royal medal that could enhance the reputation 
of one’s business. Although the benefits to exhibiting and patenting are not comparable, the 
cost of exhibiting was certainly less financially prohibitive to budget constrained inventors than 
the British patent system during the Industrial Revolution. As such, it is likely that the 
innovators observed in this study represent a wider sample in terms of social class than those 
observed in the patenting study.  
 
To estimate the effect of core KAIs on exhibits and prizes, I use the negative binomial 
model due to its suitability for handling a count dependent variable47. Since the analysis is 
cross-sectional with relatively few fixed-effects the incidental parameter problem does not 
prohibit this approach, as it does in studies one and three. This produces the following 
specification: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘  = exponential (α + β1MEMij + β2MEMi-1,j + β3EMPij  + β4EMPi-1,j  +  β5DENi  +   
β6DENi-1 + β7LITi  + β8LITi-1   + β9POPi    +  β10LONi  + β11LOC_COMMi  + δj + εij)       (3.5)                                               
 
where k = 1 or 2 and 𝑦𝑖𝑗
1 = exhibits in region i and industry j, 𝑦𝑖𝑗
2  = awards in region i and 
industry j, MEMij = number of core KAI members in region i (/100), EMPij = employees in the 
secondary sector in region i and industry j (/1,000), DENi = population density in region i 
(persons per km2), POPi = population in region i (/10,000) , LITi = male literacy rate in region 
i, LONi = London dummy, δj = industry sector fixed effect, εij = random error, and variables 
with i-1 subscript are spatially lagged variables. I include spatial lags of regressors to allow for 
knowledge spillovers operating over areas larger than registration districts. For each 
registration district, I take the average value of each regressor in bordering registration districts. 
                                                          
47 Preferred to a Poisson model owing to ‘overdispersion’ in the data and better model selection criteria scores. 
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Standard errors are clustered by registration district to allow for errors to be correlated within 
registration districts from one industry sector to the next. Second, to test for robustness, I 
estimate the following model, which includes the same underlying variables as 3.5, but uses 
simple OLS on log transformations: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘  = α + β1MEMij + β2MEMi-1,j + β3EMPij  + β4EMPi-1,j  +  β5DENi  +   
β6DENi-1 + β7LITi  + β8LITi-1   + β9POPi    +  β10LONi  + β11LOC_COMMi  + δj + εij       (3.6)                                               
  
In addition to the main specifications, I stratify KAI membership by the three types of core 
KAI introduced in chapter 2: learned societies, professional societies and mechanics institutes 
to examine their distinct impact. Figure 3.11 displays KAI members per capita and exhibitors 
per capita by registration district. 
 
KAIs and the Great Exhibition of 1851: Results 
 
There is strong evidence of an impact of KAIs on local technological innovation. Coefficients 
in table 3.9 are reported as semi-elasticities, so the first column tells us that an extra 100 core 
KAI members in a registration district was associated with a 5.6 per cent rise in exhibits and a 
6.4 per cent rise in prizes in this registration district. Bear in mind that the overall exhibition 
floor space available to British exhibitors was fixed and oversubscribed so general equilibrium 
considerations means that this result represents a 5.6% and 6.4% rise in registration district i 
relative to the other registration districts. The standard deviation of core KAI membership in 
a registration district was 746, so this suggests that a one standard deviation rise in core KAI 
members was associated with an economically significant 42 per cent relative rise in exhibits 
(7.46 x 5.6 per cent) and 48 per cent relative rise in prizes (7.46 x 6.4 per cent). Coefficients 
on core KAI membership across the four regressions are highly statistically significant. They 
are also highly robust to controlling for spillovers from neighbouring districts, falling only 
from 5.6 to 5.4 per cent for exhibits and from 6.4 to 6.1 per cent for prizes. Coefficients on 
non-spatial lag controls are mostly of expected sign and statistically significant. 
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Table 3.9: Determinants of Exhibitors and Prize Winners at the Great Exhibition of 
1851, by Industry Sector-British Census Registration District, Negative-Binomial Model 
 
 
 
Dependent Var: 
Count Model (Neg. 
Binomial) 
 
Exhibits in Sector j 
Count Model (Neg. 
Binomial) 
 
Exhibits in Sector j 
Count Model 
(Neg. Binomial) 
 
Prizes in Sector j 
Count Model 
(Neg. Binomial) 
 
Prizes in Sector j 
Spatial lag No Yes No Yes 
     
MEMij .056*** .054*** .064*** .061*** 
(100 mem) (3.96) (3.73) (4.16) (3.70) 
     
EMPij .062*** .054** .069*** .064*** 
(1,000 emp) (3.40) (2.44) (3.72) (2.78) 
     
DENi .049*** .060*** .061*** .063** 
(1000 cap per km2) (3.60) (2.71) (3.54) (2.34) 
     
POPi .32 .37 .56 .14 
(10,000 cap) (0.78) (0.86) (0.12) (0.28) 
     
LITi .020*** .021*** .011* .012* 
(%) (4.63) (4.89) (1.66) (1.86) 
     
LOC_COMMi .61*** .61*** .59*** .59*** 
(binary) (7.14) (7.15) (5.88) (5.73) 
     
MEMi-1,j  -.016*  -.018 
(100 mem)  (-1.71)  (-1.27) 
     
EMPi-1,j  .030  .025 
(1,000 emp)  (1.27)  (0.75) 
     
DENi-1j  -.085  0.023 
(1000 cap per km2) 
 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
 
 
 
Yes 
(-0.04) 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
(0.89) 
 
Yes 
N 
Pseudo R2 
6,520 
0.18 
6,430 
0.18 
6,520 
0.21 
6,430 
0.21 
Robust registration district clustered t-stats in brackets, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.10: Determinants of Exhibitors and Prize Winners by British Census 
Registration District at the Great Exhibition of 1851, OLS Estimation 
 
 
Dependent Var: 
 
 
Spatial lag 
OLS 
 
Ln Exhibits in 
Sector j 
 
No 
OLS 
 
Ln Exhibits in 
Sector j 
 
Yes 
OLS 
 
Ln Exhibits in 
Sector j 
 
No 
OLS 
 
Ln Exhibits in 
Sector j 
 
Yes 
 
Ln KAI Membersi 
 
0.0105** 
 
0.00942* 
 
0.00631** 
 
0.00580** 
 (0.00474) (0.00481) (0.00279) (0.00287) 
     
Ln Sector Employmentij 0.0495*** 0.0408*** 0.0239*** 0.0199*** 
 (0.00766) (0.00878) (0.00470) (0.00485) 
     
Ln Densityi 0.0815*** 0.104*** 0.0477*** 0.0572*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0178) (0.00929) (0.0114) 
     
Ln Populationi 0.0669** 0.0638** 0.0186 0.0129 
 (0.0289) (0.0309) (0.0161) (0.0180) 
     
Ln Literacyi 0.170*** 0.158*** 0.0389* 0.0295 
 (0.0419) (0.0439) (0.0215) (0.0218) 
     
Local Committeei 0.0464** 0.0395** 0.00819 0.00589 
 (0.0190) (0.0199) (0.0127) (0.0133) 
     
London Dummy 0.523*** 0.605*** 0.191** 0.212** 
 (0.129) (0.128) (0.0872) (0.0823) 
     
     
Ln Lagged KAI Memsi  0.0121  0.0110 
  (0.0104)  (0.00665) 
     
Ln Lagged Sec Empi  0.0189*  0.00822 
  (0.0107)  (0.00618) 
     
Ln Lagged Densityi  -0.0435***  -0.0166* 
  (0.0149)  (0.00875) 
     
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 5621 5536 5621 5536 
R2 0.412 0.416 0.255 0.257 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.11: Great Exhibition Analysis, results by type of Core KAI 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Type of KAI 
Co-efficient (semi-
elasticity) 
P-value 
Exhibits Learned Societies 0.09 0.16 
  Professional Societies -0.05* 0.09 
  Mechanics Institutes 0.08*** 0.00 
      
Prizes Learned Societies 0.1* 0.084 
  Professional Societies -0.04** 0.029 
  Mechanics Institutes 0.08*** 0.000 
*All other covariates and specification the same as regression in table X, without spatial lags 
 
 
Table 3.10 reports the results of re-estimating the relationships above using OLS with 
logged variables instead of count data models. The results are highly robust to this alternative 
approach. Both exhibit and prize counts remain responsive to core KAI membership and 
statistically significant, with and without spatial lags. Table 3.11 reports coefficients from 
count data models (semi-elasticities) and corresponding p-values when core KAI membership 
counts by registration district are stratified by the three types of core KAI defined in chapter 2, 
and included together in the same regression. The other covariates included are the same as the 
baseline specifications (without spatial lags) and are not reported here. The effect on both 
exhibits and prizes appears to be due to generalist learned societies and mechanics institutes. 
Professional societies are associated with significantly fewer technological innovations. 
Although speculative, this may be due to the rent-seeking tendencies of professional societies 
noted in chapter 2. Professional societies may have provided a less conducive environment for 
the sharing of innovative knowledge given the high degree of product market competition 
between members, a la Katz (1984) and they may have resisted technological innovation to 
protect the mutual rents of members. 
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Study 3: US Agricultural KAIs and Agricultural Patents 
 
The previous two studies examined the link between KAIs and the British Industrial 
Revolution. But KAIs were not limited to Britain, nor were their activities limited to the 
industrial sector of the economy.  In Agricultural Enlightenment: Knowledge, Technology, and 
Nature, 1750-1840, Peter M. Jones argues that an ‘Agricultural Enlightenment’ ran alongside 
the Industrial Enlightenment. He documents the accelerating flows of useful knowledge 
between British farmers during the century of the British Industrial Revolution and the role 
played in this process by agricultural KAIs such as agricultural societies and farmer’s clubs 
(Jones 2016). Systematic data on agricultural KAIs in Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries is difficult to obtain but rich data is available on the contemporaneous growth of 
agricultural KAIs in the United States. This data can be used along with data from the decennial 
US agricultural censuses as the basis of a third test of the impact of KAIs on technological 
innovation, while retaining the context of an economy experiencing the onset of modern 
economic growth. 
 
The United States developed a substantial infrastructure of core KAIs during the 
nineteenth century. This followed modest progress in the eighteenth century, the highlight of 
which was the founding of the American Philosophical Society by a group of private 
individuals including Benjamin Franklin in 1743. American KAIs were ultimately more akin 
to their British than continental counterparts in the sense that they tended to be funded and run 
primarily by private individuals rather than by the state. Nevertheless, the US government 
played a more active supporting role to KAIs than the British government through the provision 
of significant subsidies and the establishment of co-ordinating bodies.  
 
Although an overall survey of US core KAIs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
would be a useful complement to the British survey in this thesis, the current study is restricted 
to agricultural KAIs due to the relative ready availability of data. In any case, US agricultural 
KAIs happen to provide an interesting case study of government support for KAIs owing to 
the activities of the Patent Office and the US Department of Agriculture, offering an 
opportunity to contrast with the laissez-faire British case. 
 
The first US agricultural KAI was the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, 
founded in 1785. It was followed before the turn of the century by societies in Charlestown in 
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Southern Carolina, Boston, New Haven, Hallowell in Maine, New York City and Middlesex 
County in Massachusetts. The number of societies continued to grow gradually during the early 
nineteenth century, as figures 3.16 and 3.17 show. The articles of association of these early 
societies reveal that they were founded for the collection and dissemination of farming 
knowledge, particularly from England and other foreign countries.  
 
Operationally, they resembled British KAIs, holding meetings, publishing transactions, 
housing periodicals and books and corresponding with one another – although unlike most 
British KAIs (with the notable exception of the Royal Society of Arts) they often awarded 
premiums for agricultural innovations. Numerous early societies received state aid, particularly 
in the states of Massachusetts and New York. From 1839, the year work began on the first 
agricultural census, Federal aid began to be disbursed to agricultural societies, Congress 
providing £1,000 annually for the national collection of agricultural information and data. In 
the 1850s this was increased markedly, to $5,000 in 1851, $35,000 in 1854 and $105,000 in 
1856. The government assisted private societies financially but also established ‘state 
societies’, which acted as central nodes in state networks. In association with these financial 
resources, from 1839 onwards the Patent Office released a substantive and widely read annual 
agricultural report, of which around 267,000 copies were issued in 1855. These commitments 
paved the way for the establishment of the US Department of Agriculture in 1862. Around this 
time, the number of agricultural KAIs in the US exploded from less than 200 in 1850 to about 
1,500 in 1870 (Bidwell & Falconer 1925).    
 
Did this mid-century explosion of US agricultural KAIs have an effect on US 
agricultural technology? Certainly, it was a major institutional development in terms of scale. 
Furthermore, as Gallman’s estimates, displayed in figure 3.16, show, agricultural labour 
productivity growth surged post 1850, albeit interrupted during the 1860s by the Civil War 
(Gallman 1960). 
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Figure 3.14: US Agricultural Societies, Absolute and Per 100,000 Capita, 1776-1876 
 
 
Figure 3.15: US Agricultural Societies Founded in Each Year, 1785-1876 
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Figure 3.16: Decennial % Growth in US Agricultural Value Added Per Gainful Worker 
(Gallman 1960) 
 
 
US Agricultural KAIs and Patents: Data and Model 
 
In 1876 the US Department of Agriculture published A List of Agricultural Societies and 
Farmers Clubs established to promote the Agricultural, Horticultural and Pomological 
Interests of the Farmer on the Books of the Department of Agriculture, which provides rich 
data on the first century or so of US agricultural societies (US Department of Agriculture 1876). 
For each society, it provides details on location, date of foundation, number of members in 
1876, whether it was a operated by the state or not, whether it corresponded with the state 
society, number of meetings held per year and whether it held annual agricultural fairs or not. 
I manually enter the data from this survey into a spreadsheet and use a GIS programme to 
geocode based on the location field. Then, I construct a county-year panel of agricultural KAIs 
for years 1840, 1850, 1860 and 1870, to match the years of the agricultural and general 
censuses. Figure 3.17 shows a map of the distribution of agricultural KAIs per capita by county 
in 1870. 
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Figure 3.17: US Agricultural Society Members per 10,000 Rural Population in 1870 
 
 
 
 
Next, I construct agricultural patent counts by county-decade as follows. First, I access the 
database of all US utility patents filed between 1790 and 1873 located at the Patent and 
Trademark Resource Centre Association (PTRCA 2013). The original source for this database 
is the Subject Matter Index of Patents for Inventions by the United States Patent Office from 
1790 to 1873 Inclusive (USPO 1873). Then, using GIS programming, I geocode the residence 
of the first patentee for each patent and assign to county and state. Next, I classify each patent 
by ‘technology class’ by cross referencing with the technology classification database at the 
US Patent and Trademark Office, which provides one or more of around 450 technology classes 
(e.g. ‘plant husbandry’ or ‘electrical resistors’) for every patent registered (see USPTO 2013 
for the database interface and USPTO 2012 for a manual on the classification system). I identify 
all agricultural patents in this database by matching with the following fourteen patent classes: 
Plant husbandry, Harness for working animal, Harvesters, Chemistry: fertilizers, Planting, 
Animal husbandry, Wells, Unearthing plants or buried objects, Earth working, Boring or 
penetrating the earth, Fences, Closure fasteners, Hydraulic and earth engineering, and Crop 
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threshing or separating. Table 3.12 show the counts for each agricultural technology class. 
There are 24,468 agricultural patents in total. 
 
 
Figure 3.18: US Agricultural Patents, 1790-1873 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.12: US Agricultural Patent Classes and Counts 
 
Class Class Description Count 
47 Plant husbandry 381 
54 Harness for working animal 1,765 
56 Harvesters 4,057 
71 Chemistry: fertilizers 574 
111 Planting 2,385 
119 Animal husbandry 1,004 
166 Wells 317 
171 Unearthing plants or buried objects 842 
172 Earth working 6,749 
175 Boring or penetrating the earth 826 
256 Fences 1,086 
292 Closure fasteners 2,474 
405 Hydraulic and earth engineering 445 
460 Crop threshing or separating 1,563 
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Finally, I construct a panel of control variables for the agricultural sector using 
agricultural and general census data from version 11 of the NHGIS database (NHGIS 2011). 
These variables are agricultural output, population, the ratio of city dwellers to the overall 
population and the ratio of town dwellers to overall population for county i and census year t. 
I estimate the following model within-county using OLS:   
 
𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑈𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐿_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnAGRICULTURAL_SOCIETIESit + β2LnNON-
AGRICULTURAL_PATENTSit + β3AGRICULTURAL OUTPUTit + β4LnPOPit + β5CITY 
RATIOit  + β6TOWN RATIOit  + δi  + ɣt  + εit       (3.7) 
 
 
using a ln(x+1) transformation for agricultural patent counts. NON-AGRICULTURAL 
PATENTS represent counts in county i and year t of all patents not included in the fourteen 
agricultural classifications, δi is a set of county fixed effects, and ɣt is a full set of time fixed 
effects for t = 1840, 1850, 1860 and 1870. Standard errors are clustered by county. To explore 
the influence of the activities of agricultural KAIs, I estimate models of the same basic form 
with the same controls, but replace the county-level counts of agricultural KAIs with counts of 
meetings per year and agricultural fairs. Finally, I substitute in counts of agricultural KAIs by 
a dummy for the corresponding status of each KAI with the state. Table 3.13 provides 
descriptive statistics for the overall panel dataset constructed for the study. 
 
US Agricultural KAIs and Patents: Results 
 
Table 3.14 displays the results of equation 3.7 estimated using a pooled cross-section with time 
fixed-effects and using county and time fixed-effects. In both cases I report specifications 
controlling for and not controlling for non-agricultural patent counts. Agricultural patents are 
strongly associated with the presence of agricultural KAIs. Before controlling for non-
agricultural patents, the elasticity of agricultural patenting to agricultural KAIs is about 0.3 
with a standard error of about 0.03. After controlling for non-agricultural patents these 
elasticities fall to 0.12 in the cross-section and 0.15 within-county over time, remaining 
statistically significant with a standard error of about 0.02.   
 
Table 3.15 displays the results of replacing agricultural KAI counts be county year with 
counts of agricultural meetings and fairs per year. The count of meetings is not significantly 
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related to agricultural patenting rates but the prevalence of agricultural fairs is significant 
determinant of agricultural patenting in each specification. This result fits with the intended 
role of agricultural fairs as technological exhibitions. Table 3.16 stratifies KAI counts by type 
of society –  state, state correspondent and non-state correspondent. Interestingly, the overall 
effect of agricultural KAIs on agricultural patenting appears to be via agricultural KAIs that 
corresponded with state societies, not the state societies themselves nor the societies that did 
not correspond. Speculatively, the undetected effect of state KAIs might point towards the 
superiority of the private sector orientation of KAIs, as in the British as opposed to the 
continental case. At the same time, the most effective US agricultural KAIs were the ones that 
were plugged into the state’s network of information and subsidies. Perhaps Britain’s KAIs 
could have been enhanced by government support. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By exploiting three different datasets, the studies in this chapter provide complementary results 
that support the argument that core KAIs facilitated technological innovation during the 
emergence of modern economic growth. Nevertheless, although they illustrate a correlation 
between KAIs and technological innovation they do not prove causation. Were KAIs an 
exogenous cause of the British Industrial Revolution or were they merely a product of it? In 
the next chapter I turn to this question. 
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Table 3.13: Descriptive Statistics of Agricultural Patents and Agricultural Societies by 
County-Year, 1840-1870 
 Year 
 
1840 1850 1860 1870 
Agricultural Patents Mean 0.030 0.062 0.306 0.625 
 S.D. 0.006 0.009 0.024 0.042 
      
Non-Agricultural Patents Mean 0.272 0.448 1.712 4.447 
 S.D. 0.049 0.081 0.292 0.651 
      
Agricultural Societies Mean 0.035 0.100 0.273 0.507 
 S.D. 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.020 
      
Ag. Society Members Mean 21.192 58.793 122.034 144.425 
 S.D. 4.505 7.055 9.592 9.636 
      
Ag. Society Meetings Per Year Mean - - - 3.924 
 S.D. - - - 0.217 
      
Ag. Society Fairs Per Year Mean - - - 0.391 
 S.D. - - - 0.017 
      
State Ag. Societies Mean - - - 0.019 
 S.D. - - - 0.004 
      
Corresponding Ag. Societies Mean - - - 0.312 
 S.D. - - - 0.015 
      
Non-Corresponding Ag. Societies Mean - - - 0.157 
 S.D. - - - 0.010 
      
Agricultural Output Mean 578,838 658,424 795,343 1,068,735 
 S.D. 18,692 17,616 18,715 25,605 
      
Population Mean 13,339 14,354 15,009 16,837 
 S.D. 493 576 631 732 
      
City Ratio Mean 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.012 
 S.D. 0.0017 0.0019 0.0018 0.0019 
      
Town Ratio Mean 0.022 0.028 0.036 0.061 
 S.D. 0.0027 0.0025 0.0025 0.0067 
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Table 3.14: Determinants of US Agricultural Patents by County-Year, 1840-1870 (10 
yearly) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Agricultural 
Patents 
County Pooled 
1840-1870 
Agricultural 
Patents 
County Pooled 
1840-1870 
Agricultural 
Patents 
County FE 
1840-1870 
Agricultural 
Patents 
County FE 
1840-1870 
 
Agricultural KAIs 
 
0.326*** 
 
0.119*** 
 
0.306*** 
 
0.158*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0198) (0.0276) (0.0248) 
     
Non-Agricultural 
Patents 
 0.275***  0.261*** 
  (0.0123)  (0.0155) 
     
Agricultural Output -0.00362* 0.00635*** -0.00189 -0.000649 
 (0.00213) (0.00154) (0.00358) (0.00301) 
     
Population 0.0598*** 0.00461 0.00561 0.000600 
 (0.00623) (0.00343) (0.0127) (0.0103) 
     
% of Pop in Cities 1.226*** 0.399*** 1.675*** 0.710*** 
 (0.152) (0.110) (0.268) (0.194) 
     
% of Pop in Towns 0.141 0.00523 0.775*** 0.307** 
 
 
 
County Fixed 
Effects 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
(0.0903) 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
(0.0130) 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
(0.253) 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.123) 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 
Years 
7,257 
4 
7,257 
4 
7,257 
4 
7,257 
4 
R2 0.341 0.470 0.247 0.368 
Robust standard errors, clustered by county,  in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.15: US Agricultural Patents by County and Activities of Agricultural Societies 
Therein, 1873 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Agricultur
al Patents 
OLS (in 
logs) 
Cross 
Section 
1873 
Agricultural 
Patents 
OLS (in logs) 
Cross Section 
1873 
Agricultural 
Patents 
Negative 
Binomial 
Cross Section 
1873 
Agricultural 
Patents 
Negative Binomial 
Cross Section 
1873 
     
Meetings per 
year 
0.00917 0.00454 0.00458 0.00458 
 (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.00385) (0.00386) 
     
Agricultural 
Fair 
0.194*** 0.0689* 0.149** 0.148** 
 
 
Non-
Agricultural 
Patents Control 
(0.0398) 
 
 
No 
 
 
(0.0379) 
 
 
Yes 
(0.0652) 
 
 
No 
(0.0656) 
 
 
Yes 
 
Baseline 
Controls  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
(Counties) 
2,290 2,290 2,290 2,290 
R2 0.355 0.454 - - 
              Robust standard errors in parentheses 
              * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
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Table 3.16: US Agricultural Patents by County and Types of Agricultural Societies 
Therein, 1873 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Agricultural 
Patents 
OLS (in logs) 
Cross Section 
1873 
Agricultural 
Patents 
OLS (in logs) 
Cross Section 
1873 
Agricultural 
Patents 
Negative 
Binomial 
Cross Section 
1873 
Agricultural 
Patents 
Negative 
Binomial 
Cross Section 
1873 
     
State Societies Std=0.033 Std=0.020 0.345** 0.373* 
 0.249 
(0.206) 
0.152 
(0.170) 
(0.163) (0.204) 
     
Corresponding 
Societies 
Std=0.189 Std=0.082 0.194*** 0.196*** 
 0.216*** 0.0935*** (0.0584) (0.0593) 
 (0.0285) 
 
(0.0269)   
 
Non-Corresponding 
Societies 
 
Std=0.065 
 
Std=0.017 
 
0.0824 
 
0.0804 
 
 
 
 
Non-Agricultural 
Patents as Control 
0.0873*** 
(0.0306) 
 
 
No 
 
0.0242 
(0.0281) 
 
 
Yes 
(0.0686) 
 
 
 
No 
(0.0683) 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Baseline Controls 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 2,268 2,268 2,290 2,290 
R2 0.357 0.450 - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Chapter 4 
 
Why did Britain build its Knowledge Access Institutions?  
The ‘Enlightenment Subsidy’ 
 
 
In the previous two chapters I showed that the blossoming of Knowledge Access Institutions 
(KAIs) in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain facilitated the British Industrial 
Revolution. But why did KAIs blossom in the first place? Were they a response to 
industrialisation, stimulated by scale and demand for ongoing innovation in the revolutionising 
textiles, mining and iron making sectors? As such, is it misleading to think of KAIs as an 
exogenous cause of the British Industrial Revolution? Indeed, the alternative view, of 
endogenous learned societies, mechanics institutes and other institutions comprising the KAI 
infrastructure has a rich lineage in the historical literature, dating back to Marx and Engels 
(Engels 1895). This view has often been expressed in support of the claim that science owed 
more to the Industrial Revolution than the Industrial Revolution owed to science (e.g. O’Grada 
2014).   
 
In this chapter, I argue against the endogenous view of KAIs on two grounds. First, 
market-based incentives do a poor job of inducing innovative effort, even at the best of times 
(Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Tirole 1988). The conditions for endogenous innovation in the 
United States since World War II have been unprecedentedly supportive, yet US innovation 
during that period has relied heavily on government subsidy. The claim that innovation, and 
hence KAIs, were purely endogenous to the British Industrial Revolution asks far too much of 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century British market forces. 
 
Second, since market forces in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain were not 
plausibly strong enough to induce Britain’s system of KAIs and since there was no major 
government subsidy to innovation as in the twentieth century US case, the growth of KAIs and 
the high level of innovation during the British Industrial Revolution presents a puzzle. Who 
funded Britain’s KAIs and why, if not for profit? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in 
the multifaceted demand for science and KAIs in eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
Britain, much of it reflecting non-profit related motives. Eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century British culture was deeply influenced by the popular Enlightenment and within the 
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resultant milieu, science served as an ideology, entertainment, social status symbol and a 
strategic political and religious asset. These cultural sources of demand for science made a 
career in science pay in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain. As such, the 
Enlightenment effectively subsidised the construction and running costs of the world’s first 
R&D infrastructure. I provide empirical evidence for this argument by noting that Rational 
Dissenters – a group of co-religionists who based religious belief on scripture and reason alone, 
incorporating Newtonian science and the scientific method into theology and worship – 
exhibited a particularly high demand for science and KAIs. I show that there is a correlation 
across England between the geographic prevalence of Rational Dissent and early adoption of 
KAIs. I control for confounding variables, and the endogeneity of Rational Dissent to 
industrialisation using an instrumental variable approach based on the Five Mile Act of 1665, 
under which Charles II banished Rational Dissent from parts of Britain.   
 
However, although KAIs were not fully endogenous to the British Industrial 
Revolution, neither were they fully exogenous. Rather, feedback effects via industrialisation 
were important to their blossoming, just as feedback effects more generally were important to 
the economic and social ‘phase transition’ at the heart of the British Industrial Revolution. 
Indeed, it is difficult to explain the British Industrial Revolution without appealing to feedback 
effects and those inherent to the growth of the R&D infrastructure might have played an 
important role.         
 
 
The ‘Endogenous View’ of KAIs 
 
The conventional wisdom has long held that the learned societies and mechanics institutes that 
comprised Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century core KAIs were stimulated by industrial, 
rather than cultural, demand. Moreover, this claim has been advanced in the context of the 
broader argument that the correlation between the Industrial Revolution and scientific progress 
was due to the impact of industrialisation on science, rather than the other way around. Clearly, 
this argument is in the spirit of Marxist cultural determinism. Indeed, Engels expressed the case 
succinctly in 189548, when he wrote in a private letter that: "If society has a technical need, that 
helps science forward more than ten universities." In 1913 Elie Halevy wrote “it is in industrial 
                                                          
48 Letter from Engels to H. Starkenburg, Jan 25th 1895 (Cunningham Wood 1988) 
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England with its new centres of population and civilization, that we must seek the institutions 
which gave birth to the utilitarian and scientific culture of the new era. At Manchester first, 
centre of the cotton industry, a species of local academy, a literary and scientific club was 
founded” (Halevy 1913).  
 
Mid-twentieth century Marxist scholars adopted these assumptions too. In 1939, J. D. 
Bernal wrote "it was in Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and Philadelphia, rather 
than Oxford, Cambridge and London, that the science of the Industrial Revolution took root." 
Science was necessary "for directors of industry," and some knowledge of scientific principles 
"was also becoming increasingly desirable for leading operatives." (Bernal 1939). S. F. Mason 
argued similarly that "the men of the industrial regions with their scientific education and their 
technical interest forwarded institutions to promote the arts and sciences in their own 
localities…The Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society arose from the meetings of 
scientists and industrialists." (Mason 1953). J. H. Plumb wrote “By 1815 every provincial town 
of importance had its society on the model of Manchester's, supported by both the local 
aristocracy and the local manufacturers. No other aspect of English cultural life had such 
whole-hearted middle-class support, because the intention was completely and avowedly 
utilitarian – the search for useful knowledge which would maintain England's industrial 
supremacy.” (Plumb 1950) 
 
 These views are echoed by modern day scholars, who have married the endogenous 
view of KAIs with the claim that they were ineffective in generating technological innovation. 
In the Cambridge History of Science series from 2003, McClellan III writes “The principle 
answer” to the question of why eighteenth century Britain witnessed the rise of scientific 
societies “concerns the perceived usefulness of these institutions” while declaring in the same 
essay, “Plainly and tellingly, the early Industrial Revolution developed without significant 
input from eighteenth-century academies or universities (McClellan III 2003, p105)”. 
Recently, in a rebuttal of Margaret Jacob’s study of the role of scientific culture in the British 
Industrial Revolution, O’Grada writes “Yet while such societies lent scientific knowledge 
respectability, their role in spreading it was limited” (Jacob 2014, O’Grada 2014 p4).   
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KAIs and the Tragedy of the Knowledge Commons 
 
Though the endogenous view of KAIs is widely held, economic theory tells us that it takes a 
lot for granted. This is because the market does a poor job of incentivising innovative effort, 
even at the best of times. Indeed, the rapid rate of technological innovation in the US since the 
Second World War, which was achieved under unprecedentedly supportive conditions for 
endogenous innovation, relied heavily on the financing of innovative effort by government. As 
I argue below, it seems reasonable to believe that around half of the 1.5% annual US total factor 
productivity growth experienced since WWII has ultimately been the result of non-endogenous 
innovative effort. During the British Industrial Revolution, however, the government provided 
no significant financing of innovative effort. Indeed, as such, it would be convenient to assume 
that the 0.7% annual TFP growth achieved at the peak of the British Industrial Revolution,49 at 
half the post-WWII US rate, represents endogenous innovation, while the absence of 
government funding explains the ‘missing half’.  
 
However, these assumptions are implausible because the market conditions for 
endogenous innovation during the British Industrial Revolution were much weaker than those 
in the US during the twentieth century. An equal underlying rate of endogenous technological 
progress in the two cases would imply that endogenous innovation is highly inelastic to 
variation in market size and the appropriability of the returns to innovation. This seems too 
much to ask. The corollary is that the innovative effort that yielded 0.7% TFP growth per year 
during the peak of the British Industrial Revolution must have received significant exogenous 
support. And if innovative effort during the British Industrial Revolution was not fully 
endogenous to profit, then neither could have been the observed investment in the 
complementary factor of KAIs. 
 
The tragedy of the knowledge commons    
 
Technological progress is a cumulative process: new technology builds on the existing 
knowledge base established over generations. We are still reaping the social returns to the 
innovations of the Industrial Revolution. Nevertheless, it would be implausible to credit the 
incalculably large social return to the British Industrial Revolution over the past two centuries 
                                                          
49 between 1830 and 1860 (Crafts 2014) 
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with having incentivised the innovative effort of Britain’s inventors, even if these social returns 
were foreseen, ex ante, by an optimistic society. This is because market incentives offer only a 
weak mechanism for generating innovative effort.  
 
It is difficult to appropriate the social return to invention. This is because of the 
economic characteristics of knowledge. Knowledge is a non-rival good – its consumption by 
one party does not preclude consumption by anyone else. Often, it is also non-excludable, or 
at best only partially excludable, meaning that one cannot typically appropriate much of the 
social benefit that it creates through productivity gains and consumer surplus (Romer 1990). 
Even if one has access to appropriation mechanisms such as patenting or secrecy, the rents that 
subsequently flow to contingent technologies are likely to accrue to somebody else. The upshot 
is that the appropriable private return to innovative activity is much smaller than the social 
return, even in the presence of well-functioning appropriation mechanisms, but particularly so 
when these mechanisms are absent or function poorly. As such, agents motivated by private 
profit undersupply innovation from the perspective of the social good (Nelson 1959, Arrow 
1962, Tirole 1988).  
 
This argument can be explored formally for the case of the British Industrial Revolution 
using the Romer-Mokyr model. Consider the following static version, where output is a 
function of labour in the manufacturing sector and the stock of propositional and prescriptive 
knowledge. The prescriptive knowledge stock is a function of the propositional knowledge 
stock and R&D labour, while the propositional knowledge stock is a function of past invented 
technology, which ‘spills over’ into the propositional knowledge base through its physical 
embodiment, dissemination through patent specifications, other literature or verbal 
communication (Bottomley 2015). These spillovers raise the future productivity of R&D 
labour, this impact being particularly large in the case of macroinventions or knowledge access 
devices. Hence:  
 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐿𝑀 , 𝜆, 𝛺) 
𝜆 = 𝜆(𝐿𝑅 , 𝛺) 
   𝛺 =  𝛺(𝜆)  
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All labour is either allocated to manufacturing or R&D: 
 
𝐿 =  𝐿𝑀 + 𝐿𝑅 
 
and in the market equilibrium, the marginal private product of labour in both activities is equal, 
so that 
 
𝑤𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 =
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿𝑀
=
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝐿𝑅
 
 
However, although the marginal social and private products are identical in the case of 
manufacturing labour, they are not in the case of R&D labour. The marginal social product of 
R&D labour includes, in addition to the direct marginal product of prescriptive knowledge, the 
marginal product of the propositional knowledge spillover,  
   
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝐿𝑅
+ 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝛺
𝜕𝛺
𝜕𝐿𝑅
 
 
Hence, in the market equilibrium, the marginal social product of manufacturing labour is lower 
than the marginal social product of R&D labour, which means that innovative effort is 
depressed relative to the socially optimal level. Labour could be re-allocated from 
manufacturing to research at a gain to aggregate output. 
 
 How much is the rate of endogenous economic growth depressed by the wedge 
between the private and social return to innovation? Empirical estimates for the modern 
economy suggest that the effect is quite large. Three meta-studies: Hall et al (2009), Griffiths, 
on behalf of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (2000) and Frontier Economics, on behalf of the 
UK Government’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2014), collate empirical 
estimates of the ratio of social to private returns to innovation, concluding that social returns 
appear to be around two to three times larger than private returns. These estimates are derived 
from regressions of total factor productivity on R&D expenditure and are likely to be an 
underestimate since they do not count long-lag social returns (Jones & Williams 1998). Bloom, 
Schankerman and Van Reenan (2013) measure social returns while also accounting for the 
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negative externality of innovation due to the ‘business stealing effect’ captured in 
Schumpeterian models of innovation. They find that knowledge spillovers dominate business 
stealing, finding overall social returns at least twice the size of private returns. 
 
Subsidy to innovative effort: Theory 
 
This knowledge commons problem is solved when innovative effort is subsidised to raise the 
ratio of private return to social return. The scope for raising the incentive to innovate in this 
way can be investigated by finding the optimal subsidy rate μ to R&D wages in the Romer-
Mokyr model. Define μ as follows: woptimal = w market(1+ μ), where woptimal is the optimal post-
subsidy R&D wage and w market is the prevailing pre-subsidy R&D wage. Note that in the 
socially optimal allocation, wages satisfy 
 
𝑤𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 =
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿𝑀
=
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝐿𝑅
+ 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝛺
𝜕𝛺
𝜕𝐿𝑅
 
 
Now, let β be the ratio of Ω(λ) to λ, then  
 
𝛺(𝜆) =  𝛽𝜆(𝐿𝑅 , 𝜆) 
 
 
 
Hence, 
 
𝑤𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 =
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿𝑀
=
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝐿𝑅
+ 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝛺
𝜕𝛽𝜆
𝜕𝐿𝑅
 
 
Using the product rule, specifically a special case of it known as the ‘constant multiple rule’, 
we can make the following substitution: 
 
𝜕𝛽𝜆
𝜕𝐿𝑅
= 𝛽
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝐿𝑅
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so that 
 
𝑤𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 =
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿𝑀
=(𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜆
+ 𝛽
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝛺
) 𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝐿𝑅
 
 
Substituting in μ and re-arranging gives the optimal subsidy: 
 
𝜇 = 𝛽(𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝛺
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜆
⁄ ) = 𝛽.𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆(𝛺, 𝜆) 
 
where MRTS(Ω , λ) is the marginal rate of technical substitution between Ω and λ, i.e. the ratio 
of the marginal product of the knowledge spillover to the private return. Clearly, if spillovers 
are large then there exists significant scope to raise the level of output by subsidising innovative 
activity. If these spillovers were large in eighteenth century Britain, then the emergence of a 
subsidy may have played a significant role in the acceleration of innovation during the British 
Industrial Revolution.  
 
Subsidy to innovative effort: Post-WWII historical experience 
 
R&D subsidies have been central to the supply of innovation at the world technological frontier 
during the strong period of technological innovation experienced in the decades since the 
Second World War. Between 1953 and 2011 in the US just less than half of all R&D 
expenditure was financed by non-profit sources. As tables 4.1a and 4.1b (based on National 
Science Foundation data) show, although 72% of R&D was carried out by private firms, only 
56.8% was funded by private firms. The government funded 38.9%, universities 2% and non-
profits 2.3%, each of which should be considered exogenous subsidies. Likewise, for the UK, 
Goodridge, Haskel, Hughes and Wallis (2015) show that in 2011 of the £22.5bn financed 
domestically, only just over half, £12.5bn (55%) was funded by private business enterprise 
while £8.3bn (37%) was funded by the government (including research councils) and £317m 
(1.4%) by higher education. 
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Table 4.1a: % of US R&D by funding source, 1953-2011 (calculated using constant 
2009$)  
Basic Applied Devel. Total 
Business 19.4 54.4 66.9 56.8 
Government 63.6 40.1 32.3 38.9 
Universities 8.9 2.7 0.0 2.0 
Non-profits 8.1 2.7 0.7 2.3 
Source: NSF 
 
 
Table 4.1b: % of US R&D by performing sector, 1953-2011 (calculated using constant 
2009$)  
Basic Applied Devel. Total 
Business 19.7 65.4 86.9 71.7 
Government 9.6 13.7 9.1 10.2 
Universities 59.3 15.2 2.0 13.9 
 
Non-profits 11.4 5.7 2.0 
 
4.3 
Source: NSF 
 
Moreover, splitting US R&D between 1953 and 2011 into basic, applied and 
developmental reveals that exogenous subsidies likely had a disproportionately large impact.50 
Evidence suggests that social returns are larger in the case of basic than applied and 
developmental R&D (Akcigit, Hanley & Serrano-Verlade 2013). As table 4.1a shows, 
exogenous subsidies financed a highly disproportionate share of basic R&D compared to the 
other types. The government funded 63.6% of basic R&D, universities 8.9% and non-profits 
8.1%, totalling 80.6%, compared to business’ share of 19.4%.  
 
One must consider the marginal impact of these subsidies. If subsidies merely crowd 
out private funding that would otherwise be forthcoming then the marginal effect of subsidies 
                                                          
50 According to the NSF, basic R&D refers to a “systematic study to gain more comprehensive knowledge or 
understanding of the subject under study without specific applications in mind” while applied research is 
defined as a “systematic study to gain knowledge or understanding to meet a specific, recognized need” and 
developmental R&D refers to the development of specific pre-existing technology. 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind10/c4/c4s.htm#sb2 
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could be much smaller than their share of funding would suggest. Using data for the UK in the 
early twenty first century, however, Haskel et al. find that public sector R&D funding does not 
crowd out private sector R&D funding but rather ‘crowds it in’ by raising the productivity of 
private R&D (Haskel Hughes, Bascavusoglu 2014). 
 
In her 2011 book The Entrepreneurial State, Mariana Mazzucato documents the role of 
the public sector in twentieth century innovation (Mazzucato 2011). She notes that 75% of new 
molecular entities approved by the US Food and Drug Administration between 1993 and 2004 
were based on research by the government-funded National Institutes of Health labs. In IT, the 
US government’s National Science Foundation funded the algorithm behind Google’s search 
engine and early funding for Apple came from the US government’s Small Business 
Investment Company. Moreover, “all the technologies which make the iPhone ‘smart’ are also 
state-funded ... the internet, wireless networks, the global positioning system, microelectronics, 
touchscreen displays and the latest voice-activated SIRI personal assistant.” Apple’s consumer 
products were based on seven decades of state-supported innovation. 
 
One objection to this line of reasoning is that the share of the exogenous subsidy in the 
financing of R&D stated above would be overestimated if R&D statistics systematically 
overlooked a portion of innovative effort in the private sector. R&D statistics are designed to 
capture all deliberate expenditure on innovation – however, both theory and evidence suggest 
that many of the proximate gains to TFP are achieved through ‘learning by doing’, the indirect 
contribution to productivity growth that accrues during the process of using technology in 
production. The concept was first formalised in the context of a growth model by Arrow in 
1962, having first been identified empirically for the aircraft industry in 1936 by Wright, who 
measured learning curves, tracing the output-input ratio for the production of particular models 
over time following their introduction.51  
 
Is there more learning by doing in the private sector than the public sector? Should one 
count learning by doing as innovative effort? Private sector learning by doing is indeed likely 
to have been greater than public sector learning by doing because output and the capital stock 
are larger in the private sector. However, learning by doing is by definition an unfinanced 
                                                          
51 For a recent empirical study of learning by doing in the automobile industry see Levitt, List & Syverson 
(2013)  
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externality of production. It should not be aggregated alongside R&D expenditure but rather 
thought of as a downstream process. The impact of learning by doing on TFP is contingent 
upon the technology produced by upstream R&D effort. Without marginal R&D effort, the 
returns to learning by doing would eventually run out. R&D is the ultimate source of TFP gains 
while learning by doing is the proximate source of the same gains. The complementarity 
between R&D and learning by doing is formalised in an endogenous growth model by Alwyn 
Young (Young 1993).  
 
Given the R&D expenditure data and discussion above, what would be a reasonable 
decomposition of the contributions of endogenous and subsidised US TFP growth since the 
Second World War? It appears reasonable to attribute the bulk of TFP growth ultimately to 
R&D expenditure of one kind or another as endogenous growth models envisage. Empirical 
estimates of the social return to R&D suggest a value of around 50% to 85% (Hall et al. 2009, 
Frontier Economics 2014). Since the average share of R&D in US GDP since the Second World 
War is 2.5%, this implies that R&D investment could plausibly account for the 1.5% average 
annual US TFP growth during that period. A half and half split seems a reasonable 
decomposition of this 1.5% annualised gain between the impact of public and private R&D 
expenditure. As illustrated above, although the private sector share is slightly larger overall, 
the public sector disproportionately funds basic R&D, which exhibits higher social returns. As 
such, if one very crudely takes away the ‘exogenous component’ of US TFP growth since the 
Second World War, one is left with around 0.75% of annual endogenous TFP growth.  
This rate is very close to the 0.7% annual rate of TFP growth achieved at the apex of 
the British Industrial Revolution, as based on Crafts’ estimates (Crafts 2014). Given the 
similarity, it would be convenient to assume that this 0.7% rate of TFP growth represents 
endogenous growth and that growth during the British Industrial Revolution was of a purely 
endogenous form, Meanwhile, the differential between nineteenth century British TFP growth 
of 0.7% and post-WW2 US TFP growth of 1.5% is essentially attributable to twentieth century 
US government subsidies. Certainly, there were no subsidies along the lines of tables 4.1a and 
4.1b in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain. However, this is assumption is implausible. 
As Crafts has explored (Crafts 1995), the conditions for endogenous growth during the British 
Industrial Revolution were much poorer than those in the US during the second half of the 
twentieth century. To attribute all the TFP growth during the British Industrial Revolution to 
endogenous innovation would be to assume that endogenous growth is highly inelastic to its 
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underlying factors, which differed markedly between the British Industrial Revolution and the 
post-WWII US economy.      
 
The Incentives for Innovation: the British Industrial Revolution versus the Post-WWII 
Technological Frontier 
 
Endogenous growth theory emphasises the impact of market size and the presence of 
appropriation mechanisms on innovation, both of which were far less supportive during the 
British Industrial Revolution than in the US since WWII. Indeed, after surveying the conditions 
for innovation in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, Crafts concludes that endogenous 
growth theory is at least as useful in explaining why British growth was so slow during the 
British Industrial Revolution as why it was faster than previous experience (Crafts 1995, 1996). 
The the market was much smaller than in the modern US economy and access was poorer given 
less developed transportation technologies. This is true both when considering domestic 
markets only and when incorporating addressable foreign markets.  
 
There is a wide gulf also in the availability and quality of appropriation mechanisms in 
the two cases. The literature on appropriation mechanisms distinguishes between legal and 
strategic mechanisms (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al 2000). The main legal mechanism is 
patenting.52 Nuvolari and Macleod (2010) explain the problems of the British patent system 
during the Industrial Revolution,53 and although the post-war US patent system has its 
problems too (see Bessen & Meurer 2009) it is clearly superior. Strategic appropriation 
mechanisms amount to secrecy, exploiting lead time and controlling complementary assets. 
These appear to have been easier to execute in modern day America than during the British 
Industrial Revolution due to the presence of the large corporation as a form of industrial 
organisation. Vertical integration has made controlling complementary assets easier, and scale 
economies have made lead time more exploitable. 
 
Before exploring the appropriation mechanisms available during the British Industrial 
Revolution and the post-WWII US in greater detail, first, I present evidence on outcomes of 
appropriation in both cases. Knick Harley has studied profit rates in the textile industry during 
                                                          
52 In addition to the minor legal mechanisms of utility models and industrial designs 
53 The major contributions are Dutton (1984), Macleod (1988) and Bottomley (2015) 
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the British Industrial Revolution, the main sectoral locus of technological innovation. He finds 
that the profit rates of major firms in the parts of the industry transformed by technological 
change were no higher than those in the parts of the industry that had not yet been transformed 
(Harley 1998, 2012). In cotton spinning, which had been revolutionised by major inventions, 
Samuel Greg and Partners earned average profits of 12% from 1796 to 1819 and William Grey 
and Partners made less than 2% per year between 1801 and 1810. At the same time, however, 
Richard Hornby and Partners, operating in the weaving sector, which was not mechanized until 
the 1810s, made an average profit of 11% between 1777 and 1809.  
 
Greg Clark documents that the major textile inventors rarely made a fortune from their 
inventions despite the enormous social returns they produced (Clark 2007). John Kay (flying 
shuttle, 1733) was impoverished by litigation costs trying enforcing his patent, had his house 
destroyed by machine breakers in 1753 and died in poverty in France; James Hargreaves 
(spinning jenny 1769) had his patent application denied, was forced to flee by machine breakers 
in 1768 and died in a workhouse in 1777; and Richard Roberts (self-acting mule 1830) died in 
poverty in 1864, his patent revenues having barely covered his development costs. Even those 
of the great textile inventors who made money, did so late in their careers many years after 
their invention made its impact. Samuel Crompton (mule 1779), who made no attempt to 
patent, was granted £5,000 by parliament in 1811; Edmund Cartwright (power loom 1785), 
whose patent proved worthless and had his factory burned by machine breakers in 1790, was 
granted £10,000 by parliament in 1809; and Eli Whitney (US, cotton gin 1793) whose patent 
also proved worthless, made money later in his career as a government arms contractor. Even 
Richard Arkwright (water frame 1769), by far the most financially successful of the group, 
who was worth half a million pounds at his death in 1792, made most of his fortune after 1781 
when other manufacturers had stopped honouring his patent, illustrating the unpredictability of 
the available appropriation mechanisms during the era. More generally, studying the wills of 
the rich in the nineteenth century tells us that despite the extraordinary growth of the British 
textile industry during the Industrial Revolution, only a handful of textile industrialists became 
very wealthy. Of the 379 people who died in the 1860s leaving estates of more than £0.5 
million, only 17 (4%) were in textiles (Clark 2007). 
 
Clark argues that the basic problem for innovators in the textile industry during the 
British Industrial Revolution, as in the other sectors of major technological advance (coal 
mining, iron and steel and the early railroads) was that productivity gains translated into price 
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reductions rather than supernormal profits (Harley 1998, 2012, Clark 2007). The 90% reduction 
in man-hours required to produce a pound of cotton between the 1760s and 1860s – which 
produced over half of the British economy’s overall efficiency gains during the Industrial 
Revolution, and by 1860 raised annual British economic output to a level 27% higher than it 
would otherwise have been –  benefitted consumers, rather than enriching the innovators. 
Invention was not a reliable way to get rich during the British Industrial Revolution.  
 
How does this picture compare with the current era? Aswath Damodaran, Professor of 
Finance at the Stern School of Business at New York University, provides regularly updated 
company financial data aggregated by industry.54 His US database covers 95 industries based 
on 7,887 underlying US companies, including all 4,240 US companies publicly listed on major 
exchanges55 and 3,647 on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB).  
 
In 2014, the ten US industries with the highest net R&D expenditures to sales ratios 
had significantly higher profit margins than the economy overall. These industries were 
biotechnology, healthcare IT, software (system and application), software (internet), 
electronics (consumer and office), advertising, drugs (pharmaceutical), semiconductor, 
semiconductor equipment, and computers/peripherals, comprising 1,555 of the total 7,887 
companies. Although they accounted for only 6% of 2014 sales and 8% of 2014 capital 
expenditures, they accounted for 86% of 2014 net R&D expenditures. The aggregated profit 
margin in these ten industries, as measured by the ratio of aggregated EBITDA56 to sales, was 
25%, compared to a 15% average across all industries, and their profit margin excluding current 
year R&D expenditures57, was 37%, compared to a 17% average across all industries. The 
return on capital in these ten industries was also much higher than average, at 22% compared 
to 7%. This finding mirrors estimates of the relative returns to R&D and corporate capital in 
general in the US. Estimates of the private return to R&D in the US in the late twentieth and 
early twenty first centuries cluster at around 25% (Frontier Economics 2014), while James 
Poterba finds that the return to corporate capital between 1959 and 1996 averaged 8.5% 
(Poterba 1998).  
                                                          
54 This database is located at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ , At the time of writing the database was last 
updated in January 2015. 
55  including US companies listed on major foreign exchanges such as the London Stock Exchange and AIM 
56 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
57 measured using the ratio of aggregated EBITDAR&D (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization and R&D expenses) 
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Why were the private returns to innovation greater in the post-WWII US economy than 
during the British Industrial Revolution? One reason is that patenting was much more 
expensive during the British Industrial Revolution. Securing a patent for England and Wales 
prior to the patenting reforms of 1852 cost around £100 and extending it to Scotland and Ireland 
cost a further £200 to £250.  Patenting also required a great amount of effort and time, as the 
process of securing the patent in England and Wales involved obtaining the signatures of seven 
different offices, including the signature of the sovereign at two separate stages. The diary of 
one inventor in the 1720s shows that he spent five months in London petitioning for his patent 
– although by 1829 it appears that the average length of time taken was only about two months 
(Bottomley 2015). Scottish and Irish coverage required further signatures, the average length 
of time taken to obtain these during the first half of the nineteenth century appearing to be 
around six weeks for Scotland and two months for Ireland. Given the complexities of the 
process, patent agents were increasingly used as the Industrial Revolution progressed. This 
added a further £40 to £100 of cost (Dutton 1984). These costs compare to the average weekly 
wage of a skilled worker of between £1 and £2, meaning that the ratio of patenting costs to a 
skilled worker’s weekly wage was around 67 to cover England and 216 to cover the United 
Kingdom (not counting the opportunity costs of time spent navigating the process). As such, 
access to the patent system was heavily restricted to the wealthy. In the case of the modern US 
patent system, the website ‘IP Watch Dog’ estimates the cost of securing a ‘high quality’ patent 
with the intent of obtaining strong patent protection at around $10,000 to $20,000, including 
attorney fees58. This compares to the weekly wage of a bachelor’s degree holder of around 
$1,100 in 2014 (and around $1,600 for a doctoral or professional degree holder), giving a ratio 
of patent cost to the weekly wage of a ‘skilled worker’ of around 14. The modern US patent 
system is much more accessible than the British system during the Industrial Revolution.  
 
The reliability of the patent system during the British Industrial Revolution remains a 
controversial question. Dutton (1984) and Macleod (1988) illustrate the weakness of patent 
litigation, emphasising a reluctance of judges to uphold patents. Based on a sample of 82 cases 
between 1770 and 1829, Dutton found that only about one-third of decisions under common 
law fell in favour of patentees. Sean Bottomley has recently presented a revised analysis that 
puts the system in a significantly better light, finding that, based on an expanded sample of 
patent cases, around half of patent litigations were successful (Bottomley 2015). Even so, this 
                                                          
58 http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/ 
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success rate is lower than in the modern-day US, where between 1995 and 2013, 66% of the 
patent cases that were decided at trial were won by the patentee (Price Waterhouse Coopers 
2014).  
 
The predictability of patent litigation during the British Industrial Revolution was also 
hampered by minimalistic legal foundations and the limited history of cases upon which to 
base common law. Up until 1852 the basis for patent law was the Statute of Monopolies, which 
was instituted in 1623 following a conflict between James I and parliament concerning the 
king’s abuse of his prerogative powers in granting licences of monopolies to favoured parties. 
The statute restrained such licences but exempted patents for new inventions, applicable to “the 
first and true inventor” of “new manufactures under this realm”. Cases concerning patents were 
to be determined under common law, the only statutory guidance being that patents were 
limited to fourteen years and must not contradict the public interest. Patents were not required 
to be examined, although a written specification was required from 1778. As such, courts were 
required to improvise decisions under common law with no sound underpinning in statue law 
nor a broad base of precedents and, without examination, patents were awarded tenuously. In 
1795, Chief Justice Eyre, presiding over Boulton and Watt vs Bull, lamented that “patent rights 
are nowhere that I can find accurately described in our books” (Nuvolari & Macloed 2010). At 
parliament’s 1829 investigation into the patent system – the first since the 1623 statute – a 
witness told the select committee that “there being no existing basis of law, the dictum of the 
judge is one thing one day and another thing another’ and Marc Isambard Brunel declared “I 
might as well toss for the fate of a patent” (Select Committee on Patents 1829: 454, 486).  
 
The US patent system during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been 
somewhat beleaguered by the quality of patent examination and the predictability of litigation 
(Bessen and Meurer 2009). For instance, using a sample of 980 litigated patents between 2000 
and 2010, Miller (2013) estimates that 28% of all patents granted would be found at least 
partially invalid if subject to an ‘anticipation’ or ‘obviousness’ decision in litigation. 
Nevertheless, it would be an extreme claim to suggest that US patent examination adds no 
value at all to upholding of the quality of US patents and predictability of litigation.  
 
A major problem in the modern US patent system is the usage of ‘tactical patenting’, 
where companies file patents to trap another entity in patent infringement. Cohen et al (2000) 
found by surveying 765 firms engaged in patenting that although the most common reason for 
Why Did Britain Build its Knowledge Access Institutions? 
161 
 
patenting was to prevent imitation (95.8% of respondents with respect to product innovations 
and 77.6% for process innovations), blocking was also common (81.2% for product, 63.6% for 
process), and to a lesser degree, so was taking out a patent ‘for use in negotiations’ (47.4% for 
product, 37.0% for process). In recent years, tactical patenting has become an acute problem 
due to the rise of ‘patent assertion entities’ (PAEs), which do not engage in R&D but purchase 
large quantities of patents from patentees to earn a spread between litigation revenues and the 
purchase price of the patent. In 2013, PAEs filed 67% of all new patent infringement cases, up 
from 23% in 2009. This may have inhibited innovation by increasing the risk of inadvertent 
infringement. Research shows that firms that engage more in R&D are more likely to be sued 
for patent infringement by PAEs (Bessen and Meurer 2013), and that being successfully sued 
by a PAE reduces subsequent R&D expenditure and patenting (Tucker 2014, Smeets 2014, 
Cohen et al 2015).  
 
PAEs pose a considerable problem for the US patent system today, but this problem 
was much smaller prior to the past decade or so. Moreover, although tactical patenting has 
indeed presented challenges during the entire post-WWII period, it also presented challenges 
during the British Industrial Revolution. For example, James Watt’s extended patent for the 
separate condenser is the canonical example, which while in force from 1769 until 1800 
appears to have long delayed the development of the subsequent generation of steam engines 
(Bottomley 2015). Overall, given far lower costs and the presence of patent examinations, the 
post-WW2 US patent system has been superior to the system in place during the British 
Industrial Revolution. This is likely to have contributed to the superior conditions for 
endogenous growth.  
 
Strategic appropriation mechanisms (secrecy, the exploitation of lead time and the 
strategic ownership of complementary assets) were important in both periods. Cohen et al’s 
2000 survey revealed that of 1,118 companies engaged in product innovation, 35% patented, 
while 53% exploited lead time, 51% used secrecy and 46% exploited control of complementary 
manufacturing. Of 1,087 companies engaged in process innovation, only 23% patented, while 
50% used secrecy, 37% lead time and 43% complementary manufacturing. Likewise, during 
the British Industrial Revolution much innovation occurred outside of the patent system. Petra 
Moser has shown that only 11% of the British exhibits at the 1851 Great Exhibition were 
patented (Moser 2012). By matching patent data to the key inventors of the British Industrial 
Revolution as identified by economic historians of technology, one finds much higher patenting 
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rates than this, but a significant role for non-patented innovation remains. For example, of 
Allen’s 79 ‘great inventors’, 68% patented (Allen 2009), and of Meisenzahl and Mokyr’s 759 
‘tweakers’, 60% patented (Meisenzahl & Mokyr 2011).     
 
Strategic appropriation mechanisms worked more effectively in the post-WWII US 
economy than during the British Industrial Revolution because the ‘modern industrial 
enterprise’ made them easier to implement. First, vertical integration associated with the 
modern industrial enterprise facilitates the appropriation of technology rents through the 
ownership of complementary assets (Teece 1986). Second, large firms can scale up production 
of product innovations, thereby establishing a cost advantage relative to potential entrants 
(Chandler 1990). Without this structure, inventors found it difficult to appropriate the returns 
of innovation during the British Industrial Revolution. As Harley shows, the textile industry 
experienced rapid firm entry following innovation and the prices of output fell precipitously 
(Harley 2012). Policy was also unhelpful. Bottomley (2015) describes the proviso, in place 
until 1832, that if a financial interest in a patent was ever vested in more than five people then 
the patent would be immediately invalidated, frustrating capital-raising for expansion in 
production capacity or the purchase of complementary assets. 
 
The Complementarity of KAIs and Innovative Effort 
 
KAIs were an investment in the capital stock that was complementary to innovative effort. As 
such, if purely endogenous innovation during the British Industrial Revolution is implausible 
then so too are purely endogenous KAIs. Moreover, while KAIs raised the productivity and 
supply of innovative effort, at the same time, a greater supply of innovative effort raised the 
marginal productivity of the KAI capital stock. This mutually supportive relationship between 
KAI investment and innovative effort means that there must be two self-sustaining equilibria 
with respect to their joint prevalence in the economy.  
 
Since the British economy lacked any meaningful pre-existing innovation infrastructure 
before the blossoming of KAIs and since technological innovation was slow and sporadic, it 
seems reasonable to assume that Britain was situated in a lower level equilibrium on the eve of 
the British Industrial Revolution: no KAIs and little innovative effort. Innovative effort was 
too low to warrant capital investment to support it and the existing innovative infrastructure 
was too small to make much difference to the productivity of innovative effort. It seems likely 
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that Britain’s transition to the equilibrium characterised by the accumulation of KAI capital 
and accelerating innovation required an exogenous impetus. Below, I make this case formally 
in the setting of a model inspired by Redding (1996).59 
 
There are n entrepreneurs, each of whom lives for two periods and produces output 
according to the production function LMi𝜆, where LMi  is the proportion of i’s labour allocated 
to manufacturing. There is no saving or borrowing so each entrepreneur’s consumption in 
period t is equal to their output in that period. In period one, entrepreneurs decide proportions 
of their labour to allocate to manufacturing and innovation. The innovation proportion μi results 
in the sacrifice μi𝜆 of consumption in period one. However, this sacrifice pays off in period 
two when manufacturing output and consumption rise by μiσ𝜆, where σ>1 is a parameter that 
represents the productivity of innovative effort. Hence, each entrepreneur faces the following 
maximization problem 
 
 
max
𝑢𝑖
 {(1 − 𝜇𝑖)𝜆  +   𝜌[𝜇𝑖𝜎 + (1 − 𝜇𝑖)]𝜆 }   (4.1) 
 
Next, consider an additional (n+1th) entrepreneur, who can choose to spend a fraction 
v of his labour in period one operating a KAI. For simplicity, assume that if he chooses v>0 
then he spends the remaining fraction of his labour, 1-v, in manufacturing, and does not allocate 
any labour to innovation. If he chooses v=0 then his maximization problem is the same as that 
of the first n entrepreneurs.60 The KAI increases the productivity of innovative effort for 
entrepreneurs 1 to n by the factor 1+ɣvθ, where ɣ>1 and 0<θ<1 are exogenous parameters. To 
compensate himself, entrepreneur n+1 extracts a fraction β of this producer surplus. Hence, 
entrepreneurs 1 to n face the modified maximization problem  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑢𝑖
𝑈𝑖=1,…,𝑛  {(1 − 𝜇𝑖)𝜆  +   𝜌[(1 − 𝛽)𝜇𝑖𝜎(1 + 𝛾𝑣𝜃) + (1 − 𝜇𝑖)]𝜆 } (4.2) 
                                                          
59 Redding modelled the complementarity of investing in education and investing in R&D in the context of 
endogenous growth. 
60 Relaxing this assumption and allowing him to allocate his labour to a combination of all three activities in period 
1, i.e. to founding a KAI (v), innovating (μi) and manufacturing (1-v-μi), would be more realistic but also 
complicates the analysis considerably without substantively changing its conclusion. 
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And, restricting the behaviour of 1 to n to the symmetric case where μi  = μ for all i = 1,…,n, 
entrepreneur n+1 faces the maximization problem:  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 
(𝑣,𝑢𝑖)
𝑈𝑖=𝑛+1 {
(1 − 𝑣)𝜆  +   𝜌[𝛽𝑛𝜇𝜎(1 + 𝛾𝑣𝜃) + 1]𝜆 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑣 > 0
(1 − 𝜇𝑖)𝜆  +   𝜌[𝜇𝑖𝜎 + (1 − 𝜇𝑖)]𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝑣 = 0
 
 
Now, conditional on v > 0, the first order condition for n+1’s optimal choice of v, v*, is 
 
 
𝜕𝑈𝑖=𝑛+1
𝜕𝑣
 = 𝜌𝛽𝑛𝜇𝜎𝜃𝛾𝑣∗𝜃−1𝜆 − 𝜆 = 0,  
 
and so 
 
𝑣∗ = min { 1, [𝜌𝛽𝑛𝜇𝜎𝜃𝛾]
1
1−𝜃  } 
 
which is increasing in the probability that entrepreneurs 1 to n allocate effort μ to innovation. 
Alternatively, conditional on v=0, his optimal allocation to innovation μi is derived from the 
first order condition that arises from maximizing 4.1 with respect to μi: 
 
𝜇𝑖=𝑛+1
∗ =
{
 
        1 , 𝑖𝑓  𝜎 >
𝜌 + 1
𝜌
0, otherwise
 
 
which is also entrepreneur 1 to n’s optimal allocation of labour to innovation in this case. This 
means that without a KAI, if the productivity of innovation is large enough relative to the rate 
of time preference then innovation occurs, but if the productivity of innovation is too small 
relative to the rate of time preference then innovation does not occur.  
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Entrepreneurs 1 to n, in turn, choose innovative effort (i.e. μ) to maximize 4.2. Hence, 
 
 
𝜇𝑖=1,…,𝑛
∗ = {
                                    1 , 𝑖𝑓 𝜌(1 − 𝛽)𝜎(1 + 𝛾𝑣𝜃) > 2
  0, otherwise
 
 
The strategic complementarity between n+1’s KAI investment decision and the other n’s 
innovative effort decisions gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria, namely one with 
no investment in KAIs and no innovative effort: the low innovation trap, and one with both 
KAIs and innovative effort: the innovation equilibrium. For the innovation equilibrium to hold 
the following two conditions must be satisfied: 
 
Condition 1: 
𝜌(1 − 𝛽)𝜎 (1 +  𝛾[𝜌𝛽𝑛𝜎𝜃𝛾]
𝜃
1−𝜃) > 2 
 
so that the first n entrepreneurs choose to innovate when n+1 invests in the KAI. Notice that 
this condition depends positively on the productivity of innovation. 
 
Condition 2: 
Πn+1(v>0, μ*=1) > Πn+1(v=0, μ*=1) 
 
Entrepreneur n+1 must choose non-zero v and as such he requires a large enough return on his 
KAI investment to beat his alternative return on innovating without the KAI. However, this 
return cannot be derived from too large an appropriation share 𝛽, which would discourage the 
other n entrepreneurs from using the KAI. So, we require that:  
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 (1 + 𝜌) + 𝜌𝛽𝑛𝜎(1 + 𝛾[𝜌𝛽𝑛𝜎𝜃𝛾]
𝜃
1−𝜃) − [𝜌𝛽𝑛𝜎𝜃𝛾]
1
1−𝜃 > 𝜌𝜎 
 
i.e. we need a large enough combination of β, n, and ɣ, but β can’t be too large in relative terms, 
since that would violate condition one.   
 
If either of conditions 1 or 2 does not hold then v=0. There is no KAI investment and 
the economy languishes in the low innovation trap. The important point is that this is a stable 
equilibrium. Moving to the high innovation equilibrium requires an exogenous shock to one of 
the parameters. In the remainder of this chapter, I investigate the shock of a subsidy τ, due to 
Enlightenment culture, to the return on KAI investment, 𝜌[𝛽𝑛𝜇𝜎(1 + 𝛾𝑣𝜃)]𝜆. 
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KAIs and the ‘Enlightenment Subsidy’ to Innovation 
 
Although innovative effort was not subsidised by the government during the British Industrial 
Revolution as it has been since the Second World War, it was subsidised by the ideological and 
cultural preferences of a society ‘electrified’ by the European Enlightenment.  
 
Circumstantial evidence of the exogeneity of KAIs  
 
Three basic facts suggest that the roots of KAIs lay outside of the British Industrial Revolution 
itself. First, early KAIs were established long before the Industrial Revolution and although 
Britain’s KAIs proliferated markedly during the Industrial Revolution, these early forerunners 
served as an important precedent, both ideologically and operationally. The Royal Society was 
founded in 1660 (chartered in 1662) a century before the British Industrial Revolution began. 
As discussed below, it was founded upon the Baconian ideology of the 1620s, which 
emphasised the public utility of knowledge, not private return. Britain’s eighteenth and 
nineteenth century KAIs followed knowingly in its footsteps.  
 
Second, the eighteenth and early nineteenth century blossoming of KAIs occurred 
alongside the broader growth of voluntary associational societies and clubs across Britain. Peter 
Clark estimates the number of newly established societies per decade as 100 in 1700, 200 in 
1750, 400 in the 1760s, around 700 in the 1780s and over 1,000 in the 1790s, strongly 
outstripping population growth (Clark 2000). Moreover, this was a Western European-wide 
phenomenon and should be thought of as an aspect of the European Enlightenment. Clark 
writes (pp ix): “If the Enlightenment did exist, then one of its principle engines was the 
Georgian voluntary society. Fanning out across the English speaking world, clubs and societies 
may have served as vectors of ideas, new values, new kinds of social alignment, and forms of 
national, regional, and local identity”. The Enlightenment was the process of diffusion of a set 
of ideologies. It was embodied by the formal and informal social networks along which those 
ideas and beliefs passed, which were often structured by Clark’s broad range of voluntary 
societies. One strand of the Enlightenment was the ‘Industrial Enlightenment’, identified by 
Mokyr (2002), in which the ideas and beliefs that were disseminated concerned the value of 
knowledge for economic progress. At the hubs of its network were KAIs. 
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Third, while British industrialisation was concentrated in certain parts of the country, 
KAIs were spread far and wide. Figures 4.1 to 4.4 show the correlations across British 
registration districts in 1851 between the number of KAIs and KAI members (controlling for 
population) and proxies for industrialisation (the share of the workforce occupied in the 
secondary sector) and urbanisation (population density). These correlations are positive but 
low. There remains a great deal of variation in KAI prevalence to be explained by non-
endogenous factors. Moykr points out that Jane Austen lived through the British Industrial 
Revolution though never mentioned industrialisation in her novels. She lived in the non-
industrialising home counties, far from the north, midlands and black country and quite 
disconnected even from London (Mokyr 1999). Yet, her home town of Alton, Hampshire had 
three KAIs, in the form of the Alton Book Society (1805), the New Alton Book Society (1822) 
and the Alton Mechanics Institute (1837), the latter with 106 members and nearly one thousand 
books in its library in 1851.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: KAIs versus Secondary Sector Employment Ratio by British Registration 
District (After taking Logs, and controlling for Log Population) Cor = 0.13 
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Figure 4.2: KAI members per Working Population versus Secondary Sector 
Employment Ratio by British Registration District (Logs) Cor=0.0095 
 
 
Figure 4.3: KAIs versus Population Density by British Registration District (After 
taking Logs) Correlation = 0.33 
 
 
Figure 4.4: KAI Members per Working Age Population versus Population Density by 
British Registration District (Logs) Correlation = 0.18 
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The Enlightenment Subsidies of KAIs 
 
The European Enlightenment profoundly influenced politics, society, economics, culture and 
religion (Porter 2000). Moreover, political revolutions, new civic structures, industrialisation 
and new cultural and religious beliefs each interacted with one another in complex ways. For 
example, adjustments to political institutions changed the conditions for economic growth and 
created more freedom for civic structures to develop. At the same time, the rising economic 
status of certain groups in society enabled them to shape political institutions. The Scientific 
Revolution was an important ingredient in many of the strands of the European Enlightenment 
(Jacob 2009, Wootton 2015). Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau brought the scientific method to 
bear on politics and Hume on ethics. Newtonians such as Samuel Clarke and Rational 
Dissenters such as Joseph Priestley applied it to religion, Adam Smith to economics and, 
ultimately, thousands of inventors and entrepreneurs to industry. 
 
As such, as an individual living through the European Enlightenment one potentially 
would have had lots of reasons to engage with and invest in institutions that promoted science. 
Of course, this would depend upon one’s place in society – political, social and economic 
change had many enemies, particularly among those with privileges and rents to lose, and the 
individuals who founded and engaged with KAIs tended to exhibit certain characteristics, as I 
explore below. In this way, as R&D institutions, KAIs were cross-subsidised by five non-profit 
utilities of science: 1) progressive ideology advocating the public good 2) religious insight 3) 
political asset, 4) social status symbol and 5) entertainment. Below, I explore the demand for 
these five utilities and provide falsifiable evidence of the link between Rational Dissenters and 
KAIs, which was emblematic of the Enlightenment subsidy. 
 
Baconian Ideology: The Royal Society, founded in 1660, formalised the ‘invisible colleges’ 
of London and Oxford of the late 1640s and 1650s, informal gatherings of natural philosophers 
inspired by the ideology of Francis Bacon. In the 1620s, Lord Bacon advocated a programme 
of inquiry into the laws of nature using the scientific method to achieve the “relief of man’s 
estate”. In The New Atlantis, published in 1627, Bacon envisaged a “House of Salomon”, a 
research academy constituting researchers who collected data and carried out experiments and 
tried to infer from the results general regularities and laws. This was the essence of the Royal 
Society, founded thirty-three years later.  
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Britain’s provincial literary and philosophical societies founded in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries were based upon these Baconian principles and followed the 
operational format of the Royal Society, of a rotating elected governing committee, elected 
membership, subscriptions, regular meetings in which papers were read on diverse topics, the 
maintenance of a library and correspondence with other KAIs. They corresponded and shared 
members with the Royal Society.   
 
The Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (today, the 
Royal Society of Arts) was founded in 1754 (granted a Royal Charter in 1847), and operated 
by awarding premiums (cash prizes) and medals for technological innovations. The premiums 
were not funded by government, nor generally by profit-making interests. Indeed, the society 
declined to award them to patented innovations. Rather, they were funded by membership 
subscriptions, which were paid by wealthy men acting upon Baconian notions of knowledge 
and the public good. The society’s statement of intent, “the encouragement of the Arts, 
Manufactures and Commerce by the advancement of education in and the encouragement and 
conduct of research into the sustainable context within which the said Arts, Manufactures and 
Commerce may prosper and to make such research findings available to the public’, was 
overtly Baconian. So too was that of the third major metropolitan KAI, the Royal Institution, 
founded in 1799 “for diffusing the knowledge and facilitating the general and speedy 
introduction of new and useful mechanical invention and improvements, and also for teaching, 
by regular courses of philosophical lectures and experiments, the application of these 
discoveries in science to the improvement of arts and manufactures, and in facilitating the 
means of procuring the comforts and conveniences of life”.  
 
The mechanics institutes founded in the early nineteenth century, expanded the 
Baconian programme to educating the lower classes. They were founded and run by members 
of local elite KAIs along the Baconian principle of the dissemination of knowledge for the 
public good. Their pioneer, George Birkbeck, a Yorkshireman appointed Professor of Natural 
Philosophy at Anderson’s Institution in Glasgow in 1799 following his medical training at 
Edinburgh, wanted to provide mechanical operatives with knowledge of scientific principles, 
which he believed would make their work more efficient and pleasurable (Kelly 1992). In his 
first few weeks as a Professor he met some mechanical operatives in a tinman’s shop who were 
constructing apparatus for his lectures, and decided to offer a course of lectures free of charge 
‘abound with experiments, and conducted with the greatest simplicity of expression and 
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familiarity of illustration, solely for persons engaged in the practical exercise of the mechanical 
arts’. Later he remarked of the incident: 
 
I beheld, through every disadvantage of circumstance and appearance, such strong indications of the existence of 
the unquenchable spirit, and such emanations from ‘the heaven lighted lamp in man’, that the question was forced 
upon me, Why are these minds left without the means of obtaining that knowledge which they so ardently desire, 
and why are the avenues of science barred against them because they are so poor? It was impossible not the 
determine that the obstacle should be removed that much pleasure would be communicated to the mechanic in the 
exercise of his art, and that the mental vacancy which follows a cessation from bodily toil, would often be 
agreeably occupied, by a few systematic ideas, upon which, at his leisure he may meditate.    
 
By the fourth lecture Birkbeck’s audience had swelled to 500.  In 1823, Birkbeck, now 
a physician in London, co-founded the London Mechanics Institute, which paved the way for 
a national movement of institutes numbering around 800 by mid-century.  Baconian ideology 
is central to the history of KAIs. 
 
Scientific Religion: The Scientific Revolution, ushered in by the introduction of the 
heliocentric Copernican model of the universe in 1543, dealt a blow to the authority of the 
church, both its Catholic and Protestant variants. Galileo, Descartes and Newton shattered the 
Scholastic interpretation of the Aristotelian description of the universe endorsed by the 
Catholic Church, which asserted that the earth was motionless at the centre of the universe and 
that objects possessed inherent natures that determined their actions (e.g. objects fell towards 
the earth because it was in their nature to do so). The Scientific Revolution replaced this 
doctrine with a mechanical system consisting homogenously of atoms, acted upon by the forces 
of attraction and repulsion, in which the Earth assumed an arbitrary location. Moreover, due to 
the homogeneity of matter and the consistency of the laws governing its motion, the entire 
system could be understood by experimentation (i.e. the heavens were subject to the same laws 
of motion as pocket pendulums) and described by mathematical formulae. This model of the 
heavens and the Earth raised severe problems for interpreting the bible. But the bigger problem 
for the church was the elevation of evidence and reason as sources of authority.  
 
In the wake of the Scientific Revolution, religious attitudes splintered as theological 
interpretations of new scientific facts were explored. The tradition most commonly associated 
with the Enlightenment was atheism, which took hold in France (Gay 1966). However, in 
England the most influential tradition was probably the Anglican Latitudinarian interpretation 
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of Newton’s work, which saw God at the centre of Newton’s mechanical system, visible in the 
forces of attraction and repulsion acting on bodies. Indeed, Newton’s motive for writing the 
Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687) and Opticks (1704) was to support public 
belief in the deity in this way (Jacob and Stewart 2004). While relatively tolerant, the Anglican 
Latitudinarian position also emphasised the importance of a national church and an ordered 
society. It represented the English ‘moderate Enlightenment’, acting as a bulwark against the 
Enlightenment’s radical tendencies and was expressed seminally by Samuel Clark, one of the 
leading public intellectuals of the era, in his Boyle Lectures of 1704 and 1705, which were 
published in eight editions in the subsequent decades. Furthermore, Shapiro (1968) has 
identified a correlation between Latitudinarians and science in the 1650s and in the founding 
of the Royal Society, indicating a relationship between moderate religious attitudes and English 
science.  
 
The religious position that displayed the strongest direct link to KAIs, however, was 
Rational Dissent. It is distinguishable by two characteristics. The first was its adherents’ dissent 
from the Church of England following the Act of Uniformity of 1662, which demanded the use 
of the Book of Common Prayer in religious service. This Act was established by Charles II 
along with three other associated legal statutes between 1661 and 166561 (including the Five 
Mile Act of 1665, which is central to the next section of the chapter) collectively named the 
Clarendon Code after Charles II’s Lord Chancellor. The purpose of the Clarendon Code was 
to preserve the Church of England’s hegemony in Restoration England following the religious 
sectarianism of the Civil War and the growth of radical new religions during the Interregnum. 
Just over two thousand clergymen and teachers refused to conform to the Act of Uniformity 
and, as such, were displaced from their posts, creating a permanent division in the English 
religious landscape. 
 
Not all nonconformists were (or were to become) Rational Dissenters, however. Rather, 
the second characteristic that marked Rational Dissent was its adherent’s adoption of ‘natural 
religion’ – an understanding of God based only on scriptural revelation and reason. The two 
characteristics were related because the Act of Uniformity required ministers to preach the 
doctrine of the Holy Trinity, to which Rational Dissenters objected because it was supported 
by neither scripture nor reason. Furthermore, the largest denominational group among Rational 
                                                          
61 the Corporation Act (1661, which), the Conventicle Act (1664) and the Five Mile Act (1665). 
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Dissenters was that of the English Presbyterians, who had campaigned to reform the 
governance of the Church of England since 1570. The doctrine of the Trinity – established by 
the Council of Nicaea in AD 325, the first concerted attempt by the Christian church to reach 
doctrinal consensus across Christendom – represented exactly the kind of institutional 
distortion of religion that they had campaigned against. 
 
Over time, Rational Dissent came to be defined by its position on the Trinity. Rational 
Dissenters’ commitment to anti-trinitarianism was tested and their resolve strengthened during 
the eighteenth century by ongoing legal discrimination under the Clarendon Code, even as 
other variants of dissent regained their freedoms. The Act of Toleration of 1689, which 
overruled much of the Clarendon Code, excluded the toleration of nontrinitarians (alongside 
Catholics and atheists), nontrinitarian beliefs remaining illegal up until the passing of the 
Trinity Act in 1813. In 1774, however, the first Unitarian chapel was founded in Essex Street 
in London, giving birth to the formal denomination of Unitarianism – and despite its illegal 
status prior to the Trinity Act, most of the English Presbytarians converted to Unitarianism 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, joined in smaller numbers by former 
General Baptists and even some Anglicans (Watts 1978, 1993).    
 
In his chapter on Unitarians and Quakers in D.G. Paz’s 1995 edited volume Nineteenth-
century English religious traditions, Robert K. Webb surveys the historiography of 
Unitarianism. While cautious of denominational self-written history, Webb notes the 
“Unitarian commitment to the objective and external authority of science and criticism” 
stemming from the commitment to natural religion (Webb 1995). Likewise, John Hedley 
Brooke (2006) explains the complementarity of the two defining characteristics of 
Unitarianism: “Fundamental to Unitarian belief was the right to liberty of conscience in 
religious matters. This belief sat comfortably with respect for the sciences, which could be 
hailed as paradigms of free enquiry.”  
 
These verdicts match Unitarian self-perception in the eighteenth century. Joseph 
Priestley, one of the fathers of denominational Unitarianism, defined Unitarianism as “the 
belief of primitive Christianity before later corruptions set in” (Morse Wilbur 1952), while he 
also emphasised the doctrinal significance of science in the rooting out of such corruptions: 
“this rapid progress of knowledge … will, I doubt not, be the means under God of extirpating 
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all error and prejudice, and of putting an end to all undue and usurped authority in the business 
of religion as well as of science” (Hedley Brooke 2006). Even enemies of Unitarianism agreed 
on the nature of its characteristics, if not their virtue. In an attack published in 1826, Baden 
Powell noted their assumption that the human mind “enlightened by science in physical things, 
must be guided by analogy and congruity, and depend upon its own resources in the search 
after religious truth” (Hedley Brooke 2006). 
 
Newton’s anti-trinitarianism is well established (Jacob and Stewart 2004). Moreover, 
the nexus between science and Rational Dissent/Unitarianism in evident in the curricula of 
dissenting academies, higher education institutions established by Unitarians and Quakers to 
educate the sons of dissenters, non-Anglicans being unable to attend Oxford and Cambridge62 
(Rivers, forthcoming). These academies provided a superior training in science compared to 
Oxbridge until well into the nineteenth century, as can be seen, for instance, in Irene Parker’s 
comparison of the scientific content of curricula at dissenting academies with that of Oxford 
University in the eighteenth century (Parker 1914). The relationship can also be seen 
circumstantially in the link between KAIs and Unitarians. Thackery documented the strong 
link between Unitarians and the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society (Thackery 
1974), while Inkster has found a disproportionate influence of the Unitarians in the scientific 
community in Sheffield (Inkster 1977) and Orange with respect to the Newcastle Literary and 
Philosophical Society (Orange 1983). 
 
Margaret Jacob has argued that Unitarianism was the perfect religion for the science-
loving entrepreneur at the heart of the British Industrial Revolution (Jacob 2000). Jacob shows 
that Max Weber’s protestant capitalist, motivated to strive by Calvinist doctrine, is a poor 
description of the prominent entrepreneurial cliques of the British Industrial Revolution. 
Moreover, it is difficult to explain why Calvinist doctrine, particularly the doctrine of 
predestination, led to striving rather than to despair (Dowey 1952). Rather, by showing the 
central role that Unitarianism played in the lives of the Watt and Wedgewood families, she 
replaces Weber’s Calvinist capitalist with a Unitarian capitalist. As she puts it, “Sixteenth-
century Calvinism may have put striving into the psychological makeup of early Protestants, 
but…other patterns of thought had to be present before despair could be quietly laid to rest. 
                                                          
62 Cambridge allowed non-Anglicans to matriculate but not graduate without swearing allegiance to the Church 
of England, while Oxford required such an oath at matriculation (Prest 1996). 
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Striving in a law-bound, seemingly rational universe made success more thinkable, possibly 
more doable. That universe made its appearance only after 1700 and as a result largely of the 
achievements of Newtonian science” (Jacob 2000, p277). It was Unitarians, above others, for 
whom the implications of Newtonian science and method provided a religious incentive system 
conducive to innovation and industrialisation. Unitarianism made getting rich from the 
Industrial Revolution morally acceptable. As Jacob argues “Unitarianism based upon science 
possessed a self-awareness that naturalized and made acceptable, even socially benevolent, 
what might have been construed, then and now, as greed and rapaciousness (Jacob 2000, p292). 
Or similarly, as Orange remarked with respect to the picture in Newcastle, “Among the 
Unitarians, Britain’s industrial revolution was taking place not behind God’s back but at his 
express command” (Orange 1983). 
  
The Unitarian link to entrepreneurialism during the British Industrial Revolution can 
be seen in the occupational destinations of former students at Unitarian dissenting academies. 
Parker shows that of the 393 students educated at the Rational Dissenting and Unitarian, 
Warrington Academy between 1757 and 1782, at which Priestley taught, 98 entered for a 
training in ‘commerce’ compared with 22 in law, 52 in divinity and 24 in medicine (Parker 
1914). This is in stark contrast to the graduates of English universities. Crafts states that he has 
failed to find even one graduate of Cambridge University before 1850 that went into 
manufacturing (Crafts 2009).   
 
Science as a Strategic Political Asset: The Scientific Revolution’s impact on religion in 
England was matched by its impact on politics. The Church of England was intrinsic to the 
state apparatus and, as such, the Latitudinarian moderate Enlightenment – the appropriation of 
science as an establishment bulwark against radicalism – was motivated more by politics than 
religion itself. Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society of London, written in 1667, 
explained how he and the other founders of the Royal Society had intended to pit Baconian 
philosophy against the sectarian conflict that they saw as the root of the English Civil War, and 
to diffuse the radical sects that had emerged during the Interregnum, and the associated 
suppression of the Anglican Episcopy, during the previous decade. 
 
 Jacob argues that one of the primary reasons for the triumph of Newton’s mechanical 
system was its adoption as a strategic political asset by Anglican Latitudinarian churchmen in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Newton’s concept of a law-governed stable 
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universe, regulated by God, was the ideal allegory for the advocacy of a stable and pious society 
(Jacob 1976).  The culmination of this rhetoric was John Theophilus Desaguliers’ The 
Newtonian System of the World: the Best Form of Government, published in 1728, which 
defended the Anglican political status quo.       
 
The establishment also recognised the potential for science to act as antagonist if it was 
captured by radical political interests. Indeed, Jacob shows how Newton’s science was 
combined with Spinoza and Hobbes to produce Republicanism. These views were incubated 
in the Dutch Republic in the early eighteenth century before spreading to France prior to the 
Revolution (Jacob 1981). The British establishment was suspicious of KAIs, particularly 
during periods of heightened political tension. Following the American War of Independence 
and the French Revolution public lecturers in England were treated suspiciously by the 
government. The government passed the Seditious Meetings Acts of 1795 and 1799 and KAIs 
were monitored for radical sympathies. Priestley, who was forced to flee to America in 1794 
after his home in Birmingham was burned down in 1791 because of his support for 
Republicanism, remarked “The English hierarchy has reason to tremble even at an air pump or 
an electrical machine" (Delbourgo 2006). 
 
In the nineteenth century, mechanics institutes were feared by the upper classes as 
potential hotbeds of radicalism. Shapin and Barnes argue that in response the upper classes 
sought to use mechanics institutes as tools of manipulation to subdue the working classes in 
the evenings and distract them from ideas of reform (Shapin & Barnes 1977).   
 
Science as a Social Status Symbol: Royal patronage financed the careers of many of the natural 
philosophers who constituted Europe’s ‘Republic of Letters’ from the beginning of the 
sixteenth century. Paul David (2014) and Joel Mokyr (2016) have stressed the importance of 
this patronage for the expansion of the scientific community during the Scientific Revolution 
and its adoption of the ‘scientific norms’ of open publication, peer evaluation and reputational 
reward for publishing priority. These norms stood in opposition to the prevailing norms of state 
secrecy and the appropriation of knowledge for economic or military advantage.  
 
Natural philosophers conferred status upon European royals during the Scientific 
Revolution. By the late eighteenth century, science had also become a status symbol among 
the ruled. As Arnold Thackery has argued, it served particularly well the ‘marginal men’ of 
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northern industry, wealthy but far away from the national status-conferring institutions based 
in London, and often marginalised by their religious non-conformism. Thackery refers to this 
phenomenon as the ‘Manchester Model’ and illustrates its importance to the Manchester 
Literary and Philosophical Society, Unitarians playing a major role in the society and 
embodying the image of the marginal man (Thackery 1974). Although Thackery stressed the 
idiosyncrasy of the Mancunian case, Shapin identified the same utility of science in relation to 
the founding of the Pottery Philosophical Society (Shapin 1972) and Inkster for the Sheffield 
scientific community (Inkster 1977). 
 
Science as Entertainment: The Lunar Society, whose short list of members included Erasmus 
Darwin, James Watt, Mathew Boulton, Josiah Wedgewood and Joseph Priestley, met in 
Birmingham from 1765. Darwin described these meetings as the gathering of friends for “a 
little philosophical laughing”. The fun-loving sociability of the ‘Lunaticks’, as documented by 
Uglow (2003), featured throughout the KAI community. Simon Schaffer has illustrated the role 
of entertainment as a source of demand for scientific lecturers and institutions (Schaffer 1983). 
The eighteenth century witnessed the ‘commercialisation of leisure’, and natural philosophers 
competed in the marketplace. Experiments with electricity proved particularly popular, 
electrical philosophers taking centre-stage in the 1740s, particularly following the invention of 
the Leyden Jar in Germany in 1745, which aided the transportation of electrical power. As the 
Gentleman’s Magazine reported in 174563: 
 
“From the year 1743, they discover’d phenomena so surprising as to awaken the indolent curiosity of the public, 
the ladies and the people of quality, who never regard natural philosophy but when it works miracles. Electricity 
became the subject in vogue, prices were willing to see this new fire, which a man had produced from 
himself…What astonishing discoveries have been made within these four years; The polypus on the one hand, as 
incredible as a prodigy, and the electric fire, as surprising as a miracle.” 
 
The popular attractions of electrical shows were manifold. First, they were daring and 
dangerous. The French electrical philosopher Mazeas wrote of “that Wonderful Matter which 
Nature has kept hid from us since the Creation of the World. The fable of Prometheus is 
verify’d – what after this can mortals find difficult?” The Gentleman’s Magazine commented 
in similar terms on the accidental death during a performance of Russian electrical philosopher 
Richmann, “we are come at last to touch the celestial fire, which if we make too free with, as 
                                                          
63 As quoted in Schaffer (1983).  
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it is fabled Prometheus did of old, like him we may be brought too late to repent of our temerity” 
(Schaffer 1983). 
 
Second, a post-Newtonian public, versed from the 1710s onwards by early Newtonian 
public philosophers such as Desaguliers and by Clarke’s Latitudinarian interpretation of 
Newtonian science, understood the significance of electrical current as a possible proof of the 
existence of God. Newton himself had identified God’s presence in the forces of attraction and 
repulsion that he had discovered (Jacob and Stewart 2004). As Bristol cleric Richard Symes 
put it, commenting on an electrical orrery, “here a man will naturally ask himself, what is the 
power that puts bodies in motion, and what if the Light that illuminates them? The hidden 
powers of Nature are the cause which is clearly shewn by this Experiment and made more easy 
to be comprehended” (Schaffer 1983). 
 
The 2008 edited volume Science and Spectacle in the European Enlightenment added 
grist to Schaffer’s mill through case studies on theatrically performed chemistry lectures in the 
heart of the Parisian theatre district in the late eighteenth century (Lehman 2008), popularized 
physics in eighteenth century Paris (Lynn 2008), the amusements of eighteenth century 
pneumatics (Riskin 2008), and German itinerant lecturers of popular Enlightenment science 
(Bertucci 2008). The epitome of scientific entertainment during the Enlightenment, however, 
was probably Humphry Davy’s lectures at the Royal Institution in London’s Mayfair between 
1801 and 1813. Although the Royal Institution’s mission was primarily to educate rather than 
to entertain, Davy’s charisma attracted large audiences of the rich and fashionable. An 
entertainment premium for scientific performance is hinted at by considering the differential 
between Davy’s salary as lecturer at the Institution and that of his successor William Thomas 
Brande. Davy’s annual salary reached £500, while the ‘featureless’ Brande who took over from 
Davy in 1813 was paid ‘only’ £200 (Hays 1983).  
 
The possibility of an entertainment premium gave rise to problems concerning the 
dumbing-down of science and charlatanry. French lecturer Nollet described the pitfalls in 
striking the delicate balance of “spectacles of pure amusement” on the one hand and “too 
serious a study” on the other (Riskin 2008). Populist lecturer Benjamin Martin in the 1740s 
notes a critique he received from John Freke, another lecturer: “there are many empirical and 
ignorant pretenders gone out who obtrude themselves and their apparatus on the good-natured 
and generous part of mankind…Thus is the noble science brought into contempt and dispute” 
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and that “all who shew any arts to new customers for profit are bound to try any means to get 
applause” (Schaffer 1983). These problems provided a role for institutionalised popular science 
as an authentication mechanism and KAIs filled that role. During the second half of the 
eighteenth century, scientific lectures began to take place predominantly within KAIs, as 
opposed to more diverse venues under the prevailing itinerant lecturing system, and by the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century the transition was largely complete. 
 
Hays summarises the London case between 1800 and 1850, supplementing Schaffer’s 
eighteenth century analysis and Inskter’s provincial analysis between 1750 and 1850. He 
concludes that performing for audiences that wished to be entertained was an important source 
of the patronage for a scientific career during this era (Hays 1983, Inkster 1980).  
 
 
KAIs and Rational Dissent: An Empirical Analysis 
 
Given the Enlightenment subsidies listed above, Rational Dissenters should have exhibited a 
particularly strong demand for KAIs, operating through the ‘science as theology’, ‘science as 
strategic political asset’ and ‘science as social status’ channels. As such, a statistical correlation 
between Rational Dissent and KAI prevalence, after controlling for confounding variables, 
could reflect these subsidies. On this basis, in this final section of the chapter I provide 
falsifiable empirical evidence of part of the Enlightenment subsidy to KAIs by illustrating a 
link between the geographical prevalence of Rational Dissent and that of the emergence of 
KAIs in England prior to and during the British Industrial Revolution. 
 
I have compiled data on the locations of all dissenting congregations in England in the 
early eighteenth century, marking those that were to become denominationally Unitarian (and 
hence explicitly identifiable as Rational Dissenters) over the course of the following century. 
Using this data, I compare a geographical measure of the local prevalence of Rational Dissent 
across early eighteenth century England with the pattern of the emergence of KAIs in England 
between the early eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. The basic test of the relationship is 
the question: did locales with Rational Dissent in the early eighteenth century tend to adopt 
KAIs sooner than those without? 
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 The main challenge for identification is the potential endogeneity of Rational Dissent 
to industrialisation. The strategy to overcoming this challenge has three elements. The first is 
to take the spatial distribution of Rational Dissent prior to the Industrial Revolution to reduce 
the chance of reverse causality. The second is to control for standard factors that influence the 
spatial distribution of any economic or cultural phenomenon, namely population and 
population density. The third element is more complicated. One must control for any economic 
mechanisms that might also lie behind Rational Dissenters’ heightened demand for KAIs. By 
economic mechanisms, I refer to profitmaking incentives for Rational Dissenters to engage in 
science and KAIs as opposed to cultural, theological or political incentives. If present, such a 
mechanism would confound the identification of the Rational Dissent Enlightenment subsidy 
for KAIs. 
 
Until well into the nineteenth century, Rational Dissenters were legally discriminated 
against in certain parts of the labour market. The Corporation Act (1661) and the Test Act 
(1673) decreed that holders of municipal office, i.e. members of the governing bodies of 
incorporated boroughs and anyone holding ‘offices of trust’ under the Crown, whether civil or 
military, must receive holy communion under the rites of the Church of England. Furthermore, 
the Blasphemy Act (1698) barred any denier of the doctrine of the Trinity from holding any 
public office (Prest 1996). As a result, Rational Dissenters may have been particularly 
incentivised to pursue industrial careers, possibly resulting in a particularly high demand for 
KAIs as R&D institutions. This would provide an interesting example of a positive ‘allocation 
of talent’ mechanism operating on economic growth, i.e. where talent is exogenously re-
directed away from rent-seeking towards value-creating activities (Murphy, Shleifer & 
Vishney 1991, Hsieh et al 2013). However, for the present identification challenge, the 
possibility necessitates an identification strategy based on an exogenous source of variation in 
the prevalence of Rational Dissent.          
 
In 1715, to map the dissenting vote for lobbying purposes, Dr John Evans, a leading 
dissenting minister, compiled a census of dissenting congregations across England and Wales. 
He recorded the denomination of each congregation in terms of the three denominations of 
English ‘Old Dissent’: Presbyterian, Congregationalist and Baptist (General and Anabaptist), 
the size of each congregation and the number of eligible voters. In 1729, he updated the census 
to include all new congregations established during the interim. By referring to the original 
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manuscript,64 I construct counts of dissenters and congregations by each denomination for each 
English ‘hundred’, an historical English administrative unit.  
 
Dr Evans’ census can help statistically identify congregations that practiced Rational 
Dissent and provide a control group of those that did not. However, prior to the establishment 
of Unitarianism as a formal denomination in 1774, Rational Dissent was a denominationally 
ambiguous practice. As stated above, Unitarianism drew most strongly from the English 
Presbyterians, but not all English Presbyterians converted, nor was it exclusively Presbyterian.  
 
The relative tendencies of the different denominations of Old Dissent to practice 
Rational Dissent in the early eighteenth century is illustrated the ‘Salter’s Hall controversy’ of 
1719, a pivotal event in the history of Rational Dissent (Wykes 2009). This was a tumultuous 
debate between leading dissenting ministers concerning whether they should collectively 
subscribe to the first article of the Church of England – the acceptance of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. The debate took place under intimidation by Parliament in the context of the 
Occasional Conformity Act of 1711, which forbade dissenters from circumventing aspects of 
the Clarendon Code and related statutes by occasionally taking Anglican Communion (Wykes 
2009). The motivations of those who refused to subscribe bore the unmistakable marks of 
Rational Dissent: rejection of the Trinity on doctrinal grounds, as the Trinity was not supported 
by scripture nor reason, and the objection to encroachment upon Christian liberty, in being 
pressurised to subscribe. Indeed, the controversy did much to promote Rational Dissent and 
the contemporary texts setting out the nontrinitarian position, such as of Samuel Clarke's 
Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity of 1712 and John Locke's Paraphrase and Notes on the 
Epistles of St Paul of 1707. 
 
Overall, there were 78 subscribers to the first article of the Church of England and 73 
non-subscribers. Of the 76 Presbyterians embroiled, 27 subscribed, while 49 did not, indicating 
a clear bias towards Rational Dissenting values. Indeed, several subscribing Presbyterians later 
renounced their subscription. The General Baptists too displayed a clear bias towards Rational 
Dissent, with only 1 subscriber and 12 non-subscribers. The other two denominations exhibited 
a bias towards doctrinal orthodoxy and/or compliance with Church. Of the 39 Independents, 
                                                          
64 Access to which was kindly granted by Dr David Wykes at Dr Williams’ Library in London. 
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31 subscribed while 8 did not and of the Particular Baptists, 11 subscribed while 2 did not65 
(Wykes 2009). 
 
I match the dataset on Old Dissent based on Evans’ 1715/1729 census with a dataset of 
the founding dates and locations of all Unitarian congregations in historical existence in 
England. This is based on a list compiled heroically by Unitarian scholar Alan Ruston over the 
course of fifty years of research. The dates of congregational foundation in Ruston’s list do not 
necessarily represent the dates on which each congregation became denominationally 
Unitarian. Only in the case of new Unitarian congregations established post-1774 is this so. 
However, Ruston’s list enables one to identify which of the congregations listed in the Evans 
census went on to become Unitarian. This means that one can identify for the early eighteenth 
century the union of active Rational Dissenting congregations and the congregational sources 
of Rational Dissent. Even in the latter case, a congregation that went on to become Unitarian 
is likely to have been more predisposed to Rational Dissent in 1729 than one that did not, 
however latent that predisposition may still have been at that time. 
 
Figure 4.5: Congregations founded in England that would eventually become formally 
Unitarian 
 
                                                          
65 These figures do not add up to the total of the 151 ministers involved as the records are uncertain as to the 
denominations of a small number of the ministers. 
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Figure 4.5 shows the time series of the number of congregations in existence each year 
from 1620 onwards that would eventually become denominationally Unitarian. One can see 
the initial surge from essentially zero following the Act of Uniformity in 1662, which 
maintained momentum until the end of the seventeenth century. By 1729, the year of the 
augmented version of the Evans census, there were 192 such congregations in existence in 
England. Thereafter, this number remained quite steady up until the founding of 
denominational Unitarianism in 1774, reaching only 211 by 1773, after which it experienced 
another leg of growth, rising to around 400 by the mid-nineteenth century. The snapshot of 
early eighteenth century Rational Dissent identified by this methodology captures a pre-
Industrial Revolution and largely pre-KAI pattern of Rational Dissent, which helps to reduce 
the potential endogeneity of Rational Dissent to industrialisation or KAIs. The congregational 
time series also tells one that this snapshot represents a significant portion of the overall picture 
of Rational Dissent that had emerged by the nineteenth century (half of it, on a congregational 
basis). 
 
By matching the Evans and Ruston datasets I code each English hundred by its 
dissenting status in 1729. The three dissenting statuses are: Rational Dissent, non-Rational 
dissent, and no dissent, and the results are shown geographically in figure 4.6. Next, using the 
KAI dataset introduced in chapter 2, I code each English hundred for the year in which its first 
KAI was established. This enables the examination of whether hundreds with Rational Dissent 
in 1729 tended to adopt KAIs sooner than those without. 
 
Given the dynamic nature of the dependent variable – each hundred’s KAI status over 
time – the technique of ‘survival analysis’ presents a useful empirical framework. Survival 
analysis is used in medicine to estimate the probability of patient survival over time following 
a diagnosis, taking into consideration patient characteristics and treatments66. Cleves et al 
(2007) provides a comprehensive introduction to survival analysis, and Bogart (2007) uses it 
in an economic history context to investigate the diffusion of the turnpike network in eighteenth 
century Britain. In the present case, the unit of analysis is the English hundred, and the event 
signifying the year of ‘non-survival’ for each hundred is the year of adoption of its first KAI. 
 
                                                          
66 Previous economic applications of survival analysis include the study questions concerning bank failures 
during financial crises (i.e. which bank characteristics determine duration of survival following a systemic 
shock?) (e.g. Evrensel 2008).  
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Figure 4.6: English Dissent in 1729, by English hundreds  
 
 
  
Unitarian dissent 
Non-Unitarian dissent 
No dissent 
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Figure 4.7: Kaplan-Meier survival rates for learned society adoption by English 
hundreds (districts), by dissenting status in 1729 
 
 
 
The first step of the analysis is to estimate Kaplan-Meier survival curves showing the 
proportion of English hundreds without a KAI at time t, starting in 1700. The hundreds are 
stratified into three groups reflecting the three dissenting statuses described above, so there are 
three curves. The i’th curve traces the proportion of hundreds within group i that does not yet 
have a KAI by year t. Figure 4.7 shows the result. The two non-Rational Dissenting groups 
have similar curves, and indeed are not statistically distinguishable from one another using 
95% confidence intervals. In fact, of the two groups, the non-dissenting hundreds tended to 
adopt KAIs earlier than the non-Rational dissenting hundreds. However, there is a marked 
difference between these two groups and the Rational Dissenting group, which adopted KAIs 
significantly earlier, suggesting a ‘Rational Dissenting effect’. 
 
The next step in the analysis is to estimate the size of this Rational Dissenting effect on 
the year of KAI adoption, while at the same time controlling for confounding variables. 
Specifically, it is important to model adoption across space as a dynamic process controlling 
for the concurrent growth of local population, the overall growth of KAIs at the national level 
and the influence of neighbouring hundreds. I choose a standard discrete-time logistic hazard 
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function to model the probability of adoption in a hundred over time as a function of its 
characteristics67. I include as covariates, in addition to binary variables reflecting non-Unitarian 
dissent and Unitarian dissent68, the log population of hundred i on year t, and the number of 
KAIs within a 20km radius of hundred i in year t-1. The first year of observation is 1750, due 
to the lack of availability of population data by hundred before this year, and the last year is 
185169. Hence, the following model is estimated, with standard errors clustered by English 
hundred: 
 
log (
𝜆(𝑡 | 𝑥𝑖𝑡)
1− 𝜆(𝑡 | 𝑥𝑖𝑡)
) =  β1DISSENT_NOT_UNITARIANi  +  β2UNITARIAN_DISSENTi  +    
β3LnPopit  + β4NEIGHBOUR_LSit-1  +  β5Ln(t)t             (1)                                                                       
 
where λ(t) is the hazard function, which describes the probability that a hundred will adopt a 
KAI in year t if it has not already done so, and the final term on the right-hand side is the 
baseline hazard function, which increases log-linearly as a function of time70. 
 
Results: Dissent and KAIs 
 
The results are reported in table 4.2 as odds-ratios, which indicate the marginal increase in the 
probability of adoption of a KAI conditional on a marginal increase in each explanatory 
variable (or of a switch from 0 to 1 in the binary case). In contrast to the simple Kaplan-Meier 
curve, hundreds with non-Rational dissent are now associated with faster adoption than those 
with no dissent, being 2.1 times more likely to adopt in any year. Rational Dissent retains its 
strength as a predictor of adoption in any year, a Rational Dissenting hundred being 3.7 times 
more likely to adopt than one with no dissent and 1.7 times more likely than one with non-
Rational dissent71. The differences in adoption probability between the three categories are 
statistically significant.  Figure 4.8 displays model-predicted survival curves by dissenting 
status, conditional on the covariates in the regression. The faster adoption rate of Rational 
Dissenting hundreds than hundreds with non-Rational dissent can be clearly seen.  
                                                          
67 This is the most commonly used discrete time hazard model in the literature, see Singer and Willet (2003). 
68 ‘No-dissent’ is chosen as the reference, hence no dummy variable is included. 
69 As a result I am forced to omit the hundreds that adopted a learned society before 1750, of which there are 
only a handful. 
70 which is chosen due to the constant log-linear aggregate growth rate of the number of KAIs between 1750 and 
1850. 
71 (=3.66/2.13) 
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Table 4.2: results of survival analysis of adoption of learned societies by English 
hundreds. 
Dependent variable: 
Adoption of learned society 
 
Marginal odds-ratio 
  
Non-Unitarian Dissent 2.13*** 
(4.58) 
  
  
Unitarian Dissent 3.66*** 
 (6.79) 
  
Ln Population 1.82*** 
 (8.37) 
  
Learned Society within 20km 1.01 
 (1.46) 
  
Baseline hazard (log of time) 1.70*** 
 (4.97) 
  
Hundreds (districts) 
Periods at risk 
572 
44,570 
Discrete-time logistic harzard function. Baseline hazard is log of time. 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by hundred. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Predicted survival curves for learned society adoption, for i)Unitarian-
dissenting, by dissenting status in 1729 
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The ‘Five Mile Act’ of 1665 as an Instrument for Rational Dissent  
 
To further control for the endogeneity of Rational Dissent to economic factors, I attempt to 
isolate an exogenous source of variation in Rational Dissent across England due to the impact 
of the Five Mile Act of 1665, which restricted the locations in which dissenting ministers could 
preach. As mentioned above, Charles II instituted the Five Mile Act in the 1660s as part of the 
Clarendon Code, in the context of the post-Restoration political and religious tension. The Five 
Mile Act declared it illegal for anyone to preach within five miles of any city, corporate town 
or borough sending members to parliament without having taken the oath of allegiance to the 
articles of the Church of England required under the Act of Conformity. It also barred any 
minister failing to conform from preaching within five miles of any parish in which they had 
previously worked. Figure 4.9 displays the exact wording of the statute. 
 
Figure 4.9: The Five Mile Act 1665 
Persons preaching in Conventicles not to come within Five Miles of any Corporation sending Members to Parliament 
before they have taken the said Oath.  
And all such person and persons as shall take upon them to preach in any unlawfull Assembly Conventicle or Meeting under 
colour or pretence of any Exercise of Religion contrary to the Lawes and Statutes of this Kingdome shall not at any time from 
and after the Fower and twentyeth day of March which shall be in this present yeare of our Lord God One thousand six 
hundred sixty and five unlesse onely in passeing upon the Road come or be within Five miles of any Citty or Towne Corporate 
or Burrough that sends Burgesses to the Parlyament within His Majesties Kingdome of England Principallitie of Wales or of 
the Towne of Berwicke upon Tweede or within Five miles of any Parish Towne or Place wherein he or they have since the Act 
of Oblivion beene Parson Viccar Curate Stipendary or Lecturer or taken upon them to preach in any unlawfull Assembly 
Conventicle or Meeting under colour or pretence of any Exercise of Religion contrary to the Lawes and Statutes of this 
Kingdome before he or they have taken and subscribed the Oath aforesaid before the Justices of Peace at their Quarter 
Sessions to be holden for the County Rideing or Division next unto the said Corporation Citty or Burrough Parish Place or 
Towne in open Court (which said Oath the said Justices are hereby impowered there to administer) upon forfeiture of every 
such offence the summe of Forty pounds of lawfull English money, the one Third part thereof to His Majestie and His 
Successors, the other Third part to the use of the poore of the Parish where the offence shall be committed and the other Third 
part thereof to such person or persons as shall or will sue for the same by Action of Debt Plaint Bill or Information in any 
Court of Record at Westminster or before any Justices of Assize Oyer and Terminer or Goale delivery or before any Justices 
of the Countyes Pallatine of Chester Lancaster or Durham or the Justices of the Great Sessions in Wales or before any Justices 
of Peace in their Quarter Sessions wherein noe Essoigne Protection or Wager of Law shall be allowed. 
Fine: £40 
 
The Act had a long legacy on the geographic distribution of dissent in England. While 
dissenters engaged in ‘occasional conformity’ and worshipped in secret, many dissenting 
ministers and teachers re-located to parts of country that did not send members to parliament. 
Figure 4.10 shows the areas in England where nonconformist worship was forbidden after 
1665. I have constructed this map by coding five mile radiuses around all cities, county towns 
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and boroughs in 1665. The south and south-west of the country was covered most densely, 
while the north and midlands were less covered. The spatial distinction created by the Act 
between areas where Rational Dissenters could and could not preach is a useful source of 
exogenous variation in Rational Dissent. First, it pushes back part of the spatial determination 
of Rational Dissent to the seventeenth century, even further before the Industrial Revolution 
began. Second, it is the result of an exogenous state policy unrelated to industrialisation. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Shaded Area is Land Area of England Covered by  
the Five-Mile Act of 1665 
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I calculate a ‘Five Mile Act’ variable for each hundred in the dissenting status and KAI 
dataset used above. I take the area of hundred i in km sq covered by the Act and calculate the 
overall area of hundred i as a control. These variables are then used together to instrument the 
presence of Rational Dissent in hundred i in 1729. To do so, I estimate the following two-stage 
least squares equations: 
 
Stage 1 Equation    
 
RATIONAL_DISSENTi  = α  +  β1FIVE_MILE_ACT_AREAi  +  β2TOTAL_AREAi  +    
β3LnPOPi  + β4DISSENT_DUMMYi  + β5FIVE_MILE_ACT_DUMMYi  +   δ  + εi                                                                               
 
Stage 2 Equation 
 
TIME TO FIRST KAIi =  α  +  β1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇̂ i   +    β2LnPOPi    +    
β3DISSENT_DUMMYi  + β4FIVE_MILE_ACT_DUMMYi  +    δ  +   μi         
 
In the first stage, the Rational Dissent dummy is regressed on the Five Mile Act area and total 
area variables, controlling for population in 1761, the presence of any dissent at all and county 
fixed-effects. In the second stage, the time to the adoption of hundred i’s first KAI in years 
from 1750 is regressed on the IV for Rational Dissenting status from the first stage, along with 
the same covariates from the first stage. 
  
The results of this two-stage least squares procedure are shown in table 4.3. The 
estimated impact of this exogenous source of Rational Dissent on KAI adoption is that a 
Rational Dissenting hundred is likely to have adopted a KAI 46 years earlier than a non-
Rational Dissenting hundred. This supports the findings of the survival analysis and the 
interpretation of a cultural effect of Rational Dissent on KAIs.  
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Table 4.3: IV estimation of Year of First Knowledge Access Institution as a function of 
Unitarianism, where Unitarianism is instrumented by the Five Mile Act 1665 
 
 (1) (2) 
 IV estimation IV estimation 
 
Second-Stage for Year of First KAI 
 
Rational Dissent Dummy 
 
 
 
-45.63** 
 
 
 
-48.11** 
 (20.46) (20.64) 
   
Dummy for Any Dissent -6.190 -5.731 
 (5.380) (5.357) 
   
Ln(Population in 1761) -5.075** -4.863*** 
 (2.573) (2.594) 
   
Five Mile Act Dummy  0.266 
 
 
County FE 
 
 
 
Yes 
(4.620) 
 
Yes 
N 600 599 
R2 0.241 0.225 
 
First Stage for Rational Dissent Dummy 
 
Area covered by Five Mile Act (km2) 
 
 
-0.00028 
 
 
-0.00034 
 (0.00022) (0.00023) 
   
Area (km2) -0.00035* -0.00034* 
        (0.00011)        (0.00011) 
   
Dummy for Any Dissent 0.192* 0.192* 
        (0.0409)        (0.0406) 
   
Ln(Population in 1761) 0.155* 0.157* 
        (0.0283)        (0.0286) 
   
Five Mile Act Dummy  0.0666 
 
 
County FE 
 
 
 
Yes 
       (0.0608) 
 
Yes 
N 600 599 
R2 0.311 0.313 
Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses. *** p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.01 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century Knowledge Access 
Institutions were not endogenous to the British Industrial Revolution. First, profitmaking 
incentives do a poor job of inducing innovative effort even when the underlying conditions are 
relatively conducive. To claim that innovative effort and investment in KAIs during the British 
Industrial Revolution were endogenous asks too much of the incentives to innovate in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain.  
 
Second, the demand for science and KAIs in eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
Britain was multifaceted, much of it based on cultural rather than economic motives. Under the 
influence of the European Enlightenment, Britain built KAIs in response to the demand for 
science as progressive ideology, entertainment, social status symbol for wealthy establishment 
outsiders and strategic political and religious asset, alongside the demand for R&D 
productivity. The Enlightenment subsidies to which these utilities gave rise made an eighteenth 
and nineteenth century career in science pay and helped pay for the construction and operating 
costs of the world’s first R&D infrastructure. The relationship between Britain’s KAIs and 
technological innovation during the British Industrial Revolution identified in chapter 3 should 
be interpreted as causal.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The Railway Transport Revolution and  
Access to Knowledge in the Late Nineteenth Century 
 
 
Did Knowledge Access Institutions (KAIs) facilitate the emergence of modern economic 
growth outside of Britain? Was technological innovation in the industrialising countries of the 
late nineteenth century supported in a general sense by national infrastructures of KAIs? 
Indeed, can we explain Britain’s lead by its precocious KAI infrastructure? 
 
These questions follow naturally from the argument that British KAIs facilitated 
technological innovation during the British Industrial Revolution. Yet they are difficult to 
answer within this thesis because while the thesis is focused mostly on the British case they 
require a thorough comparative perspective. Moreover, such a comparison must take into 
account the qualitative differences that KAIs exhibited across countries, which may have 
affected their efficacy. For example, France’s substantial KAI infrastructure was funded and 
operated by the state rather than by private individuals. Did this reduce the contribution to 
innovation of France’s KAIs compared to that of Britain’s KAIs? For example, did the French 
state tend to direct innovative effort towards sectors and projects that were less impactful on 
economic growth and did it inhibit the practical application of knowledge by standing in the 
way of commercialisation? Or, rather, were French KAIs perhaps more efficacious than their 
British counterparts? Did privileges awarded by the French government for technology 
developed within KAIs perhaps offer a better appropriation mechanism than the English patent 
system and the free market?  
 
Although the comparative work necessary to tackle these questions is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, this chapter aims to make two related contributions. First, it illustrates the 
existence of a strong correlation between a simple measure of a country’s core KAI 
infrastructure and its level of economic development in the late nineteenth century. Second, 
although no attempt is made to tackle the crucial question of the efficacy of KAIs outside of 
Britain, it investigates whether KAIs – in reducing the cost of access to knowledge – were at 
least pushing upon a binding global constraint to technological innovation in the late nineteenth 
century. KAIs were far from the only factor reducing knowledge access costs in countries 
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around the world in the nineteenth century. By identifying variation in knowledge access costs 
due to other factors and examining its correlation with an indicator of the rate of technological 
innovation one can establish whether modern economic growth was responsive to falling 
knowledge access costs. If so, it follows that KAIs may have contributed to the emergence of 
modern economic growth in a wider context than in the British case alone.  
 
 
KAIs and the ‘Convergence Club’ 
 
In 1876 a committee comprising the Academic Council of Harvard University, the Boston 
Public Library and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences produced an international 
catalogue of all known published scientific periodicals (Scudder 1879). Using this catalogue, 
one can construct national counts of scientific institutions with a publishing record, which can 
serve as a rough proxy for the size of national core KAI infrastructures. I denominate these 
counts by national populations in 1870 using data collected by Alex Klein and Stephen 
Broadberry (2011) and Angus Maddison (2009). Figure 5.1 shows core KAIs per million capita 
across 17 countries and country groups as they appear in the committee’s catalogue. In figure 
5.2, I compare in the form of a scatter plot core KAIs per capita in 1876 with GDP per capita 
in 1913 (also taken from Broadberry and Klein 2011 and Maddison 2009), representing the 
pre-war apotheosis of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century ‘convergence club’. This 
relationship exhibits a very strong correlation of 0.9.  
 
Next, I estimate a simple cross-country ‘beta-convergence’ model of core KAIs and 
economic growth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I regress percentage 
growth in GDP per capita between 1870 and 1913 on KAIs per Capita in 1876 and initial GDP 
per capita in 1870. The results are shown in table 5.1. A one percent higher KAI to population 
ratio in 1876 is associated with 17ppts more cumulative growth between 1870 and 1913, with 
a robust standard error of 6ppts (significant at the 1% level). In standardised terms, a one 
standard deviation higher KAI to population ratio was associated with a 0.93 standard deviation 
higher growth rate. Figure 5.3 illustrates a scatterplot of the partial correlation between core 
KAIs per capita in 1876 and growth between 1870 and 1913, controlling for GDP per capita in 
1870. The correlation coefficient is 0.5.  
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Figure 5.1: Core KAIs per Million Population 1876 
 
Figure 5.2: (Log) Core KAIs per Capita 1870 vs (Log) GDP per capita 1913 (Correlation 
coefficient = 0.9) 
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Table 5.1: “Beta-Convergence” Regression, KAIs and Growth 1870-1913 
 (1) 
 100*% Growth of 
GDP per Capita, 
1870-1913 
 
(Ln) KAIs per Capita, 1876 
 
17.07*** 
 (5.71) 
  
(Ln) Initial GDP per Capita, 1870 -39.59* 
 (21.26) 
  
Constant 182.27*** 
 (36.04) 
 
Observations/Countries 18 
R2 0.247 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Figure 5.3: GDP Growth 1870-1913 vs Log KAI per Capita 1870, partial correlation 
controlling for Log GDP per Capita in 1870 (Correlation coefficient = 0.47) 
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Clearly, this cross-country relationship between KAIs and economic growth in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries cannot be interpreted causally as it is subject to serious 
concerns about reverse causality and omitted variables. Nevertheless, the fact that countries 
with more-developed KAI infrastructures had more successful economies in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century means that KAIs pass a basic test of relevance to the global 
diffusion of modern economic growth and warrant further investigation as a causal factor.   
 
 
Rail and Knowledge Access Costs 
 
As discussed above, some of the basic characteristics of KAIs differed across countries, such 
as the state’s level of financial and operational involvement. These differences may have 
influenced the relative efficacy of KAIs across countries, complicating the link between the 
size of the KAI infrastructure and its impact on knowledge access costs by country. 
Investigating the differences in efficacy of KAIs across countries is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, nevertheless, one can shed some light on whether KAIs might have influenced the 
emergence of modern economic growth more broadly than in the British case alone by asking 
whether by reducing knowledge access costs KAIs were at least pushing against a binding or 
non-binding global constraint. 
 
 We can test whether the knowledge access cost constraint was active or not for modern 
economic growth in the late nineteenth century by examining the correlation between 
knowledge access costs and an indicator of modern economic growth. Moreover, we can utilise 
variation in knowledge access costs due to any of its underlying sources, as opposed to 
variation due to KAIs alone. As such, below, I attempt to identify the impact on modern 
economic growth during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of falling knowledge 
access costs due to the global rail transportation revolution. If modern growth was responsive 
to railways via the knowledge access channel, then it is likely that it would have been 
responsive also to efficacious KAIs. 
 
Between 1825, when the first railway line built to carry passengers by steam locomotive 
was opened between Stockton and Darlington in Britain and the beginning of the First World 
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War, over 950,000 km of railway track were laid worldwide72. Figure 5.4 shows the growth of 
rail track across Europe prior to 1913. The last forty years or so of the period saw remarkable 
growth. In 1870 there were around 95,000km of track laid in Europe, most of it in Britain, 
Germany and France. By 1913 it had increased by 235% to around 318,000km. The movement 
of people along the rails increased at an even faster pace. The total number of passenger 
journeys per year in Europe rose from 670 million in 1870 to 5.1 billion in 1913, an increase 
of 770%.   
 
Figure 5.4: Length of Rail Track Laid across Europe 1820-1913 (km) 
 
 
The radically expanded set of opportunities for face-to-face communication to which 
mass rail transportation gave rise must have reduced knowledge access costs. This would be 
particularly so in the case of tacit, as opposed to codified, knowledge, which requires personal 
interaction for successful transmission. Tacit knowledge is thought to play a critical role in the 
process of technological innovation, raising the potential importance of the rail revolution to 
modern economic growth (Polanyi 1958, Cowan, David & Foray 2000, Howells 2002). But a 
substantial reduction in the cost of written correspondence due to the transportation of post by 
rail must have reduced the cost of access to codified knowledge too.  
                                                          
72 Based on the sum of rail length of 34 countries with the largest rail networks.  
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The rail revolution occurred alongside two other components of a broader transport and 
communications revolution. The introduction of the steam propulsion of ships saw 
international freight rates decline by 50% and global shipping trade increase by around 400% 
between 1870 and 1913 (Jacks and Pendakur 2010). Meanwhile, the growth of the international 
telegraph network dramatically reduced the cost of both national and international remote 
communication. In 1837, the first commercial application of the electrical telegraph connected 
railway operatives between Euston and Camden Town stations in London. By 1898 the global 
telegraph network handled around one million messages a day across more than 100,000 
offices around the world, sent along around three million miles of wire (Bryn 1900). Given 
these major concurrent developments in transportation and communication, and their likely 
impact on knowledge access costs, it may indeed not be a coincidence that modern economic 
growth accelerated in a broad set of countries during this period.     
  
But can we measure the impact of the growth of railways on the rate of technological 
innovation? If so, can we distinguish the impact that it had through a reduction in knowledge 
access costs as opposed to market access costs (Sokoloff 1988)? Below, I attempt to do so on 
the basis of two empirical analyses. First, I examine the within-country link between rail 
density and patenting rates (a proxy for technological innovation) in 21 countries worldwide 
between 1883 and 1913, controlling for population, national income and the business cycle. To 
distinguish between knowledge and market access effects, I measure side-by-side the impact 
on patenting of both passenger numbers as a proxy for knowledge access, and freight volumes 
as a proxy for market access. Second, I examine within-state rail density and patenting in the 
United States between 1840 and 1890. To distinguish between the knowledge and market 
access effects in this setting I examine the effect of rail on the quality of patents as opposed to 
merely the quantity, measured by state-level scores of average forward-citation counts per 
patent. I argue that this helps to distinguish between knowledge and market access effects 
because patent quality is likely to be influenced by knowledge access costs but not market 
access costs. The results of these two analyses point to a large effect of rail on patenting via 
the knowledge access channel, supporting the claim knowledge access costs represented an 
active constraint to modern economic at the global level in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. As such, if KAIs reduced knowledge access costs outside of Britain then 
they would have had an impact on economic growth there too.    
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Literature Review: Transport and the Emergence of Modern Growth 
 
Britain’s domestic transportation network was improved significantly during the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries in the form of vast improvements to roads and the construction 
of the canal network. Szostak (1991) and Bogart (2013) have championed the importance of 
these improvements to the British Industrial Revolution. Szostak distinguishes between the 
combined knowledge and market access effects of road improvements and the market access 
effect of canals. Bogart quantifies the effect of roads and canals on passenger journey times 
and costs and freight rates over the eighteenth century. He finds that stagecoach speeds 
increased fourfold between 1700 and 1820, from 1.96 to 7.96 miles per hour, with the bulk of 
the gains occurring after 1750. At the same time, real fare prices rose only slightly from 0.183 
shillings per mile to 0.21 shillings per mile in constant 1700 prices. Road freight rates fell from 
1.2 shillings per ton mile in 1700 to 0.7 shillings per ton mile in 1800 (in constant 1700 prices), 
and waterway freight rates fell from 0.43 shillings per ton mile for river navigation in 1730 to 
0.12 shillings per ton mile for canal navigation in 1840 (in constant 1700 prices), though the 
more important contribution of waterway transportation progress was that the canal network 
greatly extended the geographic coverage of inland waterway navigation, thus dramatically 
reducing the average cost of freight transportation across the country. Bogart shows that the 
binding constraints to these transportation improvements were often related to finance and 
property rights, which in both cases British institutions proved able to overcome. Private order 
financing in the form of turnpike trusts played a decisive role, and Britain’s eighteenth century 
parliament proved capable of passing an unprecedented flow of land use bills to enable the 
construction of roads and canals. Transportation during the British Industrial Revolution 
appears to have been an important channel through which institutional quality and 
technological capability helped to deliver modern economic growth. 
 
From the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the expansion of Britain’s railways 
augmented the contribution of transportation to British economic output. By 1870, rail 
passenger travel speeds had reached 23.2 miles per hour, at a cost of 0.08 shillings per mile (in 
1700 prices) for second class travel and 0.05 shillings per mile for third class travel, and by 
1865, rail freight transportation had reduced freight costs to 0.06 shillings per ton mile. By 
then, the daily movement of people and goods in Britain – and indeed in the many other 
countries around the world that were rapidly building national rail networks – proceeded at a 
pace more akin to a modern than a pre-modern economy.   
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What do we know in quantitative terms about the economic impact of the rail 
revolution? The answer is not very much. The most famous contribution to the question is 
Robert Fogel’s finding in 1964 that rail was surprisingly dispensable to the nineteenth century 
US economy (Fogel 1964). In writing, Fogel was responding to the conventional wisdom at 
the time, which saw the ‘Iron Horse’ as the central driving force for nineteenth century 
American growth (Jenks 1944, Savage 1954, Rostow 1960). Through a pioneering use of the 
social savings methodology – which measured the marginal contribution of rail to freight 
transportation costs within the agricultural sector over and above a counterfactual canal-based 
agricultural freight transportation system that he considered likely to have been constructed in 
the absence of the railway system – he found that removing all of America’s railroads in 1890 
and replacing them with a canal system would have reduced US GNP in 1890 by only about 
3%.  
 
Fogel’s social savings methodology was a highly valuable contribution to both 
historical and prospective policy studies, but his estimate of the impact of rail on the US 
economy is likely to be a substantial underestimate. Fogel’s analysis did not account for the 
channels other than agricultural freight costs by which rail is likely to have affected economic 
growth, such as rail’s impact on the growth of cities and therefore on productivity due to scale, 
agglomeration and specialisation effects, and the effect of rail on technological innovation via 
knowledge and market access effects. Moreover, many of Fogel’s readers mistakenly took his 
estimate to represent an ‘all-in’ effect of rail on the economy. As a consequence, rail has been 
somewhat tainted as a factor in nineteenth century US growth ever since.73  
 
Recently, Donaldson and Hornbeck have updated Fogel’s analysis using modern GIS 
techniques to calculate agricultural social savings more accurately, confirming Fogel’s 
estimate. Yet they have retained Fogel’s agricultural and static focus. Klein and Crafts (2015) 
have made progress on the identification of the cities channel, showing that the specialisation 
of output by cities had a large impact on aggregate labour productivity in US by the turn of the 
twentieth century. On rail and innovation, Sokoloff, studied the geographical distribution of 
patenting in the US in the nineteenth century, highlighting disproportionately high patenting 
                                                          
73 For instance, in the Economic History Review, Lance Davis claimed that Fogel’s work shows that “the 
railroads made some contribution to growth, but…America would not be drastically different if they had never 
existed.” (Davis 1966, pp659). Indeed, one might unsympathetically read Fogel as inviting such an 
interpretation, given passages such as “ “ (quoted in David 1975) 
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rates near canals and other waterways (Sokoloff 1988). Sokoloff explained these higher rates 
by the lower market access costs that canals and waterways provided to producers, who could 
transport freight by water cheaper than across land, neglecting the possibility of a knowledge 
access channel. Transport aside, but relatedly, recently Packalen and Bhattacharya (2015) have 
examined the relationship between cities and patenting between 1836 and 2010, finding a 
strong effect, which was stronger still earlier in the period. They attribute this to lower 
knowledge access costs in cities.   
 
 
Theory: Romer-Mokyr and the Railways  
 
Specifying the effect of rail on technological innovation via knowledge access costs is a similar 
task to specifying the effect of KAIs. Both have a spatially differential impact on the cost of 
access to knowledge, lowering it more in their locality than further away. And in both cases 
the general equilibrium impact on technological innovation is more complex than the simple 
aggregate of all the individual local impacts. Like KAIs, the more developed the global rail 
network the larger the potential gains from the establishment of a local node. In the case of rail, 
however, there are two further complexities. First, there exists a parallel effect of rail on 
technological innovation due to rail’s impact on market access (Sokoloff 1988). Second, the 
laying of track in one locale may displace population and economic activity in adjacent locales, 
potentially raising the cost of access to both knowledge and markets there. However, one is 
spared the complexities of the effect of KAIs on knowledge access costs, such as the spreading 
of scientific norms.  
 
With these considerations in mind, I reintroduce the Romer-Mokyr model from chapter 
2, adapted for the analysis of rail. Once again, for simplicity assume that each region’s 
propositional knowledge set is a perfect complement to that of the other n regions. Assume 
also for simplicity that without rail region i can access only its own propositional knowledge 
set at non-infinite cost. Then the rate of technological innovation in region i is equal to  
 
𝑑𝜆𝑖
𝑑𝑡
𝑁𝑜 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙
= 𝐿𝑅𝑖Ω𝑖 
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Assuming that m of the n other regions are connected to the rail network, connecting region i 
changes its rate of technological innovation to  
 
𝑑𝜆𝑖
𝑑𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙
= (𝐿𝑅𝑖 +
𝑑𝐿𝑅𝑖
𝑑𝑅𝑖
) [Ω𝑖 ∪ ⋃ Ω𝑗
𝑚≤𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖
] +
𝑑𝑀𝐴𝑖
𝑑𝑅𝑖
 
 
 
The rate of technological innovation in region i is now determined by the union of the 
propositional knowledge stock of all m+1 connected regions, the new size of the research 
labour force in region i after cross-regional displacement due to rail connection, and by the 
change in the market access effect on technological innovation due to rail connection. This 
theoretical relationship is more likely to be identified using within-region as opposed to cross 
region estimation. Furthermore, the major econometric challenge is to distinguish between the 
knowledge and market access effects, to which end I employ two different identification 
strategies in the two analyses below.  
 
 
Empirical Analysis A: Passengers, Freight and Patents in 21 Countries, 1883-1913 
 
The first setting in which I investigate the relationship between rail transportation and the rate 
of technological innovation uses aggregate national annual data on rail and rail activity and 
national patenting rates as a proxy for the rate of technological innovation across 21 countries 
between 1883 and 1913.  
 
Data 
 
The rail data comprises rail length (km), annual passenger numbers (m) and annual freight 
volume (kt) by each country-year. It is taken from Brian Mitchell’s statistical compendia 
(2007a, 2007b, 2007c), which Mitchell collected from national sources. National patent counts 
are taken from the World Intellectual Property Organization database (WIPO 2014), which 
provides access to post-1883 counts. 
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Figure 5.5: Patents per capita, by country, 1890, 1900 and 1910 
 
In addition, annual data on national GDP and population are taken from Broadberry and Klein 
(2011), where available, and Maddison (2009) otherwise. All countries for which data is 
available for all variables are included, which are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Table 5.2 displays descriptive statistics for 
this dataset, focused on the years 1890, 1900 and 1910. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics, Means Across Countries by Year 
 
 
 
Year 1890 1900 1910 
 
Patents Mean 6,400 7,442 12,777 
 S.D. 2,642 2,522 4,232 
     
Rail Length Mean 30,611 33,069 40,782 
 S.D. 16,145 16,358 22,272 
     
Passengers Mean 8,698 16,296 10,028 
 S.D. 7,161 11,308 9,686 
     
Freight Mean 3,142 6,036 7,439 
 S.D. 1,777 2,967 4,275 
     
GDP per Capita Mean 2,318 2,819 3,515 
 S.D. 285 315 379 
     
Population Mean 37,004 35,305 23,226 
 
S.D. 
 
16,913 
 
15,580 
 
6,518 
 
 
 
Estimation and Results 
 
To estimate the relationship between rail length and patenting, I take a within-country OLS 
estimate of the log of national patents on log rail length using annual data. I control for log 
population, log GDP per capita and time fixed-effects.74 Corresponding cross sectional 
estimates are inappropriate due to the incomparability of patent counts across countries, given 
large variation in the cost-benefit of patenting between one country and the next owing to 
variation in market size and legal and procedural variation in patenting systems (Griliches 
1990). As column 1 in table 5.3 shows, the within-country estimate of the elasticity of patenting 
to rail density is 0.76 with a standard error of 0.16. Taken at face value this elasticity is of 
considerable economic significance given that average rail density across the countries in the 
sample increased by two and a half-fold between 1883 and 1913. If interpreted causally it 
would imply that patenting rates increased by around 75% over the period due to railway 
expansion.    
                                                          
74 Since a country fixed-effects approach is used it is not necessary to denominate rail length by country area 
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Table 5.3: Determinants of countries’ patents by country-year (and rail passenger and 
freight elasticities with respect to rail length), 1883-1913 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Patents 
Country FE 
Annual 
(1883-1913) 
Patents 
Country FE 
Annual 
(1883-1913) 
Rail Passengers 
Country FE 
Annual 
(1883-1913) 
Rail Freight 
Country FE 
Annual 
(1883-1913) 
 
Rail Length 
 
0.759*** 
  
0.68*** 
 
1.38*** 
 (0.158)  (0.2) (0.3) 
     
Rail Passengers  0.333***   
  (0.110)   
     
Rail Freight  0.336***   
  (0.0871)   
     
GDP per Capita -0.0817 -0.319 0.68 0.17 
 (0.382) (0.320) (0.40) (0.27) 
     
Population -0.207 0.0551 -0.30 -0.26 
 
 
Country FE 
 
Year FE 
(0.685) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.447) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
(0.53) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.65) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 518 496 496 496 
Countries 
Years 
R2 
21 
31 
0.828 
20 
31 
0.859 
20 
31 
0.852 
20 
31 
0.902 
                       Clustered (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses 
                                   * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
To attempt to measure the distinct contributions of the knowledge and market access 
effects of rail, I replace log rail density as a regressor with logged annual passenger volume as 
a proxy for knowledge access and logged annual freight volume as a proxy for market access. 
As column 2 in table 5.3 shows, the partial elasticities of passenger numbers and freight 
volumes turn out to be almost identical to one another, at 0.33. What was the effect of each on 
patenting? As shown in columns 3 and 4 the within-country elasticities of passenger numbers 
and freight volume to rail length are 0.68 (with a standard error of 0.2) and 1.38 (with a standard 
error of 0.3). Multiplying the elasticity of passengers to rail length by the partial elasticity of 
patents to passengers gives an elasticity of patenting to rail length via the knowledge access 
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channel of 0.22. Calculated similarly, the elasticity of patenting to rail length via market access 
is 0.45. Adding these two elasticities together gives 0.68, which is close to the overall elasticity 
of patenting to rail of 0.76 (and well within its standard error), indicating that the overall effect 
of rail can be accounted for almost entirely through these two channels. The ratio of the two 
effects is approximately 2 to 1 in favour of market access, indicating that the market access 
channel was roughly twice as important as the knowledge access channel. 
        
Controlling for the Business Cycle 
 
A problem with these estimates, however, is that they may be biased upwards because annual 
rail construction, passenger numbers, freight volume and patenting are all likely to vary pro-
cyclically with the business cycle, which is largely exogenous to the system of relationships 
estimated here. Moreover, if within-cycle variation is large relative to between-cycle variation, 
this bias might be large. The solution is to try to control for the business cycle, either by re-
estimating the relationship using variation between data points that are more spaced out over 
time (i.e. gaps between data points of 5 or 10 years, say) so that within-cycle variation in this 
specification is smaller relative to between-cycle variation, or by attempting to filter out the 
cycles in the higher frequency data points and extract the trend. The first of these methods is 
attractive because it is simple, but it has the downside of omitting many of the data points. The 
second method allows one to retain most of the data points, but necessarily involves a 
somewhat arbitrary transformation of the data. Given the shortcomings of each method, I 
present both. 
 
Figure 5.6: Illustrative HP Decomposition into Cycle (left chart) and Trend (right 
trend) of Annual Rail Passengers in Germany, 1885-1911 
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I extract the trends for the rail passengers and rail freight variables using a Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter (with lambda equal to 6.25, as conventional for annual data), obtaining a cycle and 
trend component for each. The HP filter requires one to drop the first and last two data points 
for each country as each filtered data point t is calculated as a function of data at t-2, t-1, t, t+1 
and t+2. Figure 5.6 shows the resulting HP decomposition for German rail passengers between 
1885 and 1911, where the left-hand chart is the cycle and the right-hand chart is the trend. One 
can see that in the case of Germany the upward trend is quite large relative to the cyclical 
variation. The spread of the maximum to minimum log value is about 1.75 for the trend 
compared to about 0.8 for the cyclical component.  
 
Three regressions controlling for the business cycle using the different approaches 
described above are reported in table 5.4. Columns 1 and 2 show that taking 5 and 10-year 
intervals to reduce cyclical variation dramatically changes the estimated relative and absolute 
impact of passengers and freight. In both specifications the elasticity of patents to passengers 
has doubled to just less than 0.7 and the elasticity to freight has all but disappeared. Using the 
HP filter, the trend elasticity of patenting to passengers is about 0.3, while the trend elasticity 
of patenting to freight is insignificant.  These results suggest that the relationship between 
freight volumes and patenting appears to be driven by their co-cyclicality, while the 
relationship between passenger volumes and patenting appears to be based on co-trends. This 
evidence does not firmly establish a causal link between knowledge access and patenting rates, 
but does establishes a strong correlation between the two that is not driven by the business 
cycle. 
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Table 5.4: Determinants of countries’ patents by country-year, 1885-1910 (controlling 
for the business cycle) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Patents 
Country FE 
5 yearly  
(1885-1910) 
Patents 
Country FE 
10 yearly 
(1890-1910) 
Patents 
Country FE 
HP decomposition 
(1885-1911, ann.) 
 
Rail Passengers 
 
0.690*** 
 
0.683* 
 
 (0.220) (0.335)  
    
Rail Freight 0.0293 -0.0809  
 (0.135) (0.159)  
    
Rail Passengers: Trend   0.301** 
   (0.122) 
    
Rail Passengers: Cycle   0.0173 
   (0.0289) 
    
Rail Freight: Trend   -0.0325 
   (0.0262) 
    
Rail Freight: Cycle   -0.00569 
   (0.106) 
    
GDP per Capita -0.648* -0.741 -0.217 
 (0.332) (0.761) (0.384) 
    
Population 0.634 0.296 0.506 
 
 
Country FE 
 
Time FE 
(0.626) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.700) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.676) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
Countries 
Years 
97 
20 
6 
51 
19 
3 
468 
21 
27 
R2 0.883 0.891 0.809 
    Clustered (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses 
      * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Empirical Analysis B: Rail and Patent Quality in US States, 1840-1890  
 
The availability of state-level US data on rail and patents during the era of rapid US railway 
expansion, along with data on forward citations for these patents presents an alternative 
strategy to distinguish between the knowledge and market access effects of rail on modern 
economic growth. The basic idea is that while patent quantity should be affected by both 
knowledge and market access costs, patent quality should be affected only by knowledge 
access costs. Hence, the identification of an impact of rail on an unbiased indicator of patent 
quality should be interpreted as evidence of the knowledge access effect of rail on innovation.   
 
Why should the quality of innovation be affected by knowledge access but not market 
access? The reason is that market access affects the rate of innovation through its impact on 
research effort, while knowledge access affects the rate of innovation through both its impact 
on research effort and research productivity. In turn, while both research effort and productivity 
should be reflected in patent quantity, only research productivity should be reflected in patent 
quality.  
 
Market access and innovation: quantity, not quality 
 
Access to a larger market raises the expected private return to innovative effort and therefore 
the general equilibrium supply of innovative effort. This effect is discussed in chapter 6 in the 
context of Robert Allen’s induced innovation hypothesis for the Industrial Revolution, and is 
modelled formally in Acemoglu (2002) and Acemoglu & Linn (2004). Empirically, Acemoglu 
and Linn provide evidence of a link between market size and research effort in the 
pharmaceuticals industry, where demographic trends are used as a source of exogenous 
variation in market size. Furthermore, many empirical studies have shown a link between firm 
size and R&D expenditure. As larger firms have more sales over which to spread R&D costs, 
these results can be interpreted as support for a positive effect of market access on research 
effort (see Cohen 2010 for a survey).  
 
However, research effort has been found not to affect the quality of innovation. For 
example, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) construct a panel of manufacturing firms between 
1980 and 1993 and compare R&D expenditure (research effort) with firm patent counts both 
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in cross-section and within-firm. They find a strong correlation of around 0.775. Using a quality 
indicator of patents they construct based on forward citation counts, they find that the 
correlation of R&D expenditure with the new quality-adjusted patent count is no higher than 
with the raw patent count. Lanjouw and Schankerman model patent quality as a stochastic 
function of R&D effort and conclude that the stochastic component, or luck, dominates the 
quantity of effort. Tom Nicholas (2014) shows, using a broad dataset of 11,514 US R&D firms 
between 1921 and 1970, covering many industries, that firm R&D expenditure is positively 
associated with patent quantity, with an elasticity of around 0.5, which is not too different from 
Lanjouw and Schankerman’s result. However, the elasticity of a firm’s total number of patent 
citations to R&D expenditure is essentially the same as this, once again indicating no effect of 
research effort on patent quality. Furthermore, in a separate study based on late nineteenth 
century US patents, Nicholas finds that small independent inventors achieved a slightly higher 
average level of patent quality than large firms committing larger R&D expenditures (Nicholas 
2010). 
 
Knowledge access and innovation: quantity and quality 
 
Lower knowledge access costs raise research productivity, which should be reflected in higher 
patent citation counts per patent. Ultimately, research productivity is equal to the direct impact 
of a unit of research labour on labour productivity and capital formation, plus a knowledge-
spillover effect – an indirect contribution via any future dependent research (Nelson 1959, 
Arrow 1962, Griliches 1991). Romer (1990) models research productivity in a framework 
where the rate of knowledge accumulation is an increasing function of the size of the current 
knowledge stock. Specifically, research labour is more productive with access to more 
knowledge. Moreover, Romer and Rivera-Batiz (1991) show within this framework that the 
integration of knowledge bases across regions, which can be thought of as a reduction in 
knowledge access costs, also raises research productivity. Research productivity is 
denominated in Romer’s model in terms of aggregate economic output, since research produces 
new capital goods that raise the productivity of manufacturing labour engaged in producing the 
                                                          
75  As have many other studies at different units of aggregation, see Griliches 1991 for example. It is significant 
also that these studies have found that patenting is inelastic with respect to R&D spending. Increasing returns to 
scale to firms’ research effort, while not speaking directly to a quality effect, would suggest a link between 
research effort and a particular conception of research productivity per unit of effort supplied. As Cohen discusses 
in an extensive survey of the question, studies have overwhelmingly failed to find these increasing returns to scale 
(Cohen 2010). In summary, while research effort appears to have an empirically detectable effect on patent 
quantity, it does not appear to have an empirically detectable effect on patent quality. 
Chapter 5 
213 
 
economy’s single consumer good. Research labour contributes to aggregate output through the 
direct effect of newly invented capital goods on productivity, plus the indirect effect of the 
expansion of the knowledge stock on the productivity of research labour in the future. In 
practice, these effects should be reflected in indicators of patent quality. 
 
In addition, knowledge spillovers also give rise to a research effort effect of drawing 
some additional labour into the research sector, since the return to labour in the research sector 
is enhanced relative to its return in the manufacturing sector. As such Romer’s model also 
predicts a positive relationship between knowledge access and the supply of research effort, 
which should be reflected in patent counts.  
 
Mokyr’s (2002) knowledge production function is more nuanced than Romer’s because 
it delineates useful knowledge into two types: propositional (essentially, science and known 
regularities about the natural world) and prescriptive (essentially, technology). Nevertheless, 
the positive impact of access to knowledge on the productivity of innovative effort remains 
central to economic growth. The larger the base of propositional knowledge, and/or the lower 
are access costs, the faster is the rate of accumulation of prescriptive knowledge (or 
technological innovation) for a given amount of research effort. For Mokyr, access to a wider 
base of propositional knowledge raises research productivity for two main reasons. First, with 
a lower cost of access to knowledge, would-be innovators can choose from a larger set of 
technological problems to solve. So long as they possess some ability to distinguish problems 
with higher expect returns from those with lower this will result in higher average research 
productivity. Second, an innovator trying to solve a given problem can choose from a richer 
set of potential solutions, and with more information to hand is less likely to pursue erroneous 
solutions. Mokyr’s research productivity effects of lower knowledge access costs should be 
reflected in patent quality indicators, while access to spillover knowledge should also raise 
research effort and be reflected in patent counts76.  
 
                                                          
76 Aghion and Howitt (1992) model a similar innovation process to Romer but include the destructive effect of 
one firm’s innovation on the product market share of other firms. This (correctly) complicates the consideration 
and calculation of the overall contribution of research effort to national income by introducing a negative 
‘market stealing’ externality alongside Romer’s positive knowledge spillover externality. However, Bloom, 
Schankerman and Van Reenan (2013) have shown empirically that the knowledge spillover effect empirically 
dominates the market stealing effect, so focusing on Romer’s positive externality framework appears adequate 
for our purposes. 
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Empirically, patent quality appears to capture research productivity and is sensitive to 
knowledge access. Kogan et al. (2015) show that patent quality, as measured by citation counts, 
is correlated with research productivity, as estimated by the impact of a firm’s patent grant on 
its equity valuation and subsequent profit growth. Although this measure of research 
productivity does not capture knowledge spillovers external to the firm, it is a reasonable proxy 
for the private return to research. Akcigit, Kerr and Nicholas (2013) provide evidence of a 
positive relationship between knowledge access and patent quality. They examine the entire 
US patent record from 1836 to 2012, focusing on each patent’s usage of the existing 
technological knowledge base as revealed by its backward citations. They classify patents into 
three groups depending on their relationship to the pre-existing technological knowledge base: 
1) the patent creates a novel technology area, 2) the patent belongs to an existing technology 
area but incorporates knowledge from a different area and 3) the patent uses knowledge only 
from its own existing technology area. The average quality of patents by group, based on a 
forward citation count, suggests a positive relationship between knowledge access and patent 
quality. Novel technology patents are of the highest quality on average receiving the most 
citations. They make more use of the existing knowledge base, citing more patents and more 
technology areas than the other groups. Patents citing combinations of existing technology 
areas are of the second highest average quality by citations received. They also cite quite 
extensively and broadly, though not so much as novel technology area patents. Patents 
engaging with only a single technology area only are of the lowest quality by citations received 
and make the least use of the existing knowledge base. They cite fewer patents and cite within 
a narrow technological range. As such, there appears to be a basic correlation between the depth 
and breadth of usage of the existing knowledge base and patent quality.  
 
Frenken et al. (2012) argue theoretically that innovations combining disparate 
technology paths, which would likely require particularly broad access to the knowledge base, 
result in faster technological progress. Empirically, De Vaan, Stark and Vedres (2015) have 
found that novel combinations of knowledge embodied across computer programmers are 
associated with the quality of innovation in the computer games industry. Fleming and 
Sorenson (2004) find a positive link between inventors’ use of the scientific knowledge base 
and patent quality, in line with Mokyr’s focus on the importance of the propositional 
knowledge base. They show that patents citing scientific publications are of higher quality as 
measured by citations received.  
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These studies find a link between the extent of an inventor’s use of the existing 
knowledge base and the quality of his invention. However, we are interested in identifying the 
impact of knowledge access rather than usage, which may be endogenous. Hagedoorn et al. 
(2006) show using a panel of 152 firms in the IT sector between 1975 and 1999 that a firm’s 
centrality in R&D networks is a predictor of patent quality. Sorenson and Singh (2007) show 
that science-based patents are of higher quality on average because of the beneficial impact of 
the scientific norm of openness on knowledge access.  
   
Data and Econometric Model 
 
The above discussion suggests that estimating the effect of rail on patent quality should enable 
one to identify the effect via knowledge access channel. To implement this, I have constructed 
a panel dataset of US patent counts, forward citation counts, rail density and controls for US 
states at ten year intervals from 1840 to 1890, although forward citation counts are only 
available from 1840 to 1870. Rail density is calculated by taking rail length data by state and 
year from the 1890 edition of Poor’s Manual of Railroads (Poors 1890). Density is calculated 
by dividing this length in km by state area as calculated using historical GIS data. Controls for 
population, urbanisation and economic activity are constructed using decennial census data 
between 1840 and 1890, accessed at the NHGIS website77. 
 
To construct patent counts, I use a database of all US utility patents filed between 1790 
and 1873, located at the Patent and Trademark Resource Centre Association (PTRCA 2013). 
The original source for this database is the Subject Matter Index of Patents for Inventions by 
the United States Patent Office from 1790 to 1873 Inclusive (USPTO 1873). I geocode the 
residence of the first patentee named on each patent by county and state. I categorise each 
patent by technology class by cross-referencing each patent number with the technology 
classification database at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO 2013). This database 
assigns each patent (as identified by patent number) to at least one of around 450 technology 
classes (e.g. ‘plant husbandry’ or ‘electrical resistors’). Finally, to obtain a forward citation 
count for each patent, I cross-reference this dataset with the 2001 version of the NBER database 
of US patent citations, created by Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg (2001), 
                                                          
77 NHGIS: The ‘National Historical Geographic Information System’, https://www.nhgis.org/, which provides 
aggregate census data and GIS-compatible boundary files for the United States between 1790 and 2013. 
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which lists for each patent granted between 1975 and 1999 the patents it cited. Nineteenth 
century US patents were cited quite often by US patents granted between 1975 and 1999. Figure 
5.7 plots the proportion of patents granted each year between 1836 and 1873 that were 
subsequently cited between 1975 and 1999; alongside the ratio of 1975-1999 citations to 
patents for each year. Between 1836 and 1873 consistently around one-tenth of patents received 
citations during the 1975-1999 period. I create state-level patent counts by year, stratified by 
industry sector, including forward citation counts for cross-sections 1840 to 1870.  
 
Figure 5.7: Ratio of Cited Patents to All Patents, and Citations/Patents, by Year 1836-
1873 (citations from patents during 1970-1995) 
 
 
Patent citation counts have been used extensively to measure patent quality in studies 
of innovation. Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) have shown that they are correlated with 
economic measures of patent value and, as discussed above, Kogan et al. (2015) have shown 
that they are correlated with research productivity. Nevertheless, one must be careful to ensure 
that the variation in one’s aggregated citation counts is not biased by omitted variables. 
Confounding sources of variation in patent counts in the current analysis would stem from any 
geographical links between patenting frequency in the nineteenth century and citing frequency 
in the late twentieth century. For instance, consider a cross-sectional regression by state of the 
count of twentieth century citations of nineteenth century patents on nineteenth century rail 
density. Although, as argued above, market access should not affect patent quality, states with 
greater market access should have higher patenting rates via the research effort effect, and 
simply on a proportional basis exhibit more citations. Given that citations are biased to 
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geographically local patents, due to industry location and knowledge spillover effects (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg & Henderson 1993), if industry location and market access patterns across states 
are persistent between the two periods, the market access of citers in state i in the late twentieth 
century may be correlated with state i patent counts in the nineteenth century. As such, 
nineteenth century market access might be correlated via this indirect route with our measure 
of patent quality, which would upwardly bias the estimate of the effect of knowledge access. 
This problem can be overcome, however, by estimating a state-fixed effects model, which 
utilises within-state variation in rail density and patent citation counts only. As only the market 
access of the citer, not that of the patentee, is correlated with citation counts, breaking the 
geographical link between citation variation and rail density variation removes the confounding 
link. 
 
The long interval between patents and citations means that some technology 
classifications will no longer be relevant to patents filed during the citation window. This may 
bias upwards the estimate of the impact of rail density on patent quality, as the local 
agglomeration effects of rail enabled a more diversified local portfolio of industries, which 
may have been more likely to contain the exceptional technology areas that retained influence 
during the late twentieth century. The inclusion of state fixed-effects mitigates this problem. In 
addition, I normalise each patent’s citation count by technology classification and year of filing. 
The adjusted citation count for each patent is the residual from an OLS regression of logged 
citation count on year and technology classification for the approximately 150,000 patents filed 
between 1836 and 1873. The top and bottom citation receiving classifications are shown in 
tables 6.5 and 5.6.         
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Table 5.5: Patent Classes Ranked by Mean Citations (1836-1873, citations from patents 
during 1970-1995): Top 25 Classes  
Rank Class 
Mean 
cites per 
patent 
No of 
patents 
1836-
1873 
No of 
Citations 
Number 
Cited 
Percent 
cited 
1 Amusement devices: games 2.9 7 20 5 71.4 
2 Communications: radio wave antennas 2.0 1 2 1 100.0 
3 Earth boring, well treating, and oil field chemistry 2.0 6 12 5 83.3 
4 Surgery 2.0 114 228 54 47.4 
5 Surgery: splint, brace, or bandage 1.3 89 114 45 50.6 
6 Exercise devices 1.1 103 115 52 50.5 
7 Optical communications 1.0 1 1 1 100.0 
8 Powder metallurgy processes 1.0 2 2 2 100.0 
9 Telecommunications 1.0 1 1 1 100.0 
10 Synthetic resins or natural rubbers – (subclass 520) 1.0 3 3 3 100.0 
11 Surgery 1.0 34 34 20 58.8 
12 Aeronautics and astronautics 0.9 104 97 43 41.3 
13 Distillation: processes, separatory 0.9 118 107 13 11.0 
14 Surgery 0.8 269 217 101 37.5 
15 Prosthesis, parts thereof, or aids & accessories 0.8 344 270 101 29.4 
16 Package and article carriers 0.8 306 236 116 37.9 
17 Surgery: kinesitherapy 0.7 54 36 22 40.7 
18 Plant husbandry 0.6 381 230 116 30.4 
19 Pipe joints or couplings 0.6 1168 694 380 32.5 
20 Amusement devices: games 0.6 194 112 73 37.6 
21 Flexible bags 0.5 144 78 43 29.9 
22 Wire fabrics and structure 0.5 97 52 16 16.5 
23 Fluent material handling 0.5 426 225 110 25.8 
24 Needle and pin making 0.5 42 22 4 9.5 
25 Chemistry: analytical and immunological testing 0.5 2 1 1 50.0 
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Table 5.6: Patent Classes Ranked by Mean Citations (1836-1873, citations from patents 
during 1970-1995): Bottom 25 Classes  
Rank Class 
Mean 
cites per 
patent 
No of 
patents 
1836-
1873 
No of 
Citations 
Number 
Cited 
Percent 
cited 
352 (joint) 
Single-crystal, oriented-crystal, and epitaxy growth 
processes; non-coating apparatus therefor 0.00 3 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Batteries: thermoelectric and photoelectric 0.00 4 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Merchandising 0.00 3 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Check-actuated control mechanisms 0.00 11 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) 
High-voltage switches with arc preventing or 
extinguishing devices 0.00 1 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Selective cutting (e.g., punching) 0.00 14 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Radiant energy 0.00 1 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) 
Active solid-state devices (e.g., transistors, solid-
state diodes) 0.00 17 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) 
Electric lamp and discharge devices: consumable 
electrodes 0.00 6 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) 
Electricity: battery or capacitor charging or 
discharging 0.00 7 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Electricity: power supply or regulation systems 0.00 3 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Amplifiers 0.00 6 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Oscillators 0.00 1 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) 
Electricity: electrothermally or thermally actuated 
switches 0.00 12 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Electrical resistors 0.00 19 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Coded data generation or conversion 0.00 14 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) 
Communications: directive radio wave systems and 
devices (e.g., radar, radio navigation) 0.00 1 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Incremental printing of symbolic information 0.00 3 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Television 0.00 2 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Electric power conversion systems 0.00 2 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Dynamic information storage or retrieval 0.00 1 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Industrial electric heating furnaces 0.00 3 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) Pulse or digital communications 0.00 1 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) 
Electrical pulse counters, pulse dividers, or shift 
registers: circuits and systems 0.00 6 0 0 0.0 
352 (joint) X-ray or gamma ray systems or devices 0.00 1 0 0 0.0 
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I estimate the following equation on US states at ten yearly intervals between 1840 to 
1870, using OLS:  
 
𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐼𝑉𝐸𝐷 + 1)𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnRAIL DENSITYit + β2LnPATENTSit  
+ β3LnPOPULATIONit + β4 % OF POP IN CITIESit + β5 % OF POP IN TOWNSit + 
β6LnMANU. & AGRI. OUTPUTit + + β7RATIO OF MANU. TO AGRI. OUTPUTit + δj  + ɣt  
+ εit       (5.1)         
and in alternative specifications replace patent citations in state-year it with i)adjusted-patent 
citations in state-year it and ii)cited-patents in state-year it only (i.e. only patents that received 
at least one citation are counted) as barriers to citation – particularly given such a long lag – 
are likely to be larger for the first than for subsequent citations. Population, urbanisation and 
economic activity variables are included as they are likely to be correlated both with rail density 
and patent quality via knowledge access links. I include full sets of both state and time-fixed 
effects. 
 
Results 
 
As a first step, I estimate the basic relationship between the log patent count and log rail density 
in state-year it both in the cross section (using the six cross sections between 1840 and 1890 
and time fixed-effects) and within-state over time, controlling for state population, the 
proportion of state population in cities and towns, current dollar output of the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors and an indicator of industrialisation (manufacturing/agricultural output). 
As table 5.7 shows, the elasticity of state patenting with respect to rail density is 0.25 in the 
cross section and 0.39 within-state. The within-state elasticity is half the average national 
within-county elasticity between 1883 and 1913 of around 0.8, found above. 
 
Estimation results for equation 5.1 are displayed in table 5.8. Column 1 shows that, 
controlling for the underlying patent count, the elasticity of raw citations to rail density is 0.3 
and highly statistically significant with a standard error of 0.08.  As column 2 shows, when 
controlling only for cited patents this elasticity falls to 0.064, but remains statistically 
significant with a standard error of 0.028. As columns 3 and 4 show, the elasticity of adjusted 
citations to rail density is 0.49 controlling for all patents and 0.26 controlling for cited patents 
only. 
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Table 5.7: US Patents and Rail Density by State-Year, 1840-1890 
 (1) (2) 
 Patents 
State Cross Sections 
1840-90,  
10 yearly 
Patents 
State FE 
1840-90,  
10 yearly 
 
Rail Density 
 
0.249*** 
 
0.385*** 
 (0.0654) (0.0672) 
   
Population 0.231 0.842*** 
 (0.194) (0.201) 
   
% of Population in Cities 0.137 0.0520 
 (0.0925) (0.0499) 
   
% of Population in Towns 0.209* -0.193** 
 (0.109) (0.0878) 
   
Agri. & Manufact. Output 0.576*** 0.0342 
 (0.154) (0.160) 
   
Manuf. to Agri. Output Ratio 0.125 -0.173 
 
 
State Fixed Effects 
 
Time Fixed Effects 
(0.127) 
 
No 
 
Yes 
(0.142) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 230 230 
States 
Years 
R2 
48 
6 
0.934 
48 
6 
0.965 
                 Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5.8: US Patent Citations (by US Patents filed 1970-1995) and Rail Density, by State-
Year, 1840-1870 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Citations  
during 1970-95 
State FE 
1840-90,  
10 yearly 
Citations  
during 1970-95 
State FE 
1840-90,  
10 yearly 
Adjusted Citations 
during 1970-95 
State FE 
1840-90,  
10 yearly 
Adjusted Citations 
during 1970-95 
State FE 
1840-90,  
10 yearly  
 
Rail Density 
 
0.291*** 
 
0.0640** 
 
0.485*** 
 
0.260** 
 (0.0766) (0.0280) (0.152) (0.114) 
     
Patents 0.464***  0.793***  
 (0.138)  (0.208)  
     
Cited Patents  1.110***  1.452*** 
  (0.0401)  (0.173) 
     
Population -1.694*** -0.0346 -1.256** 1.020** 
 (0.264) (0.133) (0.620) (0.480) 
     
% of Population in 
Cities 
0.225*** -0.00528 0.204 -0.0608 
 (0.0829) (0.0290) (0.156) (0.140) 
     
% of Population in 
Towns 
0.142* 0.0170 0.0393 -0.144 
 (0.0807) (0.0401) (0.195) (0.236) 
     
Agri. & Manufact. 
Output 
0.913*** -0.00259 0.452 -0.711** 
 (0.211) (0.100) (0.419) (0.324) 
     
Manuf. to Agri. Ouput 
Ratio 
0.0153 -0.0363 0.158 0.0361 
 
 
State Fixed Effects 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
(0.108) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.0347) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.167) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.137) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
States 
Years 
139 
48 
6 
139 
48 
6 
139 
48 
6 
139 
48 
6 
R2 0.883 0.985 0.851 0.920 
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Adjusted 
Citations are citations adjusted for the average citations received in each sectoral classification. 
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Conclusion 
 
There exists a basic correlation between KAIs and the emergence of modern economic growth 
across countries during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Does this link have a 
causal dimension? 
 
Two analyses in this chapter have established a positive relationship between rail and 
patenting during the age of the rail transportation revolution. What role did falling knowledge 
access costs, as opposed to falling market access costs, play in this relationship? The 
identification strategies used above suggest that knowledge access played a distinct role. First, 
controlling for the influence of the business cycle, the rise in rail passengers appears to have 
been more important than the rise of rail freight in determining national patenting rates in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Second, rail had a significant effect on the quality 
of patenting in the nineteenth century US, which, as argued above, is likely to represent the 
footprint of the knowledge access effect of rail. This evidence suggests that knowledge access 
costs were a binding constraint to the emergence of modern economic growth in an 
international context during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. KAIs may have 
operated upon this constraint.  
 
In addition, this chapter challenges Robert Fogel’s result of rail’s modest impact on 
nineteenth century US economic growth (Fogel 1962). Fogel showed that railways made the 
economy of the day a bit more efficient. However, they also helped to create the economy of 
tomorrow. 
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Chapter 6 
The Demand for Technology and the Emergence of Modern Economic Growth 
 
 
Robert Allen has argued that eighteenth century British inventors and entrepreneurs were not 
particularly capable innovators, but instead were uniquely well incentivised to innovate. In this 
spirit, he has documented Britain’s relatively high wages and low energy prices and shown 
how they made some of the great labour-saving macroinventions of the British Industrial 
Revolution more profitable to adopt, and so invent, in Britain than elsewhere (Allen 2009). But 
how much of a contribution did this incentive to innovate make to the overall acceleration in 
technological progress that characterised the British Industrial Revolution? Was it, as Allen 
claims, the main driving force?  
 
Moreover, is the incentive presented by high wages and cheap capital and energy to 
substitute labour for machines the main mechanism underlying modern economic growth in 
general, as Allen also claims (Allen 2012)? Or rather, were expensive labour and cheap capital 
and energy perhaps more akin to the starter motor of modern economic growth, sparking a 
cluster of seminal innovations in eighteenth century Britain, but not themselves the engine? 
Was that engine instead an improvement over time in the capabilities required for innovation?    
 
This chapter aims to shed some light on these questions by attempting to measure the 
contribution of Allen’s incentives to aggregate productivity growth in the manufacturing sector 
during the early stages of modern economic growth, using data for the United States in the late 
nineteenth century. Clearly, the British Industrial Revolution and the subsequent emergence of 
modern economic growth in the United States were distinct events, so such an analysis cannot 
speak directly to the question central to this thesis of the cause of the British Industrial 
Revolution. Nevertheless, the high wages and low energy costs that Allen claims incentivised 
the British Industrial Revolution also prevailed in the late nineteenth century US economy 
owing to America’s abundant land and natural resources and relatively scarce labour 
(Habakkuk 1962, Allen 2014). Indeed, due to this similarity between the two cases, Allen sees 
the British Industrial Revolution as the ‘prequel’ to America’s late nineteenth century transition 
to modern economic growth (Allen 2009). In the context of this thesis, the American case is 
Chapter 6 
225 
 
interesting because of the availability of rich, sub-national data on output, factor inputs and 
wages for the US manufacturing sector in the late nineteenth century (owing to the decennial 
US Census of Manufactures), which enables one to examine the effect of Allen’s incentives in 
a more comprehensive way than one can for the British Industrial Revolution, but while 
retaining the context of an early experience of the transition to modern economic growth 
(Abramovitz & David 2001). If, by examining this evidence, Allen’s incentives can be shown 
to have influenced the American transition to modern economic growth then this would lend 
plausibility to the claim that they influenced the British transition too. 
 
Second, Allen has shown using national-level panel data for the period from the British 
Industrial Revolution until the late twentieth century that countries with higher capital-labour 
ratios have tended to experience faster subsequent rates of labour productivity growth due to a 
faster subsequent rate of both technological progress and capital accumulation. Conversely, 
countries with relatively low capital-labour ratios have experienced little labour productivity 
growth. He interprets this finding as evidence of a positive feedback loop generated by labour-
saving innovation, whereby rising capital intensity raises wages and incentivises further labour 
saving innovation, and provides increasing scope for learning by doing. He argues that this is 
the underlying engine of modern economic growth and the reason for the Great Divergence 
between rich and poor countries during the past two centuries (Allen 2012). The more 
coherently any explanation for the British Industrial Revolution fits with our understanding of 
the broader experience of modern economic growth the more plausible it is.  As such, if correct, 
Allen’s explanation of modern economic growth as the self-sustaining process of labour-saving 
innovation lends plausibility to his view of the British Industrial Revolution as the grinding 
into motion of the wheels of this process.  
 
However, Allen’s interpretation of the positive relationship between national capital-
labour ratios and subsequent national productivity growth rates during the past two centuries 
is subject to a major omitted variable problem. The historical economic development of today’s 
rich countries may have been conditional on capabilities that they attained at some point in the 
past, but which have eluded poor countries. If these capabilities are difficult to attain but 
persistent once attainted78 then one ought to expect divergent levels of technology, capital 
stocks and productivity between high and low capability countries irrespective of the existence 
                                                          
78 For example, Rocha, Ferraz, & Soares (2015) provide evidence on the long run persistence of human capital. 
The Demand for Technology and the Emergence of Modern Economic Growth 
226 
 
of a positive feedback mechanism within the mechanics of capital accumulation and 
technological change itself. The capabilities thought to be important for modern economic 
growth – such as appropriate institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012), an adequate 
educational system (Hanushek & Woessmann 2015) or an innovative culture (Mokyr 2016) – 
are likely to vary less within a single country than between countries. As such, investigating 
these relationships in American counties rather than national economies may help one to 
distinguish between the two interpretations. 
 
I specify four logical implications of Allen’s argument, which suggest four empirical 
tests of its validity and an approach to measuring its quantitative importance to the emergence 
of modern economic growth in the late nineteenth century American context: 
 
1. Can we detect an overall labour saving bias in nineteenth century US technological 
change? 
 
2. Did capital-labour ratios rise faster where labour was more expensive relative to 
capital? 
 
3. Was productivity growth faster where capital-labour ratios were higher? 
 
4. Was more innovative effort expended where the returns to innovation were higher? 
 
Taken together, the answers found to these four questions lend support to Allen’s argument for 
the importance of demand-side incentives to the acceleration in modern economic growth in 
the US case. Nevertheless, Allen’s incentives are found to fall short of plausibly accounting for 
all of this acceleration. This leaves room for the contribution of an improvement in supply-side 
capabilities.    
   
 
Allen’s Hypothesis 
 
To carefully specify Allen’s hypothesis, I closely follow Crafts’ discussion of Allen’s 2009 
book, The British Industrial Revolution in Comparative Perspective (Crafts 2011). Allen states 
that his theoretical framework is based on Paul David’s attempt in 1975 to pin down the theory 
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underlying H.J. Habakkuk’s argument for late nineteenth century American technological 
superiority (David 1975, Habakkuk 1962). Habakkuk, David and Allen write in the tradition 
of the literature on factor substitution and induced technological change that began with John 
Hicks’ insight that: “The real reason for the predominance of labour-saving inventions is surely 
that…a change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to innovation 
and to inventions of a particular kind – directed at economizing the use of a factor which has 
become relatively expensive” (Hicks 1932, pp.124-5).   
 
Mokyr (2009) and Jacob (2014) object to Hicks’ statement pointing out that a producer 
would be equally interested in cost savings made by economizing on any factor of production, 
regardless of its price. As such, factor prices do not directly determine the bias of technological 
change. Mokyr also points out that Christine MacLeod’s survey of a sample of patent records 
during the British Industrial Revolution fails to identify saving labour as a significant objective 
of inventors (MacLeod 1988). However, David and Allen’s arguments are sophisticated 
enough to survive these objections. As shown below, although relative factor prices may not 
necessarily bias technological change directly, they can do so through a multi-step, path 
dependent process. Second, patentees may have been reluctant to document their intention to 
save labour during the British Industrial Revolution because of public backlashes against 
industrialists replacing labour with machines.  
 
David and Allen’s arguments can be illustrated by figures 6.1 and 6.2, which show the 
two steps by which expensive labour relative to the cost of capital may lead to sustained 
technological progress. Given the curved isoquant in figure 6.1, if an economy faced the isocost 
line, P0, which is associated with relatively cheap labour and expensive capital, it would choose 
technology A (where its isocost line is tangential to the isoquant curve). Similarly, an economy 
facing the isocost line P1 (where labour is relatively expensive and capital relatively cheap 
compared to first economy) would choose the more capital intensive technology, B. Now, if 
the idea for a new macroinvention suddenly made point C possible, only producers in the high 
wage economy could be incentivised to switch because given factor price ratios P1 and P0, point 
C dominates B but not A. Whether the economy operating at B switches to C or not depends 
on the fixed cost and expected revenue stream of the associated R&D investment, the latter 
determined largely by the addressable market size.  
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Figure 6.1: Step 1. Factor Prices and Macroinvention 
 
Figure 6.2: Step 2. ‘Local Learning’ with Capital Intensive Technology 
 
 
Note two implications of this for the debate between supply and demand side 
explanations of the British Industrial Revolution. First, market size matters to the 
incentivisation of the macroinvention and may, in principle, be more important than relative 
factor prices.79 Allen cites Britain’s market size in the eighteenth century as an advantage over 
Holland. Nevertheless, it does not feature in his main narrative nor empirical work. Nor has it 
been discussed much in the subsequent debate on Allen’s book, Crafts’ review aside80. Second, 
the viability of the macroinvention is also dependent on the productivity of R&D, since this 
helps to determine R&D costs. Given that the capabilities explored in this thesis operate largely 
                                                          
79 Induced innovation depends on these two factors in Acemoglu (2002) 
80 Crafts & O’Rourke (2013) discuss it 
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through their effect on the productivity of R&D effort, Allen’s account of the Industrial 
Revolution is clearly compatible with an account based on such capabilities.  
 
If adoption is profitable (taking into account R&D costs and market size) then the 
macroinvention is adopted and the higher wage economy moves from point B to C and its 
capital-labour ratio rises. As the gap between capital-labour ratios in the two economies has 
widened, so has the relative potential for learning by doing – the generation of incremental 
productivity gains due to cumulative experience using the new technology (Arrow 1962). 
Allen, following David (1975 pp 68-91), argues that the subsequent burst of learning in the 
high wage economy should be neutral in its factor saving properties, or at least so ex ante. 
Technological progress then, in the form of a factor-neutral flow of microinventions, would 
proceed at point C, taking the high wage economy to, say, C’ (figure 6.2). At the same time, 
aggregate learning would be relatively stagnant in the low wage economy (still at point A) and 
may remain so until the high wage economy improves the new technology through learning 
effects to the extent where the P0 isocost line is crossed. In Allen’s words, “nothing much 
happens in the low wage country.”  
 
Once the high wage economy crosses P0, however, the new technology becomes 
profitable to adopt in the low wage economy too (conditional on its market size and locally 
required R&D expenditure). This is an important feature of Allen’s story. First, it enables one 
to explain the spread of modern economic growth as a function of the global technological 
frontier and local adoption costs. Second, it enables one to explain why Britain’s economic 
growth performance declined in the decades following the British Industrial Revolution. 
Britain lost international market share once it improved the efficiency of its technology to the 
point that it became profitable to adopt in other countries. Britain was a victim of her own 
success. 
 
Although this mechanism produces the bulk of productivity gains via the learning step, 
it can only deliver long run economic growth if new macroinventions are forthcoming owing 
to the diminishing returns accruing to the existing capital stock. This necessity is described 
formally by Alwyn Young in a ‘hybrid’ endogenous growth model that contains both R&D 
and learning by doing (Young 1993). Indeed, David emphasises the importance of scientific 
institutions to R&D and the supply of breakthrough innovations (David 1975). However, 
although Allen acknowledges that the Scientific Revolution may have been a pre-condition for 
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the Industrial Revolution, he plays down its importance. Rather, he invokes a feedback 
mechanism to explain sustained long-run growth, where rising capital-labour ratios cause 
labour productivity and wages to rise, which incentivises further labour-saving 
macroinventions. 
 
Although Allen does not do so, it is important to distinguish between high wages and 
high labour costs per se, particularly since Allen’s evidence of comparatively high eighteenth 
century British wages is based on time rates not piece rates. Technological innovation raises 
labour productivity and, so long as labour’s bargaining power is not too weak, tends to raise 
wages. But if labour productivity growth is large relative to wage growth, it will not necessarily 
raise unit labour costs. If British unit labour costs fell relative to those of its competitors once 
the British Industrial Revolution proceeded, then rising wages would not have incentivised 
further labour saving innovation. Allen’s positive feedback mechanism between rising wages 
and capital accumulation can be revived by invoking a general equilibrium effect of wages in 
the technologically progressive sector of the economy on wages in the rest of the economy. 
The basic mechanism for this, as explained by William Baumol (2012), is that competition for 
labour between the progressive and stagnant sectors means that productivity and wage growth 
in the progressive sector can cause wages to be bid up in the stagnant sector too. Note, however, 
that the strength of this general equilibrium effect would be dependent on the proportion of the 
labour force employed in the progressive sector, which was small in the early stages of the 
British Industrial Revolution (Crafts 1985).  
 
 
Empirical Questions 
 
The above theoretical framework highlights at least four testable and measurable implications 
of Allen’s hypothesis for the observed relationships between factor prices, factor ratios and 
productivity growth, and profitability and innovation, during the emergence of modern 
economic growth: 
 
Implication 1: An overall capital bias to technological change 
 
The movement of the high wage economy from B to C’ implies that technological change 
imparts an overall labour-saving bias to the isoquant curve, which now passes through C’ rather 
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than B. Nevertheless, one would not expect the patent records of the high wage country to 
reveal an overall bias towards the aim of saving labour, even after controlling for patentee 
reticence in the face of public backlashes against labour saving machines. This is because they 
would be dominated by the neutral microinventions of step 2. In contrast, although 
macroinventions radically change factor proportions, they are, by nature, rare. Hence, 
MacLeod’s finding that patentees did not state that they were trying to save labour does not 
(and cannot) contradict Allen’s argument. 
 
Crafts points out that the overall labour saving bias would be observable, however, as 
a fall in the wage share of value added as the capital-labour ratio rose over time. To attribute 
an observed correlation between a rising capital-labour ratio and a falling wage share to labour-
saving bias one must assume that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, 
which cannot be directly observed, is not too high. If the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour is less than one,81 as most empirical studies suggest (see Leon-Ledesma et 
al. 2010 for a survey), then a negative correlation between the capital-labour ratio and the wage 
share of value added can be taken as evidence of a labour-saving bias to technological change.82 
 
Using this approach, Allen provides evidence of a labour-saving bias during the British 
Industrial Revolution (Allen 2009b), however, he assumes an elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour of 0.2, which could be considered quite low. Moreover, the falling wage 
share during the British Industrial Revolution may have reflected an adverse shift in the 
bargaining power of labour relative to the owners of capital, rather than technological bias 
(Stiglitz 2015, Jaumotte & Osorio Buitron 2015). One way to strengthen the hand of the 
technological bias interpretation would be to test for a correlation using sub-national panel 
data. Although the bargaining power of capital relative to labour could in principle be positively 
correlated with capital-labour ratios across regions, this would clearly put greater demands on 
the bargaining power argument since labour mobility across regions would have acted to 
dampen regional differences in labour’s bargaining power. As such, cross-sectional 
correlations and within-region correlations over time would provide somewhat stronger 
                                                          
81 I.e. that the marginal productivity of capital relative to that of labour falls when the capital labour ratio rises, 
given constant technology or unbiased technological change 
82 Although it is essential to note that the absence of a negative correlation would not provide the same degree of 
support to the alternative hypothesis of the absence of labour saving bias, since it may just be the case that the 
effect of the labour saving bias on the wage share is more than offset by diminishing returns to capital per 
worker as the capital labour ratio rises 
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evidence of the labour-saving bias to technological change than the correlation in the aggregate 
time series.  
 
Implication 2: Manufacturing firms accumulated capital faster when they faced higher unit 
labour costs 
  
Allen argues that new waves of technological change in the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
were set in motion by labour saving macroinventions, whose rates of adoption across different 
locations were determined by the local cost of labour relative to capital and energy costs. This 
is the intuition behind the shift of the high wage/cheap capital economy from point B to C while 
the cheap labour/expensive capital economy remains at A. If this mechanism is important at 
the aggregate level, as Allen claims, then one would expect to see faster rates of capital 
accumulation in regions where labour was expensive relative to capital and energy costs.  
 
Implication 3: Total factor productivity growth was higher at higher capital-labour ratios 
 
Allen’s argument also implies that total factor productivity growth should be higher where 
capital-labour ratios are higher, owing to higher rates of learning by doing, i.e. progress is made 
from point C to C’ while there is relative stagnation at point A. This mechanism helps to explain 
why modern economic growth, if driven by labour saving induced innovation, is self-
sustaining. It also helps to explain the Great Divergence of rich and poor countries during the 
past two centuries.   
 
Implication 4: More innovative effort was expended when private returns to innovation were 
higher 
 
Allen argues that if a technological innovation is more profitable to adopt in a certain economy 
then it is also more likely that it will also be invented there, given the costly research and 
development required. For example, the superior profitability of the Spinning Jenny in Britain 
made it more likely that it was invented in Britain rather than elsewhere. Hence, innovative 
effort in region i should be correlated with the potential returns to innovators in region i. This 
will be determined by the number of potential adopters addressable by region i’s innovators, 
which is a function of the market access of region i’s innovators and relative factor prices 
weighted by distance from region i.    
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Data and Empirical Specifications: Manufacturing in American Counties in the Late 
Nineteenth Century 
 
The US economy experienced the onset of modern economic growth during the nineteenth 
century. As in the earlier British case, it was a gradual process. According to Abramowitz and 
David (2001), US labour productivity in the private domestic economy grew by about 0.4% 
per annum in the first half of the nineteenth century, which was already quite a high rate by 
historical and contemporary standards. Between 1855 and 1871, owing at least in part to 
economic disruption associated with the Civil War, labour productivity growth fell to an 
average rate of only about 0.1% per annum. However, from 1871 onwards labour productivity 
increased at a rapid clip, rising by about 1.5% per annum between 1871 and 1905. This 
acceleration in labour productivity growth was in turn largely due to an acceleration in total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth, the hallmark of modern economic growth. Between 1800 
and 1855 TFP growth contributed 0.2% of the 0.4% annual growth in labour productivity, but 
between 1871 and 1905 it contributed around 0.9% of the 1.5% annual labour productivity 
growth. 
  
The manufacturing sector employed only quite a small, although growing, share of the 
labour force during the period of emerging modern economic growth in the United States: 
17.6% in 1869 and 22.1% in 1909. This was significantly lower than in Britain, where 33.5% 
of the labour force were employed in manufacturing in 1871 and 32.1% in 1911 (Broadberry 
& Irvine 2005). Furthermore, many of the sources of modern economic growth in the US 
between 1870 and the early twentieth century were to be found outside of the manufacturing 
sector, such as improvements in transportation and communication (Abramovitz & David 
2001). Nevertheless, the growth of labour and total factor productivity in manufacturing in the 
period following 1870 was typical of the economic progress taking place. According to 
Kendrick’s calculations (Kendrick 1961, p464, table D1), manufacturing labour productivity 
grew by 1.6% per annum between 1869 and 1899, of which 1.3% per annum was due to an 
increase in total factor productivity.   
 
The Census Act of 1850 mandated a decennial Census of Manufactures, following two 
ad hoc manufacturing industry supplements to the population census in 1820 and 1840. From 
1850 until 1900 the Census of Manufactures was conducted under this mandate, in principle 
surveying all manufacturing establishments in the United States with a gross annual output 
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greater than $500. It recorded the number of workers employed and wages paid, the value of 
the capital stock accumulated, the annual value of raw materials used and the annual value of 
output produced. The results were aggregated at county, state and national levels and published 
in the official census reports, which can be found at the United States Census Bureau83. These 
aggregates have been electronically transcribed by the Minnesota Population Centre at the 
University of Minnesota, as part of the National Historic Geographic Information System 
(NHGIS) project, and are available at https://www.nhgis.org/ (NHGIS 2011).   
 
Using this data, I construct a county-decade panel dataset on the late nineteenth century 
US manufacturing sector to test the four implications of Allen’s hypothesis set out above. I 
focus on the period 1870 to 1900, which captures the early decades of rapid modern economic 
growth in the US while avoiding the period of disruption and apparent stagnation associated 
with the Civil War. The manufacturing censuses taken after 1900 lack sufficient continuity 
with respect to the pre-1900 censuses to be included in the panel, as important variables are 
discontinued. As such, I construct the panel based on the Censuses of Manufactures for the 
years 1870, 1880, 1890 and 1900. As explained below, testing some of the implications of 
Allen’s hypothesis in this setting requires the use of dynamic panel data models, which require 
the construction of instrumental variables based on lagged regressors to mitigate endogeneity 
problems. To accommodate this, I append to the panel observations for the 1840, 1850 and 
1860 manufacturing censuses with which to construct instruments for the post-1870 data. All 
manufacturing data is accessed from version 11 of the NHGIS database (NHGIS 2011). For 
each county and census year I construct variables representing manufacturing capital-labour 
ratios, manufacturing labour productivity levels (manufacturing value-added per worker, 
where value-added equals the value of output minus the value of raw materials) and 
manufacturing unit labour costs (average wage per worker divided by average value-added per 
worker).  
 
The censuses recorded current dollar values of manufacturing inputs and outputs. To 
focus on their real changes over time, I construct a set of deflators to convert all observations 
to constant 1900 dollar amounts. I deflate manufacturing output and wages by Robert 
Gallman’s goods deflator, published in Gallman (1966) and Rhode (2002) and raw materials 
by Warren and Pearson’s all commodities deflator, as published by the US Census Bureau (US 
                                                          
83 https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/overview/  
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Census Bureau 1975). I deflate the manufacturing capital stock by a weighted average of four 
deflators representing its four components. For machinery, I use Gallman’s producer durables 
deflator (Rhode 2002); for structures, an average of Warren and Pearson’s and Gallman’s 
construction deflators (Rhode 2002); for inventories, an average of Gallman’s total goods and 
Warren and Pearson’s all commodities deflators; and for land, county-specific deflators 
constructed from census data on the price of farmland per acre by county, accessed from 
version 11 of the NHGIS database (NHGIS 2011). The weights for the four components of the 
capital deflator are based on the average share of the four capital components in the overall 
capital stock as measured in the 1890 and 1900 censuses (discussed below). Where annual 
deflator series are available, I take a three-year average centred on the year of data collection 
for each census.84  
 
It is important to evaluate how appropriate the manufacturing capital stock recorded by 
the census is for testing Allen’s theory. Allen’s factor price-induced incentives to accumulate 
capital per worker in the manufacturing sector are envisaged to operate primarily on the 
machinery component of the manufacturing capital stock. Likewise, learning by doing is 
envisaged to take place when using machinery (Delong and Summers 1991)85. However, the 
US manufacturing capital stock is delineated into its four components of machinery, land, 
buildings and inventories only in the 1890 and 1900 censuses, previous censuses recording 
only the aggregate. Allen’s theory describes dynamic relationships between economic 
variables, such as the effect of unit labour costs in year t on the subsequent rate of growth of 
capital per worker. As such, if one wishes to represent the capital labour ratio by the machinery 
capital stock per worker, the availability of only two time-series observations of the machinery 
capital stock for each county (one for 1890 and one for 1900) allows only a cross sectional 
analysis of some of the implications of Allen’s theory. This is problematic because unobserved 
economic heterogeneity across counties is likely to confound estimation in the cross-section.  
 
Within-county estimation is a better approach than cross-sectional because it enables 
one to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across counties. As such, a key question is how 
closely related variation in manufacturing capital per worker is to variation in manufacturing 
                                                          
84 The manufacturing data were collected for each census in year t-1 for each census, i.e. 1870 census, data was 
collected in 1869.  
85 Indeed, Field (1985) has emphasised the importance of distinguishing between machinery and the capital 
stock more broadly when evaluating Habakkuk’s hypothesis by comparing nineteenth century capital-labour 
ratios in Britain and the US. 
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machinery per worker. In the 1890 and 1900 censuses the machinery component accounts for 
only 29% and 32% of the national manufacturing capital stock respectively, while land 
accounts for 14% and 15% respectively, buildings 16% and 21% and inventories 40% and 
32%. However, the correlation between logged machinery per worker and logged capital per 
worker across counties is high at 0.73 in 1890 and 0.76 in 1900. Moreover, the correlation in 
the change in log machinery per worker and log capital per worker between 1890 and 1900 
across counties is also high, at 0.79. These correlations seem high enough to justify the use of 
aggregate manufacturing capital per worker to represent Allen’s capital-labour ratio. Indeed, 
Allen uses aggregated capital stocks when illustrating his theory using national level data 
(Allen 2012).   
 
I also add to the panel county-level data on population, market access and 
manufacturing patent counts. The population variables are based on the census, taken from 
version 11 of the NHGIS database, and are added for all census years. County-level market 
access for 1870 and 1890 is calculated and kindly donated by Dave Donaldson and Richard 
Hornbeck (Donaldson & Hornbeck 2016). The manufacturing patent count by county is 
available for 1870 only and is based on the US patent spatial database constructed for this 
thesis, introduced in chapter 3. Descriptive statistics for all variables are displayed in table 6.1. 
 
The existence of an overall capital bias in technological change (Implication 1) is the 
only one of the four implications above that can be tested within-county using the machinery 
component of the capital stock. This is because the relationship in focus is between two static 
variables – the manufacturing capital-labour ratio at time t and the wage share of manufacturing 
value-added at time t – and so requires only two cross sections to obtain an average within-
county estimate. I estimate the within-county effect of the manufacturing machinery stock to 
worker ratio on the wage share of manufacturing value-added per worker between 1890 and 
1900. I also estimate the effect of the overall capital stock per worker, based on the full panel. 
I estimate the following two equations using OLS: 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnMACHINERY PER 
MANUFACTURING WORKERit  +  δj  + ɣt  + εit    
𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnCAPITAL PER 
MANUFACTURING WORKERit  +  δj  + ɣt  + εit      
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Table 6.1: Manufacturing in US counties, descriptive statistics 1840-1900 
  
 
1840 
 
1850 
 
1860 
 
1870 
 
1880 
 
1890 
 
1900 
 
Manu. Capital-Labour Ratio (1900$) Mean 295 408 678 484 810 1,032 1,931 
 S.D. 1,124 283 467 374 709 646 1,171 
         
Manu. Machinery-Labour Ratio (1900$)       360 653 
       239 477 
 
 
Manu. Labour Productivity (1900$) Mean 739 936 869 758 966 794 1,091 
 S.D. 4,912 668 574 425 571 443 557 
 
 
 
Manu. Wages (1900$) Mean   233 149 205 322 359 
 S.D.   88 93 99 126 128 
 
 
Manu. Unit Labour Costs Mean   0.31 0.21 0.23 0.43 0.36 
 S.D.   0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.12 
         
Manu. ULC/Capital Costs Mean   2.15 1.13 1.85 4.86  
 S.D.   0.77 0.55 0.74 1.19  
 
 
Population Mean 13,514 14,682 15,603 16,945 19,933 22,727 26,040 
 S.D. 17,858 23,574 29,663 35,139 42,528 55,211 72,311 
 
 
Share of Population in Cities  Mean 0.005  0.010 0.013 0.018 0.026 0.032 
 S.D. 0.065  0.085 0.093 0.110 0.132 0.146 
 
 
Manufacturing Workers Mean 629 603 634 905 1,048 1,707 1,816 
 S.D. 1,971 3,245 3,825 5,088 7,339 11,378 11,361 
         
No. of Counties Covered  1,045 1,304 1,639 2,040 2,093 2,491 2,723 
         
Raw Materials Deflator  202.0 158.1 179.1 283.0 179.1 126.8 100.0 
 
Output Deflator  114.0 115.2 123.7 157.7 117.8 105.3 100.0 
 
Capital Materials Deflator  184.3 167.4 156.9 197.3 149.2 117.3 100.0 
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where δj and ɣt are county and year fixed-effects respectively and where in the first regression 
t = 1890 and 1900 and in the second t = 1870, 1880, 1890 and 1900. I exclude counties for 
which the census surveyed the activity of fewer than 10 manufacturing workers in any of the 
years upon which estimation is based to reduce the impact of very small sample sizes by county. 
 
To estimate the effect of the cost of manufacturing labour relative to capital on the rate 
of accumulation of capital per manufacturing worker (Implication 2), I first calculate a measure 
of manufacturing unit labour costs by county-decade. This is total annual manufacturing wages 
in county i and year t divided by total manufacturing value-added in county i and year t. It is 
important to adjust wages for relative productivity levels in this way, since the appropriate 
measure of the cost of labour in Allen’s theory is the cost per unit of labour’s output as opposed 
to per unit of labour’s time.  
 
Next, I construct a measure of the cost of capital in county i year t, which follows an 
aggregate time series measure constructed by Allen (Allen 2014). This is the product of the 
capital deflator in county i year t, as discussed above, multiplied by a measure of the average 
annualised short-term interest rate in the region containing county i during year t to year t+9 
minus an assumed capital depreciation rate of 5%. Interest rates are taken from Lance Davis 
(1965), who calculated estimates of short-term interest rates on bank loans annually between 
1869 and 1914 for six regions covering the entire US86.  
 
Using these measures of manufacturing unit labour and capital costs, I construct a log 
ratio of the cost of manufacturing labour to capital for each county i, year t. I estimate the effect 
of this log ratio in year t on the subsequent 10-year change in the log manufacturing capital-
labour ratio by regressing the log manufacturing capital-labour ratio on its own 10-year lag and 
a 10-year lag of the log ratio of the cost of manufacturing labour to capital. The standard within 
estimator of this relationship is subject to the ‘Nickell bias’ (Nickell 1981) due to the 
endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. As such, although I implement and report the 
within estimator, I also implement and report the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano Bond 
1991), which is widely used to circumvent the above endogeneity problem by estimating the 
effect in first difference terms as opposed to de-meaned terms (as in the within estimator) and 
                                                          
86 For year t for each region, I take a simple of average of Davis’ reserve city and non-reserve city interest rates 
for years t through t+9 (Davis 1965, tables 4 and 5). 
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instrumenting the lagged difference of the dependent variable and any other endogenous 
variables by further lags of their levels87. As such I estimate the following two equations: 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡
 = α + β1LnMANU. UNIT LABOUR/CAPITAL COSTit-10 + 
β2 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅
 it-10 + β3LnPOPULATIONit-10 + δi  + ɣt  + εit                                              
 
 
where the time signature t-10 represents a one census/10-year lag and δi and ɣt represent county 
and census year fixed-effects. And:  
 
∆𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡
 = α + β1∆LnMANU. UNIT LABOUR/CAPITAL COSTit-10 
+ β2 ∆𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅
 it-10 + β3∆LnPOPULATIONit-10 + ɣt  + ∆εit                                              
 
 
where the lagged dependent variable – the 10-year lag of the first difference of the log 
manufacturing capital-labour ratio – is instrumented by all available lags t-s of the level of the 
log manufacturing capital-labour ratio, where s ≥ 30. For example, for t =1880, the change in 
the log manufacturing capital-labour ratio between 1870 and 1880 is the dependent variable. 
The change in the log manufacturing capital-labour ratio between 1860 and 1870 appears on 
the right-hand side of the model to capture the ‘trend’ behaviour of the dependent variable and 
is instrumented in a first stage regression by the log level of the manufacturing capital-labour 
ratio for years 1840 and 1850 to avoid endogeneity.   
 
To test the effect of the capital-labour ratio on the subsequent rate of labour productivity 
growth (Implication 3), I estimate the following two equations. First, within-county, using 
OLS: 
 
                                                          
87 See Cameron and Trivedi (2009) for a textbook discussion of the Nickell bias in dynamic panel estimation 
and the Arellano-Bond estimator. 
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𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷.𝑖𝑡  = α + β1LnMANUFACTURING 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅
 it + 
β2LnMANUFACTURING 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅
 it-10 +β3𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷.it-10  + 
β4LnPOPULATIONit-10 + δi  + ɣt  + εit                                    
 
where the time signature t-10 represents a one census/ten year lag and δi and ɣt represent county 
and census year fixed-effects. To correct for the Nickell bias I also estimate the following 
model using the Arellano-Bond estimator: 
∆𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷.𝑖𝑡  = α + β1∆LnMANUFACTURING 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅
 it + 
β2∆LnMANUFACTURING 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅
 it-10 +β3∆𝐿𝑛𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷.it-10  + 
β4∆LnPOPULATIONit-10 + ɣt  + ∆εit                                    
 
where, once again, the lagged dependent variable – the 10-year lag of the first difference of log 
manufacturing labour productivity – is instrumented by all available lags t-s of the level of log 
manufacturing labour productivity, where s ≥ 30.  
 
Finally, to test whether innovative effort was greater where potential returns were 
higher (Implication 4), I estimate the effect on a county-level count of manufacturing patents 
of a county-level measure of market access and the county-level manufacturing wage 
(controlling for manufacturing labour productivity88). I control for general supply capabilities 
in the form of manufacturing labour productivity, the size of the manufacturing labour force, 
population and the manufacturing capital labour ratio. Finally, I include state dummies so that 
estimation is based on the within-state effect, which reduces omitted variable bias due to state-
level heterogeneity. First, I implement estimation using OLS on logged variables: 
 
 
𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 + 1)𝑖  = α + β1LnMARKET ACCESS i + 
β2LnMANUFACTURING WAGEi + β3LnMANUFACTURING 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 i + 
β4LnANUFACTURING 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅
 i +β5𝐿𝑛𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅i + β6LnPOPULATIONit-10 + δj + εi                                             
 
                                                          
88 I use wages and control for labour productivity separately rather than using unit labour costs because labour 
productivity acts as a supply-side control for the patenting rate in its own right. The results are robust to using 
unit labour costs instead. 
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where δj represents state fixed-effects. And second, using a count data approach in the form of 
the negative binomial model (as used in chapter 3):   
𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖  = exp(α + β1MARKET ACCESS i + β2MANUFACTURING 
WAGEi + β3MANUFACTURING 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 i + β4MANUFACTURING 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅
 i 
+β5𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅i + β6POPULATIONi )+ δj + εi                                             
 
 
Results and Interpretation 
 
Implication 1 
 
Table 6.2 presents evidence of a labour-saving bias to late nineteenth century US technological 
change in the manufacturing sector. Within-county, between 1890 and 1900, a 1% positive 
change in the manufacturing machinery to labour ratio was associated with a -0.2% change 
(standard error of 0.02%) in labour’s income share of manufacturing valued-added. Estimating 
the effect over the period 1870 to 1900 using the aggregate manufacturing capital to labour 
ratio as opposed to machinery capital, within-county, a 1% positive change in the ratio of 
aggregate manufacturing capital to labour was associated with a -0.18% change (standard error 
of 0.01%) in labour’s income share of manufacturing valued-added. These two results present 
a consistent picture of an overall labour saving bias to technological change in the late 
nineteenth century US manufacturing sector. Compared to an investigation using aggregate 
time series, the use of spatially disaggregated estimation and the within-county estimator 
reduces the likelihood that this result is due to an evolution in the relative bargaining power of 
capital and labour during the nineteenth century.  
 
Implication 2 
 
Table 6.3 presents evidence of a positive material effect of the ratio of manufacturing labour 
costs to capital costs on manufacturing capital deepening, which, combined with the findings 
in table 6.2, is consistent with the Habakkuk-Allen hypothesis that high wages relative to 
capital costs induced labour saving technological change in the late nineteenth century US 
manufacturing sector. Based on the within-county estimator, a 1% rise in manufacturing unit 
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labour to capital cost ratio between 1870 and 1900 relative to the national trend was associated 
with a 0.05% short-run rise in the subsequent 10-year rate of capital deepening (with a standard 
error of 0.02%). When we correct this estimate of the short-run elasticity for endogeneity bias 
by using the Arellano Bond instrumental variable estimator, it rises to 0.6 (with a standard error 
of 0.06). Although both estimates are positive and statistically significant, they are quite far 
apart. Given potential endogeneity problems associated with the first and standard potential 
weak instrument problems associated with the second, it seems reasonable to take an average 
of the two, equal to 0.33.  
The long-run elasticity is calculated by summing to infinity the geometric progression 
of the product of the short-run elasticity and the rate of convergence of the manufacturing 
capital-labour ratio raised to the power n, where n is the number of periods since the first 
impact. Based on the standard formula for the infinite sum of a geometric progression, this is 
equal to the short run elasticity divided by one minus the rate of convergence of the 
manufacturing capital-labour ratio of -0.2 using the within-county estimator and 0.68 using the 
IV estimator (as in table 6.3). This gives a long run elasticity of the manufacturing capital 
labour ratio to the manufacturing unit labour to capital cost ratio of 0.04 based on within 
estimation, 1.9 based on IV estimation, and an average across the two of around one.  
 
Given these long-run elasticity estimates, roughly how much of the difference in 
manufacturing capital-labour ratios across counties by 1900 can variation in manufacturing 
unit labour costs relative to capital costs explain? In 1900, the 75th percentile of the 
manufacturing capital-labour ratio by county was $2,316 compared to the 25th percentile of 
$1,200, a difference of 93%. In 1870, the 75th percentile of manufacturing unit labour to capital 
cost ratio was 1.44 compared to the 25th percentile of 0.73, a difference of 97%. The thirty-year 
elasticity of the capital-labour ratio to the labour/capital cost ratio between 1870 and 1900 is 
calculated by summing the geometric series described above for n=3, which equals 0.04 based 
on within estimation and 1.29 based on IV estimation, giving an average of 0.66. Thus, initial 
differences across counties in manufacturing unit labour costs relative to the cost of capital in 
1870 can explain about 64 percentage points (0.66x82%), or 69% of the 93% difference in the 
manufacturing capital-labour ratio between the 75th and 25th percentile counties in 1900.  
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Implication 3 
 
Table 6.4 presents evidence of a significant effect of capital deepening on subsequent rates of 
total factor productivity growth in the US manufacturing sector between 1870 and 1900. The 
elasticity of 10-year manufacturing total factor productivity growth to the initial manufacturing 
capital-labour ratio is 0.10 (standard error = 0.02) based on the within county estimator and 
0.50 (standard error 0.1) based on the Arellano Bond IV estimator, with an average of 0.30. 
The long-run elasticity of manufacturing total factor productivity to the manufacturing capital-
labour ratio, calculated similarly to the method described above for implication 2, is 0.08 
(0.10/1.27) based on within-estimation and 0.40 (0.50/1.25) based on IV estimation, with an 
average of 0.24. 
 
How much of the cross-county variation in total factor productivity in 1900 can be 
attributed to variation in past capital-labour ratios from 1870 onwards? To produce an estimate 
of the spread of total factor productivity across counties in 1900, I take the residuals of a 
regression of log manufacturing labour productivity on log manufacturing capital per worker 
across counties in 1900. The manufacturing total factor productivity of the 75th percentile 
county based on this measure is 44% higher than that of the 25th percentile county. In 1870, the 
75th percentile manufacturing capital-labour ratio by county was $571 compared with $287 for 
the 25th percentile county, or about double, based on 1900 dollars. The average thirty-year 
elasticity of manufacturing total factor productivity to the manufacturing capital labour ratio, 
calculated analogously to the thirty-year elasticity in implication 2 above, is 0.08 based on the 
within estimator and 0.4 based on the IV estimator, or 0.24 on average. As such, cross-county 
differences in manufacturing capital-labour ratios from 1870 up until 1890 can explain 24 
percentage points (0.24*1), or just over half (55%) of the 44% spread in manufacturing total 
factor productivity between the 75th and 25th percentile counties in 1900.   
 
Implication 4 
 
Table 6.5 suggests that innovative effort in US manufacturing in 1870 was sensitive to 
profitability. Based on the OLS estimate, the elasticity of manufacturing patenting to market 
access across county (but within state) is 0.09 with a standard error of 0.04, controlling for the 
size of the manufacturing sector, manufacturing labour productivity and other factors. The 
results of the negative binomial model are expressed as semi-elasticities. They imply that a 
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$1,000,000 increase in market access across counties within states was associated with a 27% 
increase in patenting (standard error = 2.2%). A one standard deviation increase in market 
access across counties within states, equal to about $3,000,000, was therefore associated with 
an 81% increase in manufacturing patenting. The elasticity of manufacturing patenting to the 
average manufacturing wage across-counties, within-states in 1870 was 0.15 (standard error = 
0.05) based on OLS estimation. Based on the negative binomial model, a $100 increase in the 
manufacturing wage across counties within state was associated with a 50% increase in 
manufacturing patenting (standard error = 6.5%) and a one standard deviation increase in 
manufacturing wages across counties within state, equal to $146, was associated with a 73% 
increase in manufacturing patenting. Manufacturing patenting rates were highly non-linear 
across counties. The mean was 19 and the standard deviation was 115, while the 25th percentile 
was 0, median 2, 75th percentile 9, 90th percentile 31 and 99th percentile 305. As such, although 
the incentives to innovative determined by market access and manufacturing wages had an 
economically meaningful effect on manufacturing patenting they explain quite a small fraction 
of the cross-county variation within state.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The results above provide considerable support for Allen’s incentives as determinants of the 
emergence of modern economic growth in late nineteenth century US manufacturing. 
Technological innovation was labour saving and sensitive to unit labour costs relative to capital 
costs. Capital deepening led to higher subsequent gains in total factor productivity. Innovative 
effort was sensitive to profitability. As these results are based on county-level variation within 
the US, as opposed to national level variation, it is unlikely that they can be explained by 
institutional variation.  
 
Nevertheless, there remains much unexplained heterogeneity in the rates of modern 
economic growth in manufacturing across the US in the late nineteenth century, which may 
have been due to variation in capabilities. Learning-by-doing can plausibly account for just 
over half of TFP variation across counties. The other half or so may have been due to variation 
in the capabilities of producers to master and improve new technology and the associated 
processes of production. Moreover, the proximate effect of learning-by-doing is contingent 
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upon the prior innovative effort and accumulation of capital required to create the opportunity 
for learning. In turn, this can only be partially explained (around two-thirds) by factor price 
incentives. The other third may be due to local capabilities to do R&D and adopt new 
technology. Alongside the results in the previous chapters of this thesis, these results suggest 
that Crafts’ (2011) view of a balance between Allen’s incentives for modern economic growth 
and the capabilities to respond, in which both played a necessary role, is correct.     
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Effect of Capital-Labour Ratio on Wage Share of Value Add in 
Manufacturing, US counties 1870-1900 
 (1) (2) 
Data 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
County-Decade FE 
1870-1900 
OLS 
Ln Wage Share of V.A. it 
County-Decade FE 
1890-1900 
OLS 
Ln Wage Share of V.A. it 
 
Ln Manufacturing Capital/Labour it 
 
-0.176*** 
 
 (0.0117)  
   
 
Ln Manufacturing Machinery/Labour it 
  
-0.214*** 
 
 
 
County FE 
 
 
Year FE 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
(0.0152) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Observations 
Years 
10,257 
4 
4,966 
2 
R2 (within) 0.549 0.2955 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6.3: Effect of Unit Labour Costs on Subsequent Capital Deepening in 
Manufacturing, US counties 1870-1900 
 (1) (2) 
Data: 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
County-Decade FE 
1880-1900 
OLS 
 
Ln Capital/Labour it 
County Decade IV 
1880-1900 
Arellano-Bond 
 
Ln Capital/Labour it 
 
Ln Manu. Labour/Capital Cost Ratio it-10 
 
0.0472** 
 
0.607*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0243) 
   
Ln Manu. Capital-Labour Ratio it-10 -0.191
*** 0.471*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0309) 
   
Ln Population it-10 0.0494
** 0.379*** 
 
 
 
County FE 
 
 
Time FE 
(0.0250) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes  
(0.0326) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes  
 
Observations 
Years 
5,998 
3 
4,985 
3 
R2 0.590 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6.4: Effect of Capital-Labour Ratio on Subsequent Productivity Growth in 
Manufacturing, US counties 1870-1900 
 (1) (2) 
Data: 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
County-Decade FE 
1880-1900 
OLS 
 
Ln Labour Productivity it 
County Decade IV 
1880-1900 
Arellano-Bond 
 
Ln Labour Productivity it 
 
Ln Manu. Capital-Labour Ratio it 
 
0.467*** 
 
0.708*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0670) 
   
 
 
Ln Manu. Capital-Labour Ratio it-10 
 
 
0.104*** 
 
 
0.496*** 
 (0.0189) (0.112) 
   
 
 
Ln Manu. Labour Productivity it-10 
 
 
-0.269*** 
 
 
-0.250*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0637) 
   
 
 
Ln Population it-10 
 
 
0.0240 
 
 
0.0298 
 
 
 
County FE 
 
 
Time FE 
 
(0.0220) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
(0.0230) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 4,227 3,548 
Years 
R2 
3 
0.511 
3 
- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6.5: Determinants of Manufacturing Patenting in US counties in 1870 
 (1) (2) 
Data: 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
County Cross-Section 1870 
OLS 
Within-States 
 
Ln Manufacturing Patents i 
County Cross-Section 1870 
Negative Binomial 
Within-States 
 
Manufacturing Patents i 
   
(Ln) Market Access i 0.0853
** 0.000278*** 
 (0.0412) (0.0000227) 
   
 
(Ln) Manu. Wage i 
 
0.148*** 
 
0.00508*** 
 (0.0414) (0.000655) 
   
 
(Ln) Manu. Labour Productivity i 
 
0.0697 
 
-0.000251* 
 (0.0719) (0.000128) 
   
 
(Ln) Manu. Capital-Labour Ratio i 
 
0.0549 
 
0.00000749 
 (0.0470) (0.000143) 
   
 
(Ln) Manu. Labour i 
 
0.279*** 
 
-0.000126*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0000431) 
   
 
(Ln) Population i 
 
0.651*** 
 
0.0000379*** 
 
 
 
State FE 
(0.0551) 
 
 
Yes 
(0.00000932) 
 
 
Yes 
   
Observations 1,795 1,895 
R2 0.811  
All regressors log-transformed in equation 1, un-transformed in equation 2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by states, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Access to Knowledge in the Twenty-First Century 
 
 
During the past two centuries, modern economic growth – characterized by rapid and sustained 
technological innovation – has delivered a far greater rate of increase in living standards than 
any prior growth regime. This thesis argues that this era of improvement was ushered in by the 
blossoming of Britain’s infrastructure of Knowledge Access Institutions (KAIs) during the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which raised the productivity of R&D and drew an 
unprecedented proportion of Britain’s economic resources into innovative activities. In doing 
so, Britain’s KAIs provided the impetus for the innovation institutions created during the 
twentieth century, which raised the productivity and supply of innovative effort further still 
and helped to sustain rapid innovation up until the present day. 
 
However, the prospects for innovation and further improvements in living standards 
henceforth are contentious. Robert Gordon argues that in the coming decades innovation faces 
‘headwinds’ that may slow it down to its pre-Industrial Revolution rate of advance (Gordon 
2016). Gordon points to a deceleration of trend productivity growth in the US in recent decades 
(Fernald 2014), suggesting that the tide may have already turned.89 
 
The innovation infrastructure is far from the only factor that bears on the rate of long 
run economic growth. Nevertheless, it may contribute to a slowdown if it becomes less 
effective as the economy moves from one technological era to the next. Productivity growth 
slowed markedly in Britain in the decades following the British Industrial Revolution, even as 
it accelerated in the United States, Germany and elsewhere. The Second Industrial Revolution 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was associated with the dawn of the age of 
sophisticated science and large-scale manufacturing. Perhaps Britain’s KAIs were ill-equipped 
to facilitate R&D in this environment given their relatively low levels of funding and generalist 
focus, in contrast to the better financed and specialized research departments that were 
                                                          
89 However, the measurement of productivity growth may have become less accurate in recent years. 
Furthermore, the relationship between productivity growth and consumer surplus may have become less stable, 
reducing the usefulness of productivity as a proxy for living standards (Bean 2016).  
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emerging in universities, large firms and government (Mowery 1990). Furthermore, the 
productivity of any innovation infrastructure is dependent upon the human capital of those who 
use it. Perhaps Britain’s delay during the nineteenth century compared to the United States and 
Germany in building an educational system befitting the era of modern science hindered British 
growth during the Second Industrial Revolution (Lindert 2004, Hanushek and Woesmann 
2015).90 Likewise, we should not take it for granted that the institutions for innovation and 
education forged in the twentieth century will prove adequate to enable us to achieve our 
economic potential in the twenty-first century. Nor, as was stressed in chapter four, should we 
assume that market incentives alone will induce the invention and adoption of the most socially 
beneficial technologies.  
 
Even so, the findings in this thesis suggest that Gordon may be too pessimistic. Britain’s 
KAIs influenced innovation during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by lowering the 
cost of access to knowledge and promoting the scientific method within the R&D process. 
Today, the rapidly falling costs of collecting and using data amount to a significant tailwind at 
our backs. The increasing application of data to R&D, learning-by-doing and the potential for 
automating processes in sectors such as health care, manufacturing and transportation presents 
the prospect of major improvements in productivity and living standards in the coming decades 
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014). Furthermore, it is the world’s rate of R&D that matters, not 
that of any one country, not even the technological leader. The marginal impact of twenty-first 
century computing and communication devices on knowledge access costs in the developing 
world is likely to be very large, raising the productivity of innovative effort there and 
potentially drawing many more people into the collective innovative process. 
 
As such, the main policy prescription arising from this thesis is that rather than focus 
our concern too narrowly on Gordon’s prediction of stagnation we must also dedicate our 
efforts to guarding against a competing dystopia. This is the risk that technological change in 
the twenty-first century will occur so rapidly that we will find it quite painful to adapt to it. We 
must be alert to the possibility that technological change may eradicate jobs at too fast a rate 
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2011) and produce intolerable levels of economic inequality (Piketty 
2013). We must also try to understand the potentially harmful psychological and societal 
                                                          
90 Whether Britain’s innovation and educational institutions failed during the Second Industrial Revolution, 
contributing to Britain’s relative economic decline from the late nineteenth century onwards, is a question that 
requires further study.  
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effects of the use of new technologies (Bauman & Rivers 2015). Moreover, we must guard 
against the increasing capabilities of technology to produce mass suffering and destruction 
(Bostrom 2014). These may prove to be the biggest challenges of the twenty-first century. 
 
Yet the spirit of the European Enlightenment, which was present in the lecture rooms 
and on the bookshelves of Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century Knowledge Access 
Institutions, was optimistic regarding the possibilities for the improvement in the quality of 
life: an historic example of the principle of ‘mind over matter’. Over time, this optimism proved 
to be justified and, to a degree, it was self-fulfilling. Such an outlook during the twenty-first 
century would help us make our own luck.   
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